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{{Short description|Philosophical view that events are pre-determined}}

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'''Determinism''' is a [[Philosophy:Philosophy|philosophical]] view, where all events are determined completely by previously existing causes. Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have developed from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations. The opposite of determinism is some kind of [[Indeterminism|indeterminism]] and even more so nondeterminism (aka [[Randomness|randomness]]). Determinism is often contrasted with [[Philosophy:Free will|free will]], although some philosophers claim that the two are [[Philosophy:Compatibilism|compatible]].<ref name="Franklin">For example, see {{cite book |author=Franklin |first=Richard Langdon |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=51wIAQAAIAAJ |title=Freewill and Determinism: A Study of Rival Conceptions of Man |publisher=Routledge & K. Paul |year=1968 |isbn=9780710031570}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://conceptually.org/concepts/determinism|title=Determinism – Explanation and examples|author=Conceptually|date=20 January 2019|work=conceptually.org|access-date=20 January 2019}}</ref>

Determinism is often used to mean ''causal determinism'', which in physics is known as cause-and-effect. This is the concept that [[Philosophy:Event|event]]s within a given [[Philosophy:Paradigm|paradigm]] are bound by [[Causality|causality]] in such a way that any state of an object or event is completely determined by its prior states. This meaning can be distinguished from other varieties of determinism mentioned below.

Debates about determinism often concern the scope of determined systems; some maintain that the entire universe is a single determinate system, and others identifying more limited determinate systems (or [[Physics:Multiverse|multiverse]]). Historical debates involve many philosophical positions and varieties of determinism. They include debates concerning determinism and free will, technically denoted as compatibilistic (allowing the two to coexist) and incompatibilistic (denying their coexistence is a possibility).

Determinism should not be confused with the [[Philosophy:Self-determination theory|self-determination]] of human actions by reasons, motives, and desires. Determinism is about interactions which affect our cognitive processes in our life.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ismael|first=Jenann|date=2019-10-01|title=Determinism, Counterpredictive Devices, and the Impossibility of Laplacean Intelligences|url=https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/102/4/478/5567128|journal=The Monist|language=en|volume=102|issue=4|pages=478–498|doi=10.1093/monist/onz021|issn=0026-9662}}</ref> It is about the cause and the result of what we have done. Cause and result are always bound together in cognitive processes. It assumes that if an observer has sufficient information about an object or human being, that such an observer might be able to predict every consequent move of that object or human being. Determinism rarely requires that perfect [[Prediction|prediction]] be practically possible.

==Varieties==
"Determinism" may commonly refer to any of the following viewpoints.

=== Causal ===
Causal determinism, sometimes synonymous with [[Philosophy:Historical determinism|historical determinism]] (a sort of [[Path dependence|path dependence]]), suggests that "for any given set of circumstances, only one outcome is possible, meaning that all events are predetermined."<ref name="SEPcausaldeterminism">{{cite encyclopedia|last=Hoefer|first=Carl|title=Causal Determinism|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|edition=Winter 2009|date=1 April 2008|editor=Edward N. Zalta|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/determinism-causal/}}</ref> However, it is a broad enough term to consider that:<ref name="SEPmoralresponsibility">{{cite encyclopedia|last=Eshleman|first=Andrew|editor=Edward N. Zalta|title=Moral Responsibility|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|edition=Winter 2009|date=18 November 2009|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/moral-responsibility/}}</ref><blockquote>...One's deliberations, choices, and actions will often be necessary links in the causal chain that brings something about. In other words, even though our deliberations, choices, and actions are themselves determined like everything else, it is still the case, according to causal determinism, that the occurrence or existence of yet other things depends upon our deliberating, choosing and acting in a certain way.</blockquote>Causal determinism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. The relation between events may not be specified, nor the origin of that universe. Causal determinists believe that there is nothing in the universe that has no cause or is [[Philosophy:Causa sui|self-caused]].

Causal determinism has also been considered more generally as the idea that everything that happens or exists is caused by antecedent conditions.<ref name="StanfordIncompatibilism">{{cite book| chapter-url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/| title = Arguments for Incompatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)| chapter = Arguments for Incompatibilism| year = 2018| publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> In the case of nomological determinism, these conditions are considered events also, implying that the future is determined completely by preceding events—a combination of prior states of the universe and the laws of nature.<ref name="SEPcausaldeterminism" /> Yet they can also be considered metaphysical of origin (such as in the case of theological determinism).<ref name="SEPmoralresponsibility" />[[File:Bled (9664110474).jpg|thumb|right|140px|Many philosophical theories of determinism frame themselves with the idea that reality follows a sort of predetermined path.]]

==== {{anchor|Nomological determinism}}Nomological ====
Nomological determinism, generally synonymous with physical determinism (its opposite being [[Indeterminism|physical indeterminism]]), the most common form of causal determinism, is the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events. Nomological determinism is sometimes illustrated by the [[Thought experiment|thought experiment]] of [[Laplace's demon]].<ref name="laplace">
Laplace posited that an omniscient observer, knowing with infinite precision all the positions and velocities of every particle in the universe, could predict the future entirely. For a discussion, see {{cite book |author1=Robert C. Solomon |title=The Big Questions: A Short Introduction to Philosophy |author2=Kathleen M. Higgins |publisher=Cengage Learning |year=2009 |isbn=978-0495595151 |edition=8th |page=232 |chapter=Free will and determinism |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ekh2AKqXdqgC&pg=PA232}} Another view of determinism is discussed by {{cite book |author=Ernest Nagel |title=The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation |publisher=Hackett |year=1999 |isbn=978-0915144716 |edition=2nd |pages=285–292 |chapter=§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state |quote=A theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period. |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=u6EycHgRfkQC&pg=PA285}}
</ref> Nomological determinism is sometimes called ''scientific determinism'', although that is a misnomer.

==== Necessitarianism ====
[[Philosophy:Necessitarianism|Necessitarianism]] is closely related to the causal determinism described above. It is a [[Philosophy:Metaphysics|metaphysical]] principle that denies all mere possibility; there is exactly one way for the world to be. [[Biography:Leucippus|Leucippus]] claimed there were no uncaused events, and that everything occurs for a reason and by necessity.<ref>Leucippus, Fragment 569 – from Fr. 2 Actius I, 25, 4.</ref>

=== Predeterminism ===
[[Philosophy:Predeterminism|Predeterminism]] is the idea that all events are determined in advance.<ref name="McKewan">{{cite encyclopedia |last=McKewan |first=Jaclyn |editor=H. James Birx"|encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of Time: Science, Philosophy, Theology, & Culture |title=Predeterminism |year=2009 |publisher=Sage Publications, Inc. |doi=10.4135/9781412963961.n191 |pages=1035–1036|chapter=Evolution, Chemical |isbn=9781412941648 }}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Oxford Dictionaries |title=Predeterminism |url=http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/predeterminism |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120904051839/http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/predeterminism |url-status=dead |archive-date=4 September 2012 |access-date=20 December 2012 |date=April 2010 |publisher=Oxford Dictionaries}}. See also {{cite encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Collins English Dictionary |title=Predeterminism |url=http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/predeterminism |access-date=20 December 2012 |publisher=Collins}}</ref> The concept is often argued by invoking causal determinism, implying that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. In the case of predeterminism, this chain of events has been pre-established, and human actions cannot interfere with the outcomes of this pre-established chain.

