View source for Philosophy:Internal–external distinction

The '''internal–external distinction''' is a distinction used in philosophy to divide an [[Philosophy:Ontology|ontology]] into two parts: an internal part concerning [[Observation|observation]] related to philosophy, and an external part concerning question related to philosophy.

==Linguistic framework==
[[Biography:Rudolf Carnap|Rudolf Carnap]] introduced the idea of a 'linguistic framework' or a 'form of language' that uses a precise specification of the definitions of and the relations between ontological entities. The discussion of a proposition within a framework can take on a logical or an empirical (that is, factual) aspect. The logical aspect concerns whether the proposition respects the definitions and rules set up in the framework. The empirical aspect concerns the application of the framework in some or another practical situation.
{{quote| “If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question.”|Rudolf Carnap|"Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology"}}
{{quote|“After the new forms are introduced into the language, it is possible to formulate with their help internal questions and possible answers to them. A question of this kind may be either empirical or logical; accordingly a true answer is either factually true or analytic.”|Rudolf Carnap|"Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology"}}

The utility of a linguistic framework constitutes issues that Carnap calls 'external' or 'pragmatic'.
{{quote|“To be sure, we have to face at this point an important question; but it is a practical, not a theoretical question; it is the question of whether or not to accept the new linguistic forms. The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended. Judgments of this kind supply the motivation for the decision of accepting or rejecting the kind of entities.”|Rudolf Carnap|"Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology"''}}
{{quote|“the decisive question is not the alleged ontological question of the existence of abstract entities but rather the question whether the rise of abstract linguistic forms or, in technical terms, the use of variables beyond those for things (or phenomenal data), is expedient and fruitful for the purposes for which semantical analyses are made, viz. the analysis, interpretation, clarification, or construction of languages of communication, especially languages of science.”|Rudolf Carnap|"Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology"}}

The distinction between 'internal' and 'external' arguments is not as obvious as it might appear. For example, discussion of the [[Imaginary unit|imaginary unit]] {{radic|−1}} ''might'' be an internal question framed in the language of [[Complex number|complex number]]s about the correct usage of {{radic|−1}}, or it {{em|might}} be a question about the utility of complex numbers: whether there is any practical advantage in using {{radic|−1}}.<ref name=Yablo/> Clearly the question of utility is not completely separable from the way a linguistic framework is organized. A more formal statement of the internal-external difference is provided by Myhill:
{{quote|"A question...is internal relative to [a linguistic framework] ''T'' if the asker accepts ''T'' at the time of his asking, and is prepared to use ''T'' in order to obtain an answer; external otherwise, in particular if the question is part of a chain of reflections and discussions aimed at choosing between ''T'' and some rival theory."<ref name=Myhill/>|John R Myhill| Review of W. V. Quine: "On Carnap's Views on Ontology"}}

==Quine's critique==
Quine disputed Carnap's position from several points of view. His most famous criticism of Carnap was ''Two dogmas of empiricism'', but this work is not directed at the internal-external distinction but at the [[Philosophy:Analytic–synthetic distinction|analytic–synthetic distinction]] brought up by Carnap in his work on logic: ''Meaning and Necessity''.<ref name=Quine/><ref name=Carnap2/> Quine's criticism of the internal-external distinction is found in his works ''On Carnap's views on Ontology'' and ''Word and Object''.<ref name=Quine2/><ref name=Quine3/>

Quine's approach to the internal-external division was to cast internal questions as ''subclass'' questions and external questions as ''category'' questions. What Quine meant by 'subclass' questions were questions like "what are so-and-so's?" where the answers are restricted to lie within a specific linguistic framework. On the other hand, 'category' questions were questions like "what are so-and-so's?"  asked outside any specific language where the answers are not so-restricted.<ref name=Thomasson/> The term ''subclass'' arises as follows: Quine supposes that a particular linguistic framework selects from a broad ''category'' of meanings for a term, say ''furniture'', a particular or subclass of meanings, say ''chairs''.

Quine argued that there is always possible an overarching language that encompasses both types of question and the distinction between the two types is artificial.
{{quote|It is evident that the question whether there are numbers will be a category question only with respect to languages which appropriate a separate style of variables for the exclusive purpose of referring to numbers. If our language refers to numbers through variables that also take classes other than numbers as values, then the question whether there are numbers becomes a subclass question...Even the question whether there are classes, or whether there are physical objects becomes a subclass question if our language uses a single style of variables to range over both sorts of entities. Whether the statement that there are physical objects and the statement that there are black swans should be put on the same side of the dichotomy, or on opposite sides, comes to depend upon the rather trivial consideration of whether we use one style of variables or two for physical objects and classes.|Willard Van Orman Quine| Carnap's views on ontology}}

So we can switch back and forth from internal to external questions just by a shift of vocabulary. As Thomasson puts it,<ref name=Thomasson/> if our language refers to 'things' we can ask of all the ''things'' there are, are any of them ''numbers''; while if our language includes only 'numbers', we can ask only narrower questions like whether any ''numbers'' are ''prime numbers''. In other words, Quine's position is that "Carnap's main objection to metaphysics rests on an unsupported premise, namely the assumption that there is some sort of principled plurality in language which blocks Quine's move to homogenize the existential quantifier."<ref name=Price/> "What is to stop us treating all ontological issues as internal questions within a single grand framework?"<ref name=Price/>

==Later views==
A view close to Quine’s subclass/category description is called ‘’conceptual relativity’’.<ref name=Putnam/> To describe conceptual relativity, Putnam points out that while the pages of a book are regarded as part of book when they are attached, they are things-in-themselves if they are detached. My nose is only part of an object, my person. On the other hand, is my nose the same as the collection of atoms or molecules forming it? This arbitrariness of language is called conceptual relativity, a matter of conventions.<ref name=Putnam2/> The point is made that if one wishes to refer only to 'pages', then books may not exist, and ''vice versa'' if one wishes to admit only to books. Thus, in this view, the Carnapian multiplicity of possible linguistic frameworks proposes a variety of 'realities' and the prospect of choosing between them, a form of what is called ontological pluralism, or multiple realities.<ref name=Thomasson/><ref name=Davies/><ref name=Eklund/>  The notion of 'one reality' behind our everyday perceptions is common in everyday life, and some find it unsettling that what 'exists' might be a matter of what language one chooses to use.

A related idea is [[Philosophy:Quantifier variance|quantifier variance]].<ref name=Hirsch/> Loosely speaking a 'quantifier expression' is just a function that says ''there exists at least one such-and-such''. Then 'quantifier variance' combines the notion that the same object can have different names, so the quantifier may refer to the same thing even though different names are employed by it, and the notion that quantifier expressions can be formed in a variety of ways. Hirsch says this arbitrariness over what 'exists' is a quandary only due to Putnam's formulation, and it is resolved by turning things upside down and saying things that exist can have different names. In other words, Hirsch agrees with Quine that there is an overarching language that we can adapt to different situations. The Carnapian internal/external distinction in this view, as with the subclass/category distinction, is just a matter of language, and has nothing to do with 'reality'.<ref name=Hirsch1/>

More recently, some philosophers have stressed that the real issue is not one of language as such, but the difference between questions asked ''using'' a linguistic framework and those asked somehow before the adoption of a linguistic framework, the difference between questions about the construction and rules of a framework, and questions about the decision whether to use a framework.<ref name=Thomasson/> This distinction is called by Thomasson and Price the difference between ‘’using’’ a term and ‘’mentioning’’ a term.<ref name=Thomasson/><ref name=Price/> As Price notes, Carnap holds that there is a mistake involved in "assimilating issues of the existence of numbers (say) and of the existence of physical objects...the distinctions in question are not grounded at the syntactical level."<ref name=Price/> Price suggests a connection with Ryle's view of different functions of language:
{{quote|Ryle's functional orientation attention – his attention to the question as to what a linguistic category ''does'' –  will instead lead us to focus on the difference between the ''functions'' of talk of beliefs and talk of tables; on the issue of what the two kinds of talk are ''for'', rather than that of what they are ''about''.<ref name=Ryle/>|Huw Price |Metaphysics after Carnap: The ghost who walks, p. 331}}

Although not supporting an entire lack of distinction like the subclass/category view of Quine, as a ''pragmatic'' issue, the use/mention distinction still does not provide a sharp division between the issues of forming and conceptualizing a framework and deciding whether to adopt it: each informs the other.<ref name=convention/> An example is the well-known tension between mathematicians and physicists, the one group very concerned over questions of logic and rigor, and the other inclined to sacrifice a bit of rigor to explain observations.<ref name=Lutzen/>

{{quote|But the poor mathematician translates it into equations, and as the symbols do not mean anything to him he has no guide but precise mathematical rigor and care in the argument. The physicist, who knows more or less how the answer is going to come out, can sort of guess part way, and so go along rather rapidly. The mathematical rigor of great precision is not very useful in physics. But one should not criticize the mathematicians on this score...They are doing their own job.<ref name=Feynman/> |Richard Feynman |The character of physical law, pp. 56–57}}

One approach to selecting a framework is based upon an examination of the conceptual relations between entities in a framework, which entities are more 'fundamental'. One framework may then 'include' another because the entities in one framework apparently can be derived from or [[Philosophy:Supervenience|'supervene']] upon those in the more fundamental one.<ref name=supervene/>  While Carnap claims such decisions are pragmatic in nature, external questions with no philosophical importance, Schaffer suggests we avoid this formulation. Instead, we should go back to Aristotle and look upon nature as hierarchical, and pursue philosophical ''diagnostics'': that is, examination of criteria for what is fundamental and what relations exist between all entities and these fundamental ones.<ref name=Schaffer/> But "how can we discover what grounds what?...questions regarding not only what grounds what, but also what the grounding consists in, and how one may discover or discern grounding facts, seem to be part of an emerging set of relational research problems in metaphysics."<ref name=Thomasson2/>

==See also==
*[[Philosophy:Analytic–synthetic distinction|Analytic–synthetic distinction]]
*[[Philosophy:Anti-realism|Anti-realism]]
*[[Philosophy:Indeterminacy of translation|Indeterminacy of translation]]
*[[Philosophy:Logical positivism|Logical positivism]]
*[[Philosophy:Meta-ontology|Meta-ontology]]
*[[Mereology]]
*[[Model-dependent realism]]
*[[Philosophy:Ordinary language philosophy|Ordinary language philosophy]]
*[[Philosophy:Philosophical realism|Philosophical realism]]
*Benj Hellie's [[Philosophy:Vertiginous question|Vertiginous question]]

==References==
{{reflist|refs= 
<!-- unused <ref name=AllspectorKelly>
{{cite journal |author=M Allspector-Kelly  |url=http://homepages.wmich.edu/~malspect/On%20Quine%20on%20Carnap%20on%20Ontology.pdf |title=On Quine on Carnap on Ontology |journal=Philosophical Studies |volume=102 |pages=93–122 |year=2001 |doi=10.1023/a:1010353825006 |s2cid=30329501 |quote= Quine’s and Carnap’s views are much closer than Quine ever suspected.}}
</ref> -->

<!-- unused <ref name=Bird>
{{cite journal |author=Graham H. Bird |title=Carnap and Quine: Internal and external questions. |journal=Erkenntnis |volume=42 |issue=1 |year=1995 |pages=41–64 |doi=10.1007/bf01666811|s2cid=171081719 }} Reprinted in: {{cite book |editor=Thomas Bonk |chapter=Carnap's internal and external questions |author=Graham H. Bird |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zWi5yL243xAC&pg=PA107 |page=107 |title=Language, Truth and Knowledge: Contributions to the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap |isbn=1402012063 |year=2003 |publisher=Springer}} "I want to argue that Quine's criticisms leave Carnap's central points quite untouched."
</ref> -->

<!-- unused <ref name=Carnap>
{{cite journal |author=Rudolf Carnap |title=Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology |url=http://www.ditext.com/carnap/carnap.html |journal=Revue Internationale de Philosophie |volume=4 |year=1950 |pages=40–50}}
</ref> -->

<ref name=Carnap2>
{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/stream/meaningandnecess033225mbp#page/n7/mode/2up |author=Rudolf Carnap |title= Meaning and Necessity |publisher=Chicago University Press |year=1947|origyear=1946}}
</ref>

<ref name=convention>
From a very broad point of view, this issue is a particular example of forming and adopting a ''convention''. See {{cite encyclopedia|author=Rescorla, Michael |title=Convention |encyclopedia= The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition) |editor= Edward N. Zalta |url= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/convention/#Con |date=January 13, 2011 |access-date=2013-06-28}}.
</ref>

<ref name=Davies>
The term 'ontological' pluralism does not cover the entire topic. A different aspect is [[Philosophy:Epistemological pluralism|epistemological pluralism]]. See {{cite web |title=Epistemological pluralism |author=E. Brian Davies |url=http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003083/01/EP3single.doc |year=2006}}
</ref>

<ref name=Eklund>
{{cite book |chapter-url=https://courses.cit.cornell.edu/me72/carnap.pdf |author=Matti Eklund |chapter=Chapter 4: Carnap and ontological pluralism |pages=130–156 |date=April 17, 2008 |title=Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology |editor1=David Chalmers |editor2=David Manley |editor3=Ryan Wasserman |isbn=	978-0199546046  |publisher=Oxford University Press}}
</ref>

<ref name=Feynman>
{{cite book |author=Richard P. Feynman |title=The Character of Physical Law |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zMwTcCz4d18C |edition=Penguin reprint |year=2007 |isbn=978-0141956114 |publisher=Penguin Books Limited|author-link=Richard P. Feynman }} Quoted by {{cite book |author=Miklós Rédei |chapter=John von Neumann on mathematics and axiomatic physics  |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zBrmFshq3qYC&pg=PA44 |title=The Role of Mathematics in Physical Sciences: Interdisciplinary and Philosophical Aspects |editor1=Giovanni Boniolo |editor2=Paolo Budinich |editor3=Majda Trobok |year=2005 |publisher=Springer |isbn=1402031068}}
</ref>

<ref name=Hirsch>
{{cite book |title=Quantifier Variance and Realism : Essays in Metaontology: Essays in Metaontology |author=Eli Hirsch |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iPRqtcjeHPsC&pg=PA68 |pages=68–95 |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2011 |isbn=978-0199780716 |chapter=Chapter 5: Quantifier variance and realism }}
</ref>

<ref name=Hirsch1>
{{cite book |title=Quantifier Variance and Realism : Essays in Metaontology: Essays in Metaontology |author=Eli Hirsch |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iPRqtcjeHPsC&pg=PA220 |pages=220–250 |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2011 |quote=I take it for granted that the world and the things in it exist for the most part in complete independence of our knowledge or language. Our linguistic choices do not determine what exists, but determine what we are to mean by the words "what exists" and related words. |isbn=978-0199780716 |chapter=Chapter 12: Ontology and alternative languages}}
</ref>

<ref name=Lutzen>
For example see the discussion of the history of the mathematical justification of the delta function in {{cite book |title=The prehistory of the theory of distributions |author=Jesper Lützen |isbn=0387906479 |year=1982 |publisher=Springer-Verlag |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pC7vAAAAMAAJ}}
</ref>

<ref name=Myhill>
{{cite journal |author=John R Myhill |title=Review: W. V. Quine, On Carnap's Views on Ontology  |pages=61–62 |year=1955 |journal=The Journal of Symbolic Logic |volume=20  |issue=1 |url= http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb=Display&handle=euclid.jsl/1183732058 |doi=10.2307/2268063|jstor=2268063 }} Quoted by Oswaldo Chateaubriand, ''Quine and Ontology''.
</ref>

<ref name=Price>
{{cite book |chapter=Chapter 11: Metaphysics After Carnap: the Ghost Who Walks? |author=Huw Price |chapter-url=http://prce.hu/w/preprints/metameta.pdf |editor1=David Chalmers |editor2=Ryan Wasserman |editor3=David Manley |title=Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2009|isbn=978-0199546046 |pages=320–346}}
</ref>

<ref name=Putnam>
{{cite book |title=The many faces of realism |url=https://archive.org/details/manyfacesofreali0000putn |url-access=registration |year=1987 |author=Hilary Putnam |publisher=Open Court Publishing |isbn= 0812690427 |edition=2nd}}
</ref>

<ref name=Putnam2>
{{cite book |chapter-url= https://books.google.com/books?id=A0YJILtyCPEC&pg=PA111 |title= Representation and Reality |author=Hilary Putnam |chapter=Chapter 7: Objectivity and conceptual relativity |page=111  |isbn= 0262660741 |year=1991 |publisher=MIT Press}}
</ref>

<ref name=Quine>
{{cite book |title=From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-philosophical Essays |author=Willard Van Orman Quine |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OalXwuw3MvMC&pg=PA20 |pages=20ff |chapter=Chapter 2: Two dogmas of empiricism |isbn=	0674323513 |year=1980 |publisher=Harvard University Press |edition =2nd}} See [http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html this on-line version].
</ref>

<ref name=Quine2>
{{cite journal |title=On Carnap's views on ontology |author= Willard Van Orman Quine |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=October 1951 |number=5 |volume=II |pages=65–72 |doi=10.1007/bf02199422|s2cid= 170241527 }} Reprinted in {{cite book |title=The ways of paradox: and other essays |author=W. V. O. Quine |chapter=Chapter 19: On Carnap's views on ontology |edition =2nd |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=0674948378 |year=1976 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YReOv31gdVIC&pg=PA203 |pages=203ff }}
</ref>

<ref name=Quine3>
{{cite book |author=Willard Van Orman Quine |title=Word and Object |publisher=University of Chicago Press |year=1960|origyear=1951}}
</ref>

<ref name=Ryle>
Price refers to {{cite book |title=The concept of mind |author=Gilbert Ryle |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IFsKMBOazIoC&pg=PA23 |quote=It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds and to say, in another logical tone of voice, that there exist bodies. But these expressions do not indicate two different species of existence, for 'existence' is not a generic word like 'colored' or 'sexed'. They indicate two different senses of 'exist', somewhat as 'rising' has different senses in 'the tide is rising', 'hopes are rising', and 'the average age of death is rising'. |chapter=Descartes' myth |page=23 |isbn=0226732967 |year=1946 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |edition=2nd}}
</ref>

<ref name=Schaffer>
{{cite book |chapter-url=http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/grounds.pdf |author=Jonathan Schaffer |chapter=Chapter 12: On what grounds what |title=Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology |editor1=David Chalmers |editor2=David Manley |editor3=Ryan Wasserman |isbn=978-0199546046 |year=2009 |publisher=Oxford University Press}}
</ref>

<ref name=supervene>
Some caution is warranted here. For example, [[Physics:Newton's laws of motion|Newton's laws of motion]] suffice for practical engineering work like building and bridge design, even though the more 'fundamental' theory of the Standard model of elementary particle physics is available. The more 'fundamental' model is, for such engineering, superfluous.
</ref>

<ref name=Thomasson>
{{cite book |chapter=Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology |chapter-url=http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/63fc8a_22998f92ed59477bae644138df18a843.docx?dn=Carnap%20and%20prospects%20for%20easy%20ontology%20revised%20(2).docx |title=Ontology after Carnap |editor1=Stephan Blattie |editor2=Sandra LaPointe |publisher=Oxford University Press |date=2016 |author=Amie L Thomasson |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131220135908/http://www.amiethomasson.org/papers%20to%20link/Carnap%20and%20prospects%20for%20easy%20ontology%20revised.docx |archive-date=2013-12-20 |}}
</ref>

<ref name=Thomasson2>
{{cite book |chapter=Chapter 1: Research Problems and Methods in Metaphysics |author=Amie Thomasson |chapter-url=http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/63fc8a_496b6fdf56af49a781fbd842ef04fcaf.docx?dn=Research%20Problems%20and%20Methods%20in%20Metaphysics%20(2).docx |title=The Continuum companion to metaphysics |editor1=Robert Barnard |editor2=Neil Manson |pages=14–45 |year=2012 |isbn=978-1-4411-3022-8 |publisher=Continuum International Publishing Group}}
</ref>

<ref name=Yablo>
{{cite journal |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |title=Does ontology rest upon a mistake? |author1=Stephen Yablo <!--Gallois did not contribute to the original paper|author2=André Gallois--> |url=http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/factual/papers/YabloMistake.pdf |volume=72 |pages=229–261 |quote=The usual charge against Carnap’s internal/external distinction is one of ‘guilt by association with analytic/synthetic’. But it can be freed of this association... |year=1998}}
</ref>
}}


{{DEFAULTSORT:Internal-external distinction}}
[[Category:Concepts in metaphysics]]
[[Category:Meaning (philosophy of language)]]

{{Sourceattribution|Internal–external distinction}}