View source for Philosophy:Prioritarianism

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'''Prioritarianism''', or the '''priority view''',<ref name=Parfit1997>{{cite journal |last=Parfit |first=Derek |title=Equality and priority |journal=Ratio |volume=10 |issue=3 |date=December 1997 |pages=202–221 |doi=10.1111/1467-9329.00041}}</ref> is a perspective within [[Philosophy:Ethics|ethics]] and [[Philosophy:Political philosophy|political philosophy]] stating that "social welfare orderings should give explicit priority to the worse off".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Brunori |first=Paolo |date=26 January 2021 |title=Prioritarianism and Equality of Opportunity |url=https://www.lse.ac.uk/cpnss/assets/documents/wellbeing-and-human-development/Prioritarianism-and-EoP-Working-Paper.pdf |journal=Wellbeing and Human Development Project Preprint and Discussion Paper Series |pages=1}}</ref> Prioritarianism resembles [[Philosophy:Utilitarianism|utilitarianism]], and is likewise a form of aggregative [[Philosophy:Consequentialism|consequentialism]].

The term "prioritarianism" was coined by the moral philosopher [[Biography:Larry Temkin|Larry Temkin]]. [[Biography:Richard Arneson|Richard Arneson]], a proponent of the view,<ref name=":0">{{cite journal |first=Richard |last=Arneson |title=Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism |journal=Ethics |volume=110 |issue=2 |date=January 2000 |pages=339–349 |doi=10.1086/233272|s2cid=15536237 }}</ref> offers the following formulation:  
<blockquote>
Prioritarianism holds that the moral value of achieving a benefit for an individual (or avoiding a loss) is greater, the greater the size of the benefit as measured by a well-being scale, and the greater, the lower the person's level of well-being over the course of her life apart from receipt of this benefit.<ref>Arneson, Richard, "[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/egalitarianism/ Egalitarianism]", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (fall 2008 edition).</ref>
</blockquote>

Prioritarianism is one interpretation of [[Philosophy:Distributive justice|distributive justice]] and is often pitted against [[Philosophy:Egalitarianism|egalitarianism]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=John Broome, Oxford Philosophy |url=https://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0060/ |access-date=2022-04-20 |website=users.ox.ac.uk}}</ref>{{Failed verification|date=October 2023}}<ref>{{Citation |last=Hirose |first=Iwao |title=Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism |date=2011 |url=https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230305885_6 |work=New Waves in Ethics |pages=88–107 |editor-last=Brooks |editor-first=Thom |place=London |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK |language=en |doi=10.1057/9780230305885_6 |isbn=978-0-230-30588-5 |access-date=2022-04-20|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

== Distinction from utilitarianism ==
Prioritarianism is a portmanteau of "priority" and "utilitarianism." 

While common forms of utilitarianism view the consequences of an action as having equal moral weight regardless of the person who experiences those consequences,<ref>{{Citation |last=Driver |first=Julia |title=The History of Utilitarianism |date=2014 |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/utilitarianism-history/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |edition=Winter 2014 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2022-04-18}}</ref> prioritarianism dictates that the consequences of an action should be weighted differently depending on how relatively advantaged the bearer of the consequence is, ''[[Philosophy:Ceteris paribus|ceteris paribus]]''.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Holtug |first=Nils |date=2017-01-25 |title=Prioritarianism |url=https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-232?mediaType=Article |access-date=2022-04-18 |website=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics |language=en |doi=10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.232|isbn=978-0-19-022863-7 }}</ref> Under this view, the morality of any given action is not dependent on a simple maximization of "good" produced from its consequences but, rather, dependent on the maximization of "good" that takes into account the relative (dis)advantage of the effected individual. In effect, the impacts on those who are more disadvantaged are weighted heavier in the moral calculus than those who are more advantaged.

Prioritarianism can also be understood to be a sub-theory of utilitarianism, under the interpretation of the latter as simply the maximization of "good" with the unintentional disregard for differences in utility dependent on circumstance to effected individuals.

==Comparisons to related theories==

Proponents of prioritarianism argue that prioritarian's emphasis on [[Philosophy:Compassion|compassion]] addresses criticisms aimed at utilitarianism of what some interpret to be disregard for marginal and relative circumstance.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Crisp |first=Roger |title=Equality, Priority, and Compassion |journal=Ethics |volume=113 |issue=4 |date=July 2003 |pages=145–63 |doi=10.1086/373954|s2cid=159578503 }}</ref>

It also differs from radical forms of [[Philosophy:Egalitarianism|egalitarianism]] that value only equality at the expense of overall maximization of good. Prioritarianism does not accord any [[Philosophy:Intrinsic value (ethics)|intrinsic value]] to equality of well-being across individuals and would not regard a move toward a more equal distribution of well-being as better if the worse off did not benefit.<ref name=Parfit1997/>

In addition to addressing common criticisms of utilitarianism and pure egalitarianism, prioritarianism also avoids criticisms of the maximin principle (also note [[Biography:John Rawls|Rawls]]'s difference principle).<ref>''A Theory of Justice''. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.</ref> The maximin principle ranks outcomes solely according to the well-being of the worst-off member of a society, potentially at the expense of overall good or of other members in society.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Harsanyi |first=J. C. |date=June 1975 |title=Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory |journal=American Political Science Review |volume=69 |issue=2 |pages=594–606 |doi=10.2307/1959090 |jstor=1959090|s2cid=118261543 }}</ref>

== Objections  ==
Objections to prioritarianism include many of the standard objections that adhere to aggregative [[Philosophy:Consequentialism|consequentialism]], for instance, the repugnant conclusion<ref>Ryberg, Jesper, Tännsjö, Torbjörn, Arrhenius, Gustaf, "[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/repugnant-conclusion/ The Repugnant Conclusion]", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (fall 2008 edition).</ref> and related objections based on the apparent implausibility of certain trade-offs (if there is some very large number of mild headaches such that it would be worse to bring about these mild headaches than the protracted and intense torture of an innocent person).<ref>{{cite journal |last=Norcross |first=Alastair |year=1998 |title=Great Harms from Small Benefits Grow: How Death can be Outweighed by Headaches |journal=Analysis |volume=58 |issue=2 |pages=152–158 |doi=10.1093/analys/58.2.152 |jstor=3328486}}</ref>{{Dubious|date=February 2023}} There are also objections to quantifying, measuring, or making interpersonal comparisons of well-being, that strike against most if not all forms of aggregative consequentialism, including prioritarianism.{{citation needed|date=February 2012}}

Another objection to prioritarianism concerns ''how much'' weight should be given to the well-being of the worse off. There may be issues of arbitrariness or "sloppy [[Intuitionism|intuitionism]]" lurking there. Prioritarians are faced with the potentially awkward task of balancing overall well-being against priority. Any theory that leaves any room for judgment in particular cases is also susceptible to that kind of objection about sloppiness or arbitrariness. A prioritarian might claim that how much weight should be given to the well-being of the worse off is something to be worked out in [[Reflective equilibrium|reflective equilibrium]], or that if weights cannot be determined exactly, there is a range of weights that is acceptable or justifiable.{{citation needed|date=February 2012}}

In response to claims that utilitarianism may be more parsimonious than prioritarianism (which values well-being and priority), prioritarianism may argue that even a putatively genuinely monistic utilitarianism like hedonistic utilitarianism is not fully mechanized (and perhaps not even genuinely monistic) as it still requires judgment, as when it comes to balancing various pleasures against various pains.<ref>On the last point, see W.D. Ross, ''Foundations of Ethics'', p. 89</ref>

== See also ==
* Painism - a similar ethical view that prioritizes the maximum sufferer
* [[Philosophy:Suffering-focused ethics|Suffering-focused ethics]]

==References==
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{{Ethics}}

[[Category:Political theories]]
[[Category:Utilitarianism]]
[[Category:Ethical theories]]

{{Sourceattribution|Prioritarianism}}