Predeterminism can be used to mean such pre-established causal determinism, in which case it is categorized as a specific type of determinism.<ref name="McKewan" /><ref>{{cite web |url=http://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/notes-determinism.html |title=Some Varieties of Free Will and Determinism |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |work=Philosophy 302: Ethics |publisher=philosophy.lander.edu |access-date=19 December 2012| quote=Predeterminism: the philosophical and theological view that combines God with determinism. On this doctrine events throughout eternity have been foreordained by some supernatural power in a causal sequence.}}</ref> It can also be used interchangeably with causal determinism—in the context of its capacity to determine future events.<ref name="McKewan" /><ref>See for example {{cite arXiv |eprint=hep-th/0104219 |author=Hooft, G. |title=How does god play dice? (Pre-)determinism at the Planck scale |quote=Predeterminism is here defined by the assumption that the experimenter's 'free will' in deciding what to measure (such as his choice to measure the x- or the y-component of an electron's spin), is in fact limited by deterministic laws, hence not free at all |year=2001}}, and {{cite journal |author=Sukumar |first=C.V. |year=1996 |title=A new paradigm for science and architecture |journal=City |volume=1 |issue=1–2 |pages=181–183 |doi=10.1080/13604819608900044 |quote=Quantum Theory provided a beautiful description of the behaviour of isolated atoms and nuclei and small aggregates of elementary particles. Modern science recognized that predisposition rather than predeterminism is what is widely prevalent in nature.}}</ref> Despite this, predeterminism is often considered as independent of causal determinism.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Borst, C. |year=1992 |title=Leibniz and the Compatibilist Account of Free Will |journal=Studia Leibnitiana |volume=24 |issue=1 |pages=49–58 |jstor=40694201 |quote=Leibniz presents a clear case of a philosopher who does not think that predeterminism requires universal causal determinism.}}</ref><ref name="Society1971">{{cite book|author=Far Western Philosophy of Education Society|title=Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=spkpAQAAMAAJ|year=1971|publisher=Far Western Philosophy of Education Society.|page=12|quote="Determinism" is, in essence, the position which holds that all behavior is caused by prior behavior. "Predeterminism" is the position which holds that all behavior is caused by conditions which predate behavior altogether (such impersonal boundaries as "the human conditions", instincts, the will of God, inherent knowledge, fate, and such).}}</ref>

==== Biological ====
The term ''predeterminism'' is also frequently used in the context of biology and heredity, in which case it represents a form of [[Philosophy:Biological determinism|biological determinism]], sometimes called ''genetic determinism''.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Predeterminism |encyclopedia=Merriam-Webster Dictionary |publisher=Merriam-Webster, Incorporated |url=http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/predeterminism |access-date=20 December 2012}} See for example {{cite journal |author=Ormond |first=A.T. |year=1894 |title=Freedom and psycho-genesis |url=https://zenodo.org/record/1429090 |journal=Psychological Review |volume=1 |issue=3 |pages=217–229 |doi=10.1037/h0065249 |quote=The problem of predeterminism is one that involves the factors of heredity and environment, and the point to be debated here is the relation of the present self that chooses to these predetermining agencies.}}, and {{cite journal |author=Garris, M.D. |display-authors=0 |year=1992 |title=A Platform for Evolving Genetic Automata for Text Segmentation (GNATS) |journal=Science of Artificial Neural Networks |volume=1710 |pages=714–724 |bibcode=1992SPIE.1710..714G |doi=10.1117/12.140132 |quote=However, predeterminism is not completely avoided. If the codes within the genotype are not designed properly, then the organisms being evolved will be fundamentally handicapped. |s2cid=62639035}}</ref> Biological determinism is the idea that each of human behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by human genetic nature.

[[Biography:Friedrich Nietzsche|Friedrich Nietzsche]] explained that a human being is "determined" by his/her body, since he/she is subject to passions, impulsions and instincts.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Nietzsche |first=Friedrich |title=The Gay Science |publisher=Vintage |year=1974 |isbn=978-0394719856 |pages=7 |language=English}}</ref> 

=== Fatalism ===
[[Philosophy:Fatalism|Fatalism]] is normally distinguished from "determinism",<ref name="SEPDeterminism">{{cite book| url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/| title = SEP, Causal Determinism| year = 2016| publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> as a form of teleological determinism. Fatalism is the idea that everything is fated to happen, so that humans have no control over their future. [[Philosophy:Fate|Fate]] has arbitrary power, and need not follow any causal or otherwise deterministic [[Philosophy:Law|law]]s.<ref name="StanfordIncompatibilism" /> Types of fatalism include hard [[Philosophy:Theological determinism|theological determinism]] and the idea of [[Philosophy:Predestination|predestination]], where there is a [[Religion:God|God]] who determines all that humans will do. This may be accomplished either by knowing their actions in advance, via some form of [[Philosophy:Omniscience|omniscience]]<ref name="Fischer">Fischer, John Martin (1989) ''God, Foreknowledge and Freedom''. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. {{ISBN|1-55786-857-3}}.</ref> or by decreeing their actions in advance.<ref name="Watt">Watt, Montgomery (1948) ''Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam''. London: Luzac & Co.</ref>

=== Theological  ===
[[Philosophy:Theological determinism|Theological determinism]] is a form of determinism that holds that all events that happen are either preordained (i.e., [[Philosophy:Predestination|predestined]]) to happen by a [[Philosophy:Monotheism|monotheistic]] [[Religion:Deity|deity]], or are [[Philosophy:Destiny|destined]] to occur given its [[Philosophy:Omniscience|omniscience]]. Two forms of theological determinism exist, referred to as ''strong'' and ''weak'' theological determinism.<ref name="JordanTate2004">{{cite book|author1=Anne Lockyer Jordan|author2=Anne Lockyer Jordan Neil Lockyer Edwin Tate|author3=Neil Lockyer|author4=Edwin Tate|title=Philosophy of Religion for A Level OCR Edition|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uBVuNip8qjkC|access-date=22 December 2012|year=2004|publisher=Nelson Thornes|isbn=978-0-7487-8078-5|page=211}}</ref>

Strong theological determinism is based on the concept of a [[Religion:Creator deity|creator deity]] dictating all events in history: "everything that happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity."<ref name="Iannone2001">{{cite book |author=Iannone |first=Abel Pablo |title=Dictionary of World Philosophy |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-415-17995-9 |page=194 |chapter=Determinism |quote=Theological determinism, or the doctrine of predestination: the view that everything which happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity. A weaker version holds that, though not predestined to happen, everything that happens has been eternally known by virtue of the divine foreknowledge of an omniscient divinity. If this divinity is also omnipotent, as in the case of the Judeo-Christian religions, this weaker version is hard to distinguish from the previous one because, though able to prevent what happens and knowing that it is going to happen, God lets it happen. To this, advocates of free will reply that God permits it to happen in order to make room for the free will of humans. |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7wBmBO3vpE4C}}</ref>

Weak theological determinism is based on the concept of divine foreknowledge—"because [[Religion:God|God]]'s omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed."<ref name="Huyssteen2003">{{cite book |author=Wentzel Van Huyssteen |title=Encyclopedia of Science and Religion |publisher=Macmillan Reference |year=2003 |isbn=978-0-02-865705-9 |volume=1 |page=217 |chapter=Theological determinism |quote=Theological determinism constitutes a fifth kind of determinism. There are two types of theological determinism, both compatible with scientific and metaphysical determinism. In the first, God determines everything that happens, either in one all-determining single act at the initial creation of the universe or through continuous divine interactions with the world. Either way, the consequence is that everything that happens becomes God's action, and determinism is closely linked to divine action and God's omnipotence. According to the second type of theological determinism, God has perfect knowledge of everything in the universe because God is omniscient. And, as some say, because God is outside of time, God has the capacity of knowing past, present, and future in one instance. This means that God knows what will happen in the future. And because God's omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed. |access-date=22 December 2012 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HIcYAAAAIAAJ}}</ref> There exist slight variations on this categorisation, however. Some claim either that theological determinism requires predestination of all events and outcomes by the divinity—i.e., they do not classify the weaker version as ''theological determinism'' unless libertarian free will is assumed to be denied as a consequence—or that the weaker version does not constitute ''theological determinism'' at all.<ref name="VanArragon2010">{{cite book|author=Raymond J. VanArragon|title=Key Terms in Philosophy of Religion|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JyTohO1AMzwC|access-date=22 December 2012|year=2010|publisher=Continuum International Publishing Group|isbn=978-1-4411-3867-5|page=21|quote=Theological determinism, on the other hand, claims that all events are determined by God. On this view, God decree that everything will go thus-and-so and ensure that everything goes that way, so that ultimately God is the cause of everything that happens and everything that happens is part of God's plan. We might think of God here as the all-powerful movie director who writes script and causes everything to go accord with it. We should note, as an aside, that there is some debate over what would be sufficient for theological determinism to be true. Some people claim that God's merely knowing what will happen determines that it will, while others believe that God must not only know but must also cause those events to occur in order for their occurrence to be determined.}}</ref>

With respect to free will, "theological determinism is the thesis that God exists and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions about our future actions," more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all forms of theological determinism.<ref name="stanfordincompatibilismarguments">{{cite encyclopedia|last=Vihvelin |first=Kadri |editor=Edward N. Zalta | title=Arguments for Incompatibilism | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| edition=Spring 2011 | year=2011 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/incompatibilism-arguments}}</ref>

Theological determinism can also be seen as a form of causal determinism, in which the antecedent conditions are the nature and will of God.<ref name="SEPmoralresponsibility" /> Some have asserted that [[Biography:Augustine of Hippo|Augustine of Hippo]] introduced theological determinism into Christianity in 412 CE, whereas all prior Christian authors supported free will against Stoic and Gnostic determinism.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wilson |first1=Kenneth |title=Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology ''in the series Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 111'' |date=2018 |publisher=Mohr Siebeck |location=Tübingen, Germany |isbn=9783161557538 |pages=273–298}}</ref> However, there are many Biblical passages that seem to support the idea of some kind of theological determinism.

=== Adequate ===
Adequate determinism is the idea, because of [[Physics:Quantum decoherence|quantum decoherence]], that [[Physics:Quantum indeterminacy|quantum indeterminacy]] can be ignored for most macroscopic events. Random quantum events "average out" in the [[Expected value|limit of large numbers]] of particles (where the laws of quantum mechanics asymptotically approach the laws of classical mechanics).<ref>[http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/adequate_determinism.html The Information Philosopher], "Adequate Determinism", from the site: "''We are happy to agree with scientists and philosophers who feel that quantum effects are for the most part negligible in the macroscopic world. We particularly agree that they are negligible when considering the causally determined will and the causally determined actions set in motion by decisions of that will.''"</ref> [[Biography:Stephen Hawking|Stephen Hawking]] explains a similar idea: he says that the microscopic world of [[Physics:Quantum mechanics|quantum mechanics]] is one of determined probabilities. That is, quantum effects rarely alter the predictions of [[Physics:Classical mechanics|classical mechanics]], which are quite accurate (albeit still [[Physics:Uncertainty principle|not perfectly certain]]) at larger scales.<ref>Grand Design (2010), p. 32: "The molecular basis of biology shows that biological processes are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry and therefore are as determined as the orbits of the planets.", and p. 72: ''"Quantum physics might seem to undermine the idea that nature is governed by laws, but that is not the case. Instead it leads us to accept a new form of determinism: Given the state of a system at some time, the laws of nature determine the probabilities of various futures and pasts rather than determining the future and past with certainty."'' (Emphasis in original, discussing a [[Physics:Many-worlds interpretation|many worlds interpretation]].)</ref> Something as large as an [[Biology:Cell|animal cell]], then, would be "adequately determined" (even in light of quantum indeterminacy).{{Cn|date=December 2022}}

=== Many-worlds ===
The [[Physics:Many-worlds interpretation|many-worlds interpretation]] accepts the linear causal sets of sequential events with adequate consistency yet also suggests constant forking of causal chains creating "multiple universes" to account for multiple outcomes from single events.<ref>Kent, Adrian. "One world versus many: the inadequacy of Everettian accounts of evolution, probability, and scientific confirmation." Many worlds (2010): 307–354.</ref> Meaning the causal set of events leading to the present are all valid yet appear as a singular linear time stream within a much broader unseen conic probability field of other outcomes that "split off" from the locally observed timeline.  Under this model causal sets are still "consistent" yet not exclusive to singular iterated outcomes.

The interpretation sidesteps the exclusive retrospective causal chain problem of "could not have done otherwise" by suggesting "the other outcome does exist" in a set of parallel universe time streams that split off when the action occurred. This theory is sometimes described with the example of agent based choices but more involved models argue that recursive causal splitting occurs with all particle wave functions at play.<ref>[[Biography:Lev Vaidman|Vaidman, Lev]]. 2002. ''Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics''.</ref> This model is highly contested with multiple objections from the scientific community.

===Philosophical varieties===

====Determinism in nature/nurture controversy====
[[File:JuliusOttoGrimm-Sculpture.jpg|thumb|140px|Nature and nurture interact in humans. A scientist looking at a sculpture after some time does not ask whether we are seeing the effects of the starting materials or of environmental influences.]]
Although some of the above forms of determinism concern human behaviors and [[Cognition|cognition]], others frame themselves as an answer to the debate on nature and nurture. They will suggest that one factor will entirely determine behavior. As scientific understanding has grown, however, the strongest versions of these theories have been widely rejected as a [[Philosophy:Fallacy of the single cause|single-cause fallacy]].<ref name="melo-martin">{{cite journal |author=Inmaculada de Melo-Martín |year=2005 |title=Firing up the nature/nurture controversy: Bioethics and genetic determinism |journal=Journal of Medical Ethics |volume=31 |issue=9 |pages=526–530 |doi=10.1136/jme.2004.008417 |pmc=1734214 |pmid=16131554}}</ref> In other words, the modern deterministic theories attempt to explain how the interaction of both nature ''and'' nurture is entirely predictable. The concept of [[Philosophy:Heritability|heritability]] has been helpful in making this distinction.

* [[Philosophy:Biological determinism|Biological determinism]], sometimes called ''genetic determinism'', is the idea that each of human behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by human genetic nature.
* [[Philosophy:Behaviorism|Behaviorism]] involves the idea that all behavior can be traced to specific causes—either environmental or reflexive. [[Biography:John B. Watson|John B. Watson]] and [[Biography:B. F. Skinner|B. F. Skinner]] developed this nurture-focused determinism.
* [[Philosophy:Cultural materialism (anthropology)|Cultural materialism]], contends that the physical world impacts and sets constraints on human behavior.
* [[Philosophy:Cultural determinism|Cultural determinism]], along with [[Philosophy:Social determinism|social determinism]], is the nurture-focused theory that the culture in which we are raised determines who we are.
* [[Philosophy:Environmental determinism|Environmental determinism]], also known as ''climatic'' or ''geographical determinism,'' proposes that the physical environment, rather than social conditions, determines culture. Supporters of environmental determinism often{{quantify|date=August 2014}} also support [[Philosophy:Behaviorism|behavioral determinism]]. Key proponents of this notion have included Ellen Churchill Semple, [[Biography:Ellsworth Huntington|Ellsworth Huntington]], Thomas Griffith Taylor and possibly [[Biography:Jared Diamond|Jared Diamond]], although his status as an environmental determinist is debated.<ref>{{cite journal
  |last = Andrew
  |first = Sluyter
  |title=Neo-Environmental Determinism, Intellectual Damage Control, and Nature/Society Science
  |journal = Antipode
  |volume = 35
  |issue = 4
  |doi = 10.1046/j.1467-8330.2003.00354.x
  |year=2003
  |pages=813–817|url = https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1086&context=geoanth_pubs
 }}
</ref>

==== Determinism and prediction ====
[[File:Using Mobile Phone 0251.JPG|thumb|right|150px|A technological determinist might suggest that technology like the mobile phone is the greatest factor shaping human civilization.]]
Other "deterministic"{{Opinion|date=December 2022}} theories actually seek only to highlight the importance of a particular factor in predicting the future. These theories often use the factor as a sort of guide or constraint on the future. They need not suppose that complete knowledge of that one factor would allow the making of perfect predictions.

* [[Philosophy:Psychological determinism|Psychological determinism]] can mean that humans must act according to reason, but it can also be synonymous with some sort of [[Philosophy:Psychological egoism|psychological egoism]]. The latter is the view that humans will always act according to their perceived best interest.
* [[Philosophy:Linguistic determinism|Linguistic determinism]] proposes that language determines (or at least limits) the things that humans can think and say and thus know. The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis argues that individuals experience the world based on the grammatical structures they habitually use.
* [[Philosophy:Economic determinism|Economic determinism]] attributes primacy to economic structure over politics in the development of human history. It is associated with the [[Philosophy:Dialectical materialism|dialectical materialism]] of [[Biography:Karl Marx|Karl Marx]].
* [[Philosophy:Technological determinism|Technological determinism]] is the theory that a society's technology drives the development of its social structure and cultural values.

==Structural==
Structural determinism is the philosophical view that actions, events, and processes are predicated on and determined by structural factors.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Proulx|first=J|date=2008|title=Structural determinism as hindrance to teachers' learning: Implications for teacher education|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337843839|journal=Proceedings of PME-33 and PME-NA-20|volume=4}}</ref> Given any particular structure or set of estimable components, it is a concept that emphasizes rational and predictable outcomes. Chilean biologists [[Biography:Humberto Maturana|Humberto Maturana]] and [[Biography:Francisco Varela|Francisco Varela]] popularized the notion, writing that a living system's general order is maintained via a circular process of ongoing self-referral, and thus its organization and structure defines the changes it undergoes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Leyland|first=M.L|date=1988|title=An introduction to some of the ideas of Humberto Maturana|journal=Journal of Family Therapy|volume=10|issue=4|pages=357–374|doi=10.1046/j..1988.00323.x|doi-access=free}}</ref> According to the authors, a system can undergo changes of state (alteration of structure without loss of identity) or disintegrations (alteration of structure with loss of identity). Such changes or disintegrations are not ascertained by the elements of the disturbing agent, as each disturbance will only trigger responses in the respective system, which in turn, are determined by each system’s own structure.

On an [[Philosophy:Individualism|individualistic]] level, what this means is that human beings as free and independent entities are triggered to react by external stimuli or change in circumstance. However, their own internal state and existing physical and mental capacities determine their responses to those triggers. On a much broader societal level, structural determinists believe that larger issues in the society—especially those pertaining to minorities and subjugated communities—are predominantly assessed through existing structural conditions, making change of prevailing conditions difficult, and sometimes outright impossible. For example, the concept has been applied to the politics of race in the {{wipe|United States}} and other Western countries such as the {{wipe|United Kingdom}} and {{wipe|Australia}}, with structural determinists lamenting structural factors for the prevalence of racism in these countries.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Tate|first=W|date=1997|title=Critical Race Theory and Education: History, Theory, and Implications|url=https://thrive.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/Critical%20Race%20Theory%20and%20Education%20History%2C%20Theory%2C%20and%20Implications.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200819194101/https://thrive.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/Critical%20Race%20Theory%20and%20Education%20History,%20Theory,%20and%20Implications.pdf |archive-date=2020-08-19 |url-status=live|journal=Review of Research in Education|volume=22|pages=195–247|doi=10.3102/0091732X022001195|s2cid=53626156}}</ref> Additionally, [[Philosophy:Marxism|Marxists]] have conceptualized the writings of [[Biography:Karl Marx|Karl Marx]] within the context of structural determinism as well. For example, [[Biography:Louis Althusser|Louis Althusser]], a [[Philosophy:Structural Marxism|structural Marxist]], argues that the state, in its political, economic, and legal structures, reproduces the discourse of capitalism, in turn, allowing for the burgeoning of capitalistic structures.

Proponents of the notion highlight the usefulness of structural determinism to study complicated issues related to race and gender, as it highlights often gilded structural conditions that block meaningful change.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pleasants|first=N|date=2019|title=Free Will, Determinism and the "Problem" of Structure and Agency in the Social Sciences|url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0048393118814952|journal=Philosophy of the Social Sciences|volume=49|pages=3–30|doi=10.1177/0048393118814952|s2cid=149735710|hdl=10871/34537|hdl-access=free}}</ref> Critics call it too rigid, reductionist and inflexible. Additionally, they also criticize the notion for overemphasizing deterministic forces such as structure over the role of human agency and the ability of the people to act. These critics argue that politicians, academics, and social activists have the capability to bring about significant change despite stringent structural conditions.

===With free will===
{{Main|Free will}}Philosophers have debated both the truth of determinism, and the truth of free will. This creates the four possible positions in the figure. [[Philosophy:Compatibilism|Compatibilism]] refers to the view that [[Philosophy:Free will|free will]] is, in some sense, compatible with determinism. The three incompatibilist positions deny this possibility. The hard incompatibilists hold that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, the [[Philosophy:Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarians]] that determinism does not hold, and free will might exist, and the [[Philosophy:Hard determinism|hard determinists]] that determinism does hold and free will does not exist. The Dutch philosopher [[Biography:Baruch Spinoza|Baruch Spinoza]] was a determinist thinker, and argued that human freedom can be achieved through knowledge of the causes that determine our desire and affections. He defined human servitude as the state of bondage of anyone who is aware of their own desires, but ignorant of the causes that determined them. However, the free or virtuous person becomes capable, through reason and knowledge, to be genuinely free, even as they are being "determined". For the Dutch philosopher, acting out of one's own internal necessity is genuine [[Social:Freedom|freedom]] while being driven by exterior determinations is akin to bondage. Spinoza's thoughts on human servitude and liberty are respectively detailed in the fourth<ref>"Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse." – Ethics, Book IV, Preface</ref> and fifth<ref>"At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant." Ethics, book V, Preface</ref> volumes of his work ''Ethics''.

The standard argument against free will, according to philosopher [[Biography:J. J. C. Smart|J. J. C. Smart]], focuses on the implications of determinism for free will.<ref>J. J. C. Smart, "Free-Will, Praise and Blame,"''Mind'', July 1961, pp. 293–294.</ref> He suggests free will is denied whether determinism is true or not. He says that if determinism is true, all actions are predicted and no one is assumed to be free; however, if determinism is false, all actions are presumed to be random and as such no one seems free because they have no part in controlling what happens.

===With the soul===
Some determinists argue that [[Philosophy:Materialism|materialism]] does not present a complete understanding of the universe, because while it can describe determinate interactions among material things, it ignores the [[Philosophy:Mind|mind]]s or souls of conscious beings.

A number of positions can be delineated:

* Immaterial souls are all that exist ([[Philosophy:Idealism|idealism]]).
* Immaterial souls exist and exert a non-deterministic causal influence on bodies (traditional free-will, interactionist dualism).<ref>By "soul" is meant an autonomous immaterial agent that has the power to control the body but not to be controlled by the body (this theory of determinism thus conceives of conscious agents in dualistic terms). Therefore the soul stands to the activities of the individual agent's body as does the creator of the universe to the universe. The creator of the universe put in motion a deterministic system of material entities that would, if left to themselves, carry out the chain of events determined by ordinary causation. But the creator also provided for souls that could exert a causal force analogous to the primordial causal force and alter outcomes in the physical universe via the acts of their bodies. Thus, it emerges that no events in the physical universe are uncaused. Some are caused entirely by the original creative act and the way it plays itself out through time, and some are caused by the acts of created souls. But those created souls were not created by means of physical processes involving ordinary causation. They are another order of being entirely, gifted with the power to modify the original creation. However, determinism is not necessarily limited to matter; it can encompass energy as well. The question of how these immaterial entities can act upon material entities is deeply involved in what is generally known as the "mind-body problem". It is a significant problem which philosophers have not reached agreement about.</ref><ref>{{cite book| chapter-url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/| title = Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)| chapter = Free Will| year = 2022| publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref>
* Immaterial souls exist but are part of a deterministic framework.
* Immaterial souls exist, but exert no causal influence, free or determined ([[Philosophy:Epiphenomenalism|epiphenomenalism]], [[Philosophy:Occasionalism|occasionalism]])
* Immaterial souls do not exist – there is no mind-body [[Dichotomy|dichotomy]], and there is a [[Philosophy:Materialism|materialistic]] explanation for intuitions to the contrary.

===With ethics and morality===
Another topic of debate is the implication that determinism has on [[Philosophy:Ethics|morality]].

Philosopher and incompatibilist [[Biography:Peter van Inwagen|Peter van Inwagen]] introduced this thesis, when arguments that free will is required for moral judgments, as such:<ref>{{cite book|last=van Inwagen|first=Peter|title=The Powers of Rational Beings: Freedom of the Will|publisher=Oxford|year=2009}}{{page needed|date=August 2021}}</ref>
# The moral judgment that ''X'' should not have been done implies that something else should have been done instead.
# That something else should have been done instead implies that there was something else to do.
# That there was something else to do, implies that something else could have been done.
# That something else could have been done implies that there is free will.
# If there is no free will to have done other than ''X'' we cannot make the moral judgment that ''X'' should not have been done.

== History ==
Determinism was developed by the Greek philosophers during the 7th and 6th centuries BCE by the Pre-socratic philosophers [[Biography:Heraclitus|Heraclitus]] and [[Biography:Leucippus|Leucippus]], later [[Biography:Aristotle|Aristotle]], and mainly by the [[Philosophy:Stoicism|Stoics]]. Some of the main philosophers who have dealt with this issue are [[Biography:Marcus Aurelius|Marcus Aurelius]], Omar Khayyám, [[Biography:Thomas Hobbes|Thomas Hobbes]], [[Biography:Baruch Spinoza|Baruch Spinoza]], Gottfried Leibniz, [[Biography:David Hume|David Hume]], [[Biography:Baron d'Holbach|Baron d'Holbach]] (Paul Heinrich Dietrich), [[Biography:Pierre-Simon Laplace|Pierre-Simon Laplace]], [[Biography:Arthur Schopenhauer|Arthur Schopenhauer]], [[Biography:William James|William James]], [[Biography:Friedrich Nietzsche|Friedrich Nietzsche]], [[Biography:Albert Einstein|Albert Einstein]], [[Biography:Niels Bohr|Niels Bohr]], [[Biography:Ralph Waldo Emerson|Ralph Waldo Emerson]] and, more recently, [[Biography:John Searle|John Searle]], [[Biography:Ted Honderich|Ted Honderich]], and [[Biography:Daniel Dennett|Daniel Dennett]].

Mecca Chiesa notes that the probabilistic or selectionistic determinism of [[Biography:B. F. Skinner|B. F. Skinner]] comprised a wholly separate conception of determinism that was not [[Philosophy:Mechanism|mechanistic]] at all. Mechanistic determinism assumes that every event has an unbroken chain of prior occurrences, but a selectionistic or probabilistic model does not.<ref>Chiesa, Mecca (2004) ''Radical Behaviorism: The Philosophy & The Science''.</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Ringen | first1 = J. D. | year = 1993 | title = Adaptation, teleology, and selection by consequences | journal = Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis | volume = 60 | issue = 1| pages = 3–15 | pmc=1322142 | doi=10.1901/jeab.1993.60-3 | pmid=16812698}}</ref>

===Western tradition===
In the West, some elements of determinism have been expressed in Greece from the 6th century BCE by the Presocratics [[Biography:Heraclitus|Heraclitus]]<ref>Stobaeus ''Eclogae'' I 5 ([[Biography:Heraclitus|Heraclitus]])</ref> and [[Biography:Leucippus|Leucippus]].<ref>Stobaeus ''Eclogae'' I 4 ([[Biography:Leucippus|Leucippus]])</ref> The first notions of determinism appears to originate with the [[Philosophy:Stoicism|Stoics]], as part of their theory of universal causal determinism.<ref>[[Biography:Susanne Bobzien|Susanne Bobzien]] ''Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy'' (Oxford 1998) chapter 1.</ref> The resulting philosophical debates, which involved the confluence of elements of Aristotelian Ethics with Stoic psychology, led in the 1st–3rd centuries CE in the works of [[Biography:Alexander of Aphrodisias|Alexander of Aphrodisias]] to the first recorded Western debate over determinism and freedom,<ref>Susanne Bobzien ''The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem'' (Phronesis 43, 1998).</ref> an issue that is known in theology as the [[Philosophy:Argument from free will|paradox of free will]]. The writings of [[Biography:Epictetus|Epictetus]] as well as middle Platonist and early Christian thought were instrumental in this development.<ref>[[Biography:Michael Frede|Michael Frede]] ''A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought'' (Berkeley 2011).</ref> Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides said of the deterministic implications of an omniscient god:<ref>Though Moses Maimonides was not arguing against the existence of God, but rather for the incompatibility between the full ''exercise'' by God of his [[Philosophy:Omniscience|omniscience]] and genuine human [[Philosophy:Free will|free will]], his argument is considered by some as affected by modal fallacy.</ref> "Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that [that] man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would act, otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect."<ref name="maimonides">''The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics (Semonah Perakhim)'', edited, annotated, and translated with an Introduction by Joseph I. Gorfinkle, pp. 99–100. (New York: AMS Press), 1966.</ref>

==== Newtonian mechanics ====
Determinism in the West is often associated with Newtonian mechanics/physics, which depicts the physical matter of the universe as operating according to a set of fixed laws. The "billiard ball" hypothesis, a product of Newtonian physics, argues that once the initial conditions of the universe have been established, the rest of the history of the universe follows inevitably. If it were actually possible to have complete knowledge of physical matter and all of the laws governing that matter at any one time, then it would be theoretically possible to compute the time and place of every event that will ever occur (''[[Laplace's demon]]''). In this sense, the basic particles of the universe operate in the same fashion as the rolling balls on a billiard table, moving and striking each other in predictable ways to produce predictable results.

Whether or not it is all-encompassing in so doing, Newtonian mechanics deals only with caused events; for example, if an object begins in a known position and is hit dead on by an object with some known velocity, then it will be pushed straight toward another predictable point. If it goes somewhere else, the Newtonians argue, one must question one's measurements of the original position of the object, the exact direction of the striking object, gravitational or other fields that were inadvertently ignored, etc. Then, they maintain, repeated experiments and improvements in accuracy will always bring one's observations closer to the theoretically predicted results. When dealing with situations on an ordinary human scale, Newtonian physics has been successful. But it fails as velocities become some substantial fraction of the [[Physics:Speed of light|speed of light]] and when interactions at the atomic scale are studied. Before the discovery of [[Physics:Introduction to quantum mechanics|quantum]] effects and other challenges to Newtonian physics, "uncertainty" was always a term that applied to the accuracy of human knowledge about causes and effects, and not to the causes and effects themselves.

Newtonian mechanics, as well as any following physical theories, are results of observations and experiments, and so they describe "how it all works" within a tolerance. However, old western scientists believed if there are any logical connections found between an observed cause and effect, there must be also some absolute natural laws behind. Belief in perfect natural laws driving everything, instead of just describing what we should expect, led to searching for a set of universal simple laws that rule the world. This movement significantly encouraged deterministic views in Western philosophy,<ref>Swartz, Norman (2003) The Concept of Physical Law / Chapter 10: Free Will and Determinism https://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/</ref> as well as the related theological views of [[Philosophy:Classical pantheism|classical pantheism]].

=== Eastern tradition ===
The idea that the entire universe is a [[Philosophy:Deterministic system|deterministic system]] has been articulated in both Eastern and non-Eastern religions, philosophy, and literature.

The ancient Arabs that inhabited the [[Place:Arabian Peninsula|Arabian Peninsula]] before the advent of Islam used to profess a widespread belief in [[Philosophy:Fatalism|fatalism]] (''ḳadar'') alongside a fearful consideration for [[Astronomy:Astrotheology|the sky and the stars as divine beings]], which they held to be ultimately responsible for every phenomena that occurs on Earth and for the destiny of humankind.<ref name="Al-Abbasi 2020">{{cite journal |last=al-Abbasi |first=Abeer Abdullah |date=August 2020 |title=The Arabsʾ Visions of the Upper Realm |url=https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/ep/0004/article/view/8301/8105 |journal=Marburg Journal of Religion |publisher=[[Organization:University of Marburg|University of Marburg]] |volume=22 |issue=2 |pages=1–28 |doi=10.17192/mjr.2020.22.8301 |issn=1612-2941 |access-date=23 May 2022}}</ref> Accordingly, they shaped their entire lives in accordance with their [[Unsolved:Astrology|interpretations of astral configurations and phenomena]].<ref name="Al-Abbasi 2020"/>

In the ''[[Philosophy:I Ching|I Ching]]'' and philosophical Taoism, the ebb and flow of favorable and unfavorable conditions suggests the path of least resistance is effortless (''see'': Wu wei). In the [[Philosophy:Indian philosophy|philosophical schools of the Indian Subcontinent]], the concept of ''[[Philosophy:Karma|karma]]'' deals with similar philosophical issues to the Western concept of determinism. Karma is understood as a spiritual mechanism which causes the [[Philosophy:Saṃsāra|eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth]] (''saṃsāra'').<ref name="Bodewitz 2019">{{cite book |author-last=Bodewitz |author-first=Henk |year=2019 |chapter=Chapter 1 – The Hindu Doctrine of Transmigration: Its Origin and Background |editor1-last=Heilijgers |editor1-first=Dory H. |editor2-last=Houben |editor2-first=Jan E. M. |editor3-last=van Kooij |editor3-first=Karel |title=Vedic Cosmology and Ethics: Selected Studies |location=Leiden and Boston |publisher=[[Company:Brill Publishers|Brill Publishers]] |series=Gonda Indological Studies |volume=19 |doi=10.1163/9789004400139_002 |doi-access=free |pages=3–19 |isbn=978-90-04-40013-9 |issn=1382-3442}}</ref> Karma, either positive or negative, accumulates according to an individual's actions throughout their life, and at their death determines the nature of their next life in the cycle of Saṃsāra.<ref name="Bodewitz 2019"/> Most major religions originating in India hold this belief to some degree, most notably [[Religion:Hinduism|Hinduism]],<ref name="Bodewitz 2019"/> [[Philosophy:Jainism|Jainism]], [[Religion:Sikhism|Sikhism]], and [[Religion:Buddhism|Buddhism]].

The views on the interaction of karma and free will are numerous, and diverge from each other. For example, in [[Religion:Sikhism#Liberation|Sikhism]], god's grace, gained through worship, can erase one's karmic debts, a belief which reconciles the principle of karma with a monotheistic god one must freely choose to worship.<ref>House, H. Wayne. 1991. "Resurrection, Reincarnation, and Humanness." ''Bibliotheca Sacra'' 148(590). Retrieved 29 November 2013.</ref> [[Unsolved:Karma in Jainism#Material theory|Jainists]] believe in [[Philosophy:Compatibilism|compatibilism]], in which the cycle of Saṃsara is a completely mechanistic process, occurring without any divine intervention. The Jains hold an atomic view of reality, in which particles of karma form the fundamental microscopic building material of the universe.

==== Ājīvika ====
In ancient India, the [[Philosophy:Ājīvika|Ājīvika]] school of philosophy founded by [[Biography:Makkhali Gosala|Makkhali Gosāla]] (around 500 BCE), otherwise referred to as "Ājīvikism" in Western scholarship,<ref name="Balcerowicz">{{cite book |last=Balcerowicz |first=Piotr |year=2016 |chapter=Determinism, Ājīvikas, and Jainism |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nfOPCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA136 |title=Early Asceticism in India: Ājīvikism and Jainism |location=[[Place:London|London]] and {{wipe|New York City}} |publisher=[[Company:Routledge|Routledge]] |edition=1st |series=Routledge Advances in Jaina Studies |pages=136–174 |isbn=9781317538530 |quote=The Ājīvikas' doctrinal signature was indubitably the idea of determinism and [[Philosophy:Fate|fate]], which traditionally incorporated four elements: the doctrine of destiny (''niyati-vāda''), the doctrine of predetermined concurrence of factors (''saṅgati-vāda''), the doctrine of intrinsic nature (''svabhāva-vāda''), occasionally also linked to [[Philosophy:Charvaka|materialists]], and the doctrine of fate (''daiva-vāda''), or simply [[Philosophy:Fatalism|fatalism]]. The Ājīvikas' emphasis on fate and determinism was so profound that later sources would consistently refer to them as ''niyati-vādins'', or ‘the propounders of the doctrine of destiny’.}}</ref> upheld the ''Niyati'' ("[[Philosophy:Fate|Fate]]") doctrine of absolute [[Philosophy:Fatalism|fatalism]] or determinism,<ref name="Balcerowicz"/><ref name="Leaman 1999">{{cite book |editor-last=Leaman |editor-first=Oliver |year=1999 |chapter=Fatalism |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_4crBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA80 |title=Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy |location=[[Place:London|London]] and {{wipe|New York City}} |publisher=[[Company:Routledge|Routledge]] |edition=1st |series=Routledge Key Guides |pages=80–81 |isbn=9780415173636 |quote='''Fatalism.''' Some of the teachings of [[Philosophy:Indian philosophy|Indian philosophy]] are fatalistic. For example, the Ajivika school argued that fate (''nyati'') governs both the [[Philosophy:Saṃsāra|cycle of birth and rebirth]], and also individual lives. Suffering is not attributed to past actions, but just takes place without any cause or rationale, as does relief from suffering. There is nothing we can do to achieve '''''[[Philosophy:Moksha|moksha]]''''', we just have to hope that all will go well with us. [...] But the Ajivikas were committed to '''[[Philosophy:Asceticism|asceticism]]''', and they justified this in terms of its practice being just as determined by fate as anything else.}}</ref><ref name="Basham 1981">{{cite book |author-last=Basham |author-first=Arthur L. |year=1981 |origyear=1951 |chapter=Chapter XII: Niyati |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BiGQzc5lRGYC&pg=PA224 |title=History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas, a Vanished Indian Religion |location=[[Place:Delhi|Delhi]] |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass |edition=1st |series=Lala L. S. Jain Series |pages=224–238 |isbn=9788120812048 |oclc=633493794 |quote=The fundamental principle of Ājīvika philosophy was Fate, usually called ''Niyati''. [[Religion:Buddhist texts|Buddhist]] and [[Religion:Jain literature|Jaina]] sources agree that [[Biography:Makkhali Gosala|Gosāla]] was a rigid determinist, who exalted ''Niyati'' to the status of the motive factor of the universe and the sole agent of all phenomenal change. This is quite clear in our ''locus classicus'', the ''Samaññaphala Sutta''. Sin and suffering, attributed by [[Philosophy:Āstika and nāstika|other sects]] to the laws of ''[[Philosophy:Karma|karma]]'', the result of evil committed in the previous lives or in the present one, were declared by Gosāla to be without cause or basis, other, presumably, than the force of destiny. Similarly, the escape from evil, the working off of accumulated evil ''karma'', was likewise without cause or basis.}}</ref> which negates the existence of [[Philosophy:Free will|free will]] and ''[[Philosophy:Karma|karma]]'', and is therefore considered one of the [[Philosophy:Āstika and nāstika|''nāstika'']] or "heterodox" schools of [[Philosophy:Indian philosophy|Indian philosophy]].<ref name="Balcerowicz"/><ref name="Leaman 1999"/><ref name="Basham 1981"/> The oldest descriptions of the Ājīvika fatalists and their founder Gosāla can be found both in the [[Religion:Buddhist texts|Buddhist]] and [[Religion:Jain literature|Jaina]] scriptures of ancient India.<ref name="Balcerowicz"/><ref name="Basham 1981"/> The predetermined fate of living beings and the impossibility to achieve liberation (''[[Philosophy:Moksha|moksha]]'') from the [[Philosophy:Saṃsāra|eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth]] was the major distinctive philosophical and [[Philosophy:Metaphysics|metaphysical]] doctrine of this heterodox school of Indian philosophy,<ref name="Balcerowicz"/><ref name="Leaman 1999"/><ref name="Basham 1981"/> annoverated among the other ''Śramaṇa'' movements that emerged in India during the Second urbanization (600–200 BCE).<ref name="Balcerowicz"/>

==== Buddhism ====
[[Philosophy:Buddhist philosophy|Buddhist philosophy]] contains several concepts which some scholars {{By whom|date=December 2022}} describe as deterministic to various levels. 

One concept which is argued {{By whom|date=December 2022}} to support a hard determinism is the idea of [[Philosophy:Pratītyasamutpāda|dependent origination]], which claims that all phenomena (''[[Philosophy:Dharma|dharma]]'') are necessarily caused by some other phenomenon, which it can be said to be ''dependent'' on, like links in a massive chain. In traditional Buddhist philosophy, this concept is used to explain the functioning of the cycle of ''saṃsāra''; all actions exert a karmic force, which will manifest results in future lives. In other words, righteous or unrighteous actions in one life will necessarily cause good or bad responses in another.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tricycle.org/magazine/dependent-origination/|title=Dependent Origination: The Twelve Links Explained|last=Goldstein|first=Joseph|website=Tricycle: The Buddhist Review|language=en|access-date=2020-01-26}}</ref>

Another Buddhist concept which many scholars perceive to be deterministic is the idea of [[Philosophy:Anatta|non-self]], or ''[[Philosophy:Anatta|anatta]]''.<ref name=":0" /> In Buddhism, attaining [[Philosophy:Nirvana|enlightenment]] involves one realizing that in humans there is no fundamental core of being which can be called the "soul", and that humans are instead made of several constantly changing [[Philosophy:Skandha|factors]] which bind them to the cycle of Saṃsāra.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/anatta|title=Anatta {{!}} Buddhism|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|language=en|access-date=2020-01-26}}</ref>

Some scholars argue that the concept of non-self necessarily disproves the ideas of free will and moral culpability. If there is no autonomous self, in this view, and all events are necessarily and unchangeably caused by others, then no type of autonomy can be said to exist, moral or otherwise. However, other scholars disagree, claiming that the Buddhist conception of the universe allows for a form of compatibilism. Buddhism perceives reality occurring on two different levels, the ultimate reality which can only be truly understood by the enlightened, and the [[Religion:Maya#Buddhism|illusory]] and false material reality. Therefore, Buddhism perceives free will as a notion belonging to material reality, while concepts like non-self and dependent origination belong to the ultimate reality; the transition between the two can be truly understood, Buddhists claim, by one who has attained enlightenment.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Repetti|first=Ricardo|date=2012|title=Buddhist Hard Determinism: No Self, No Free Will, No Responsibility|url=http://enlight.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-MAG/mag388415.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200126014915/http://enlight.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-MAG/mag388415.pdf |archive-date=2020-01-26 |url-status=live|journal=Journal of Buddhist Ethics|volume=19|pages=136–137, 143–145}}</ref>

== Modern scientific perspective ==

=== Generative processes ===
{{Main|Philosophy:Emergence}}
Although it was once thought by scientists that any indeterminism in quantum mechanics occurred at too small a scale to influence biological or neurological systems, there is indication that [[Biology:Nervous system|nervous system]]s are influenced by quantum indeterminism due to [[Chaos theory|chaos theory]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lewis |first1=Edwin R. |last2=Macgregor |first2=Ronald J. |date=2006-06-01 |title=On indeterminism, chaos, and small number particle systems in the brain |url=https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219635206001112 |journal=Journal of Integrative Neuroscience |volume=05 |issue=2 |pages=223–247 |doi=10.1142/S0219635206001112 |pmid=16783870 |issn=0219-6352}}</ref> It is unclear what implications this has for the problem of [[Philosophy:Free will|free will]] given various possible reactions to the problem in the first place.<ref>{{cite journal | doi=10.1142/S0219635206001112 | last=Lewis | first=E.R. |author2=MacGregor, R.J. | year=2006 | title=On Indeterminism, Chaos, and Small Number Particle Systems in the Brain | journal=Journal of Integrative Neuroscience | volume=5 | issue=2 | pages=223–247 |url=http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~lewis/LewisMacGregor.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110608034826/http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~lewis/LewisMacGregor.pdf |archive-date=2011-06-08 |url-status=live | citeseerx=10.1.1.361.7065 | pmid=16783870 }}</ref> Many biologists do not grant determinism: [[Biography:Christof Koch|Christof Koch]], for instance, argues against it, and in favour of [[Philosophy:Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarian free will]], by making arguments based on generative processes ([[Philosophy:Emergence|emergence]]).<ref name=Koch>{{cite book |last1=Koch |first1=Christof |editor1-first=Nancy|editor1-last=Murphy |editor2-first=George |editor2-last=Ellis |editor3-first=Timothy|editor3-last=O'Connor |title=Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will |year=2009 |publisher=[[Company:Springer Science+Business Media|Springer]] |location=New York|isbn=978-3-642-03204-2 |chapter=Free Will, Physics, Biology and the Brain|bibcode=2009dcnf.book.....M }}</ref> Other proponents of emergentist or [[Philosophy:Emergence|generative philosophy]], [[Cognitive science|cognitive science]]s, and [[Philosophy:Evolutionary psychology|evolutionary psychology]], argue that a certain form of determinism (not necessarily causal) is true.<ref name="Kenrick">{{cite journal | last1 = Kenrick | first1 = D. T. | last2 = Li | first2 = N. P. | last3 = Butner | first3 = J. | year = 2003 | title = Dynamical evolutionary psychology: Individual decision rules and emergent social norms | url = http://www.mysmu.edu/faculty/normanli/KenrickLiButner2003.pdf| journal = Psychological Review | volume = 110 | issue = 1| pages = 3–28 | doi=10.1037/0033-295x.110.1.3 | pmid=12529056| citeseerx = 10.1.1.526.5218 | s2cid = 43306158 }}</ref><ref name="Nowak">Nowak A., Vallacher R.R., Tesser A., Borkowski W., (2000) "Society of Self: The emergence of collective properties in self-structure", Psychological Review 107.</ref><ref name="Axtell">Epstein J.M. and Axtell R. (1996) Growing Artificial Societies - Social Science from the Bottom. Cambridge MA, MIT Press.</ref><ref name="Epstein">Epstein J.M. (1999) Agent Based Models and Generative Social Science. Complexity, IV (5)</ref> They suggest instead that an illusion of free will is experienced due to the generation of infinite behaviour from the interaction of finite-deterministic set of rules and [[Parameter|parameter]]s. Thus the unpredictability of the emerging behaviour from deterministic processes leads to a perception of free will, even though free will as an [[Philosophy:Ontology|ontological]] entity does not exist.<ref name= "Kenrick"/><ref name= "Nowak"/><ref name= "Axtell"/><ref name= "Epstein"/>

[[File:Gospers glider gun.gif|thumb|right|120px|In [[Conway's Game of Life|Conway's Game of Life]], the interaction of just four simple rules creates patterns that seem somehow "alive".]]

As an illustration, the strategy board-games chess and [[Software:Go (game)|Go]] have rigorous rules in which no information (such as cards' face-values) is hidden from either player and no [[Randomness|random]] events (such as dice-rolling) happen within the game. Yet, chess and especially Go with its extremely simple deterministic rules, can still have an extremely large number of unpredictable moves. When chess is simplified to 7 or fewer pieces, however, endgame tables are available that dictate which moves to play to achieve a perfect game.  This implies that, given a less complex environment (with the original 32 pieces reduced to 7 or fewer pieces), a perfectly predictable game of chess is possible.  In this scenario, the winning player can announce that a checkmate will happen within a given number of moves, assuming a perfect defense by the losing player, or fewer moves if the defending player chooses sub-optimal moves as the game progresses into its inevitable, predicted conclