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{{Short description|Description of the concept of shared intentionality}}
'''Shared intentionality''' is a concept in psychology that describes the human capacity to engage with the [[Philosophy:Mental state|psychological states]] of others. According to conventional wisdom in [[Cognitive science|cognitive science]]s, shared intentionality supports the development of everything from [[Biology:Cooperation|cooperative interactions]] and knowledge assimilation to [[Philosophy:Moral identity|moral identity]] and cultural evolution that provides building societies, being a pre-requisite of [[Philosophy:Social reality|social reality]] formation.<ref name="Rumelhart Prize 2022">{{cite web |title=David E. Rumelhart Prize |at="2022 Recipient – Michael Tomasello" section |date=2022 |work=CognitiveScienceSociety.org |publisher=[[Organization:Cognitive Science Society|Cognitive Science Society]] |url= https://cognitivesciencesociety.org/rumelhart-prize/ |access-date=10 November 2023}}</ref>

Knowledge about shared intentionality has been developing since the last century's end. This psychological construct was introduced in the 1980s with a straightforward definition of sharing psychological states among participants without attributing to age when it begins.<ref>Gilbert, M. ''On Social Facts.'' London: Routledge; 1989</ref><ref>Searle, J. R. ''The Rediscovery of the Mind''. London: MIT Press; 1992.</ref><ref>Tuomela, Raimo. ''The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions''. Stanford University Press; 1995.</ref> The development of knowledge on mother-child interactions has made additional attributes about appearing shared intentionality; it enables one-year-olds to cultural learning.<ref>Tomasello, M.; Rakoczy, H. "What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality". ''Mind & Language'', 2003; 18: 121–147.</ref> Later, Tomasello et al. specified that, even at birth, infants grasp shared intentionality with caregivers – this ability to share psychological states with others emerges immediately after birth.<ref>Tomasello, M.; Carpenter, M.; Call, J.; Behne, T.; Moll, H. "Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition". ''Behavioral and Brain Sciences''. 2005; 28: 675–691.</ref> Tomasello hypothesized gradually increasing social bonds between children and caregivers through the essential motive force of shared intentionality beginning from emotion sharing from birth.<ref>Tomasello, M. ''Becoming Human: A Theory of Ontogeny''. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; 2019.</ref>

In 2022, [[Biography:Michael Tomasello|Michael Tomasello]] received the David Rumelhart Prize 2022 in the Cognitive Science Society as an award for his insights into cognition evolution and, specifically, the knowledge development about a contribution of shared intentionality to cognition and social reality formation.<ref name="Rumelhart Prize 2022" />

The concept is slightly close to [[Social:Collective intentionality|collective intentionality]]. The philosophical notion of collective intentionality defines the capability of collectives to form co-intentions when individuals become jointly directed at objects, matters of fact, states of affairs, goals, or values. This co-intention occurs when two or more individuals undertake an aware task together. The attribute of the collective intentionality is defined in the object's awareness of a common intention, in the conscious power of minds to be jointly directed at a goal. It is thought that collective intentionality only implies aware intentions–the causal antecedents of action. Therefore, only three or four years old, after years of continuous interaction with other persons, children can develop an ability for collective intentionality, which acts as the comprehension of cultural institutions based on collective beliefs and practices.<ref>Tomasello, M.; Rakoczy, H. "What Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality". ''Mind & Language'', Vol. 18, No. 2, April 2003, pp. 121–147.</ref> In contrast, the psychological construct of shared intentionality describes unaware processes during social learning at the onset of life, when organisms in the simple reflexes substage of the sensorimotor stage of cognitive development do not possess abstract thinking.<ref>Tomasello, M. ''The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition''. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1999.</ref> This difference between the two concepts implies the possibility of two different neurophysiological processes underlying their appearance.

In recent years, the psychological construct of shared intentionality is being explored from different perspectives by studying: e.g., the cognitive processes involved in creating and sustaining cooperative group activity,<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Skau |first=Simon |date=2022 |title=Analysis of the cognitive processes involved in creating and sustaining cooperative group activity |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |volume=13 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1038309 |issn=1664-1078 |pmc=9768542 |pmid=36571038 |doi-access=free }}</ref> collaborative neuronal activity in inter-brain neuroscience studies,<ref>Fishburn, F. A.; Murty, V. P.; Hlutkowsky, C. O.; MacGillivray, C. E.; Bemis, L. M.; Murphy, M. E.; Huppert, T. J.; Perlman, S. B. "Putting our heads together: Interpersonal neural synchronization as a biological mechanism for shared intentionality". ''Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience''. 2018 Aug; 13(8):841-9.</ref><ref>Astolfi; L.; et al.: "Neuroelectrical hyperscanning measures simultaneous brain activity in humans". Brain Topography, 2010; 23:243–256.</ref><ref>Szymanski, C.; et al. "Teams on the same wavelength perform better: Inter-brain phase synchronization constitutes a neural substrate for social facilitation". ''Neuroimage'', 2017; 15:425–436.</ref><ref>Hu, Y.; et al. "Inter-brain synchrony and cooperation context in interactive decision making". ''Biological Psychology'', 2018; 133: 54–62, 2018.</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Painter |first1=David R. |last2=Kim |first2=Jeffrey J. |last3=Renton |first3=Angela I. |last4=Mattingley |first4=Jason B. |date=2021-06-29 |title=Joint control of visually guided actions involves concordant increases in behavioural and neural coupling |journal=Communications Biology |language=en |volume=4 |issue=1 |page=816 |doi=10.1038/s42003-021-02319-3 |issn=2399-3642 |pmc=8242020 |pmid=34188170}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Liu |first1=Jieqiong |last2=Zhang |first2=Ruqian |last3=Xie |first3=Enhui |last4=Lin |first4=Yixuan |last5=Chen |first5=Danni |last6=Liu |first6=Yang |last7=Li |first7=Keshuang |last8=Chen |first8=Mei |last9=Li |first9=Yangzhuo |last10=Wang |first10=Guanghai |last11=Li |first11=Xianchun |date=2023-08-10 |title=Shared intentionality modulates interpersonal neural synchronization at the establishment of communication system |journal=Communications Biology |language=en |volume=6 |issue=1 |page=832 |doi=10.1038/s42003-023-05197-z |issn=2399-3642 |pmc=10415255 |pmid=37563301}}</ref> and group performance in psychophysiological studies.<ref>Atmaca, S.; Sebanz, N.; Prinz, W.; Knoblich, G. "Action co-representation: The joint SNARC effect". ''Social Neuroscience'' 2008; 3:3–4, 410–420.</ref><ref>Shteynberg, G.; Galinsky, A. D. "Implicit coordination: Sharing goals with similar others intensifies goal pursuit". ''Journal of Experimental Social Psychology'', 2011; 47: 1291–1294, ISSN 0022-1031.</ref><ref>McClung, J. S.; Placì, S.; Bangerter, A.; Clément, F.; Bshary, R. "The language of cooperation: Shared intentionality drives variation in helping as a function of group membership". ''Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences''; 2017; 284:20171682. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.1682.</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Val Danilov |first1=I. |last2=Mihailova |first2=S. |last3=Perepjolkina |first3=V. |title=Unconscious Social Interaction Coherent Intelligence in Learning |date=2019 |url=https://library.iated.org/view/DANILOV2019UNC |journal=ICERI2019 Proceedings |volume=1 |language=en |pages=2217–2222 |doi=10.21125/iceri.2019.0606 |isbn=978-84-09-14755-7 |s2cid=214449703 |issn=2340-1095}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Tang |first1=Ning |last2=Gong |first2=Siyi |last3=Zhao |first3=Minglu |last4=Gu |first4=Chenya |last5=Zhou |first5=Jifan |last6=Shen |first6=Mowei |last7=Gao |first7=Tao |date=2022 |title=Exploring an Imagined "We" in Human Collective Hunting: Joint Commitment within Shared Intentionality |url=https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3wj722pb |journal=Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society |language=en |volume=44 |issue=44}}</ref> However, the nature of the interaction in shared intentionality is unclear, since it occurs even in infants, organisms at the simple reflexes stage of development.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Val Danilov |first1=Igor |last2=Mihailova |first2=Sandra |date= 2022|title=A New Perspective on Assessing Cognition in Children through Estimating Shared Intentionality |journal=Journal of Intelligence |language=en |volume=10 |issue=2 |pages=21 |doi=10.3390/jintelligence10020021 |issn=2079-3200 |pmc=9036231 |pmid=35466234 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

== Definitions ==
In classical thought, a [[Philosophy:Definition|definition]] is a statement of a thing's essence. Shared intentionality is a [[Social:Latent variable|latent variable]] that can only be inferred indirectly. The definition of this psychological construct should be carefully considered because the translational impact of research relies on how we define this implicit phenomenon. The definition of shared intentionality should constitute further research directions, e.g., for understanding the neurophysiological processes underlying cooperative targeting in individuals. The study on shared intentionality began by understanding the phenomenon as the ability to enable coordinated, collaborative interactions made possible by a motivation to share mental states. However, because this mutual comprehension of a target succeeds in even newborns, the essence of the phenomenon is unclear. The definition should explain meanings of such a fundamental for this construct constituent as the mode of how this sharing of mental states may occur, considering the age of the organism exhibiting this ability. The initial definition left unclear how infants are able to perceive shared intentionality while they cannot provide communication through sensory cues at the beginning of social learning. Even the essence of a mental state at this developmental stage needs clarification.

Based on recent insights in neuroscience research, a hypothesis of neurophysiological grounds of shared intentionality specified that this collaborative interaction emerges in the mother-child pairs at birth for sharing the essential sensory stimulus of the actual cognitive problem.<ref>Val Danilov, I; Mihailova S. "Neuronal coherence agent for shared intentionality: A hypothesis of neurobiological processes occurring during social interaction". ''OBM Neurobiology'' 2021; 5(4): 26; DOI: 10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2104113</ref><ref>{{cite journal |title=Theoretical Grounds of Shared Intentionality for Neuroscience in Developing Bioengineering Systems |first=Igor |last=Val Danilov |journal=OBM Neurobiology |url= https://www.lidsen.com/journals/neurobiology/neurobiology-07-01-156 |date=2023-02-17 |volume=7 |issue=1 |page=156 |doi=10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2301156|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Val Danilov |first=Igor |title=Intelligent Communication Technologies and Virtual Mobile Networks |chapter=Advances in Computer-Aided Diagnosis of Developmental Delay in Children Using Bioengineering Systems: A New Math Model and Algorithm |date=2023 |editor-last=Rajakumar |editor-first=G. |editor2-last=Du |editor2-first=Ke-Lin |editor3-last=Rocha |editor3-first=Álvaro |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-99-1767-9_33 |series=Lecture Notes on Data Engineering and Communications Technologies |volume=171 |language=en |location=Singapore |publisher=Springer Nature |pages=443–458 |doi=10.1007/978-981-99-1767-9_33 |isbn=978-981-99-1767-9}}</ref> This social bond enables ecological training of immature organisms, starting at the simple reflexes substage of the sensorimotor stage of cognitive development.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Val Danilov |first=Igor |title=A Bioengineering System for Assessing Children's Cognitive Development by Computerized Evaluation of Shared Intentionality {{!}} IEEE Conference Publication {{!}} IEEE Xplore |url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10216436?fbclid=IwAR22GYUVlz-Ym4_oFbAVuhqi5Erf28JUR3abSitMv4cVNYIuBqfo3MSHa7c |access-date=2023-11-16 |website=ieeexplore.ieee.org}}</ref>

== Contributions == 
Shared intentionality is a driver of environmental learning of organisms at the onset of cognition. The significance of this notion is that it defines pre-perceptual communication, which contributes to the assimilation of initial environmental knowledge in the period when organisms cannot communicate through sensory cues. In this stage, organisms are not even able to target; they can show goal-directed behavior in primitive reflexes only. Even a perception of objects cannot appear on its own independently in this developmental stage. The organisms should gain a holistic representation of the environment before beginning perception for then successfully processing the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory information.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Val Danilov |first=Igor |date=2021-06-14 |title=Imitation or Early Imitation: Towards the Problem of Primary Data Entry |url=https://articlegateway.com/index.php/JHETP/article/view/4222 |journal=Journal of Higher Education Theory and Practice |language=en |volume=21 |issue=4 |doi=10.33423/jhetp.v21i4.4222 |issn=2158-3595|doi-access=free }}</ref> This explanation of shared intentionality significance also yields an analytical reasoning of why it is defined as an unaware interaction in which the immature recipient organism experiences the ability to select the only stimulus that the mature contributor organism is targeting.<ref>Val Danilov, I. "Smartphone in Detecting Developmental Disability in Infancy: A Theoretical Approach to Shared Intentionality for Assessment Tool of Cognitive Decline and e-Learning." K. Arai (Ed.): ''Proceedings of the SAI 2022,'' LNNS 508, pp. 1–11, 2022. Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10467-1_19 .
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-10467-1_19</ref>

An explanation of neurophysiological processes during this initial interaction is intriguing as much as essential since it reveals perspectives for understanding perception and consciousness and even promotes advances in many fields of knowledge, from biomedicine to artificial intelligence. In medicine, evaluation of shared intentionality magnitude in mother-child dyad can contribute to assessing children's cognitive development.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Val Danilov |first1=Igor |last2=Mihailova |first2=Sandra |last3=Svajyan |first3=Araksia |date= 2022|title=Computerized Assessment of Cognitive Development in Neurotypical and Neurodivergent Children |url=https://www.lidsen.com/journals/neurobiology/neurobiology-06-03-137 |journal=OBM Neurobiology |language=en |volume=6 |issue=3 |pages=1–8 |doi=10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2203137|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Val Danilov |first1=Igor |last2=Svajyan |first2=Araksia |last3=Mihailova |first3=Sandra |date= 2023|title=A New Computer-Aided Method for Assessing Children's Cognition in Bioengineering Systems for Diagnosing Developmental Delay |url=https://www.lidsen.com/journals/neurobiology/neurobiology-07-04-189 |journal=OBM Neurobiology |language=en |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=1–15 |doi=10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2304189|doi-access=free }}</ref> Progress in knowledge of underlying processes of shared intentionality can provide management of artificial neural networks of intelligent prosthetic limbs via a bond with the human sensorimotor network.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Val Danilov |first=Igor |title=Proceedings of the Future Technologies Conference (FTC) 2021, Volume 3 |chapter=Contactless Human-Computer Systems via Shared Intentionality: A Concept Design for the Next Generation of Smart Prosthetic Limbs |date=2022 |editor-last=Arai |editor-first=Kohei |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-89912-7_59 |series=Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems |volume=360 |language=en |location=Cham |publisher=Springer International Publishing |pages=776–791 |doi=10.1007/978-3-030-89912-7_59 |isbn=978-3-030-89912-7|s2cid=239822573 }}</ref> The feasibility of integrating the human brain with a computer shows the way to a new stage in artificial intelligence design.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Val Danilov |first=Igor |title=Advances in Information and Communication |chapter=Advanced Artificial Intelligence in Contactless Human-Computer Systems Through Shared Intentionality |date=2022 |editor-last=Arai |editor-first=Kohei |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-98012-2_54 |series=Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems |volume=438 |language=en |location=Cham |publisher=Springer International Publishing |pages=773–782 |doi=10.1007/978-3-030-98012-2_54 |isbn=978-3-030-98012-2}}</ref>

== Neurophysiological hypothesis ==
Nowadays, only one hypothesis tends to explain neurophysiological processes during shared intentionality in integrative complexity from cellular to interpersonal dynamics levels. According to Val Danilov,<ref name="Val Danilov Bioengineering Systems">{{Cite journal |last=Val Danilov |first=Igor |date= 2023|title=Shared Intentionality Modulation at the Cell Level: Low-Frequency Oscillations for Temporal Coordination in Bioengineering Systems |url=https://www.lidsen.com/journals/neurobiology/neurobiology-07-04-185 |journal=OBM Neurobiology |language=en |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=1–17 |doi=10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2304185|doi-access=free }}</ref> Shared intentionality emerges in the mother (contributor) and child (recipient) dyad under specific conditions that match the mother-fetus communication model. This model of interaction between closely related organisms is described by the following attributes: (i) social learning in a lack of meaningful sensory interaction between them; (ii) unintelligible stimuli (for the recipient) in a shared ecological context; (iii) a single low-frequency harmonic oscillator.<ref name="Val Danilov Bioengineering Systems" />

In the beginning, interpersonal dynamics in these relative organisms maintain the inherited mechanism of social entrainment of the recipient to the contributor's socio-biological rhythm, synchronizing physiological processes in these organisms. Therefore, at the cellular level, a coordination of gamma neuronal activity in each organism occurs in similar separate networks of different subsystems that are relevant to the interpersonal dynamics of these organisms in the specific ecological context.<ref name="Val Danilov Bioengineering Systems" />

The increased heartbeats of the contributor (low-frequency oscillator) coordinate central and peripheral gamma temporal coordination in each organism by nesting gamma oscillations of local networks (interference of delta and gamma waves). The similarly modulated local gamma-temporal coordination in different brain zones of the different nervous systems provides a coordinated neuronal activity that can provide integrated neuronal processing.<ref name="Val Danilov Bioengineering Systems" /> So, because of the interpersonal dynamics, shared ecological context, and the low-frequency oscillator, cells and even their networks in different nervous systems behave coordinately (nonlocal neuronal coupling), and the integrated neuronal processing in all organisms is similar.<ref name="Val Danilov Bioengineering Systems" /> In these conditions, each intentional act of the contributor becomes a template for the recipient's nervous system–the "instructions" about synaptic structural organisation corresponding to a specific sensory stimulus.<ref name="Val Danilov 2023 Origin of Perception">{{Cite journal |last=Val Danilov |first=Igor |date= 2023|title=Low-Frequency Oscillations for Nonlocal Neuronal Coupling in Shared Intentionality Before and After Birth: Toward the Origin of Perception |url=https://www.lidsen.com/journals/neurobiology/neurobiology-07-04-192 |journal=OBM Neurobiology |language=en |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=1–17 |doi=10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2304192|doi-access=free }}</ref>

In short, the mother's heartbeats can synchronize brain gamma waves of already excited central and peripheral neuronal ensembles, similar in both organisms due to physiological entrainment being in the shared ecosystem, and, due to this physiological harmony, specific sensorimotor networks activation in the mother entrain those in the fetus; and because of the shared ecosystem, this engagement trains the young nervous system to respond correctly to certain sensory stimuli through statistical mechanisms based on numerous successful trials and errors.<ref name="Val Danilov Bioengineering Systems" /><ref name="Val Danilov 2023 Origin of Perception" />
In such a manner, an intentional act of the contributor simultaneously becomes an appearance of subliminal perception in the recipient. Therefore, nonlocal neuronal coupling provides subliminal perception in the recipient, similar to the intentional act of the contributor. Shared intentionality gives the recipient a direct clue for the relevant stimulus, providing pre-perceptual communication.<ref>Val Danilov, I. "Advances in Computer-Aided Diagnosis of Developmental Delay in Children Using Bioengineering Systems: A New Math Model and Algorithm." ''In Intelligent Communication Technologies and Virtual Mobile Networks'' (pp. 443–458). Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore. 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1767-9_33</ref>

The Shared intentionality approach attempts to combine [[Philosophy:Externalism|Externalism]] with empiricist ideas of the beginning of cognition through learning in the environment. According to this group of positions in the philosophy of mind (Externalism), communicative symbols are encoded in local topological properties of neuronal maps,<ref name="Thompson 2019">Thompson, E. (2010). ''Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind.'' 1st ed. Cambridge: The Belknap press of Harvard University press.</ref> which reflect a dynamic model of action.<ref>Van Gelder, T. (1998). "The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science." ''Behavioral and Brain Sciences,'' vol. 21 (5), pp. 615-628. DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x98001733.</ref> The sensorimotor neural network allows the relevant cue to be connected to a specific symbol stored in sensorimotor structures, which reveals embodied meanings.<ref name="Thompson 2019" /><ref>Varela, F. J.; Bourgine, P. (1992). "Towards a practice of autonomous systems." ''In Towards a Practice of Autonomous Systems. The first European conference on Artificial Life,'' ed. F. J. Varela and P. Bourgine, pp. xi–xviii. Cambridge: MIT Press.</ref> From this perspective, the hypothesis of Shared intentionality also complements the Core Knowledge Theory, even being the self-sufficient and independent hypothesis.

==See also==
* [[Binding problem]]
* [[Categorization]]
* Child development
* [[Cognition]]
* [[Philosophy:Cognitive development|Cognitive development]]
* [[Social:Collective behavior|Collective behaviour]]
* [[Social:Collective intentionality|Collective intentionality]]
* [[Philosophy:Infant cognitive development|Infant cognitive development]]
* [[Philosophy:Multisensory integration|Multisensory integration]]
* [[Perception]]
* [[Philosophy:Social cognition|Social cognition]]

== References ==
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[[Category:Psychological concepts]]

{{Sourceattribution|Shared intentionality}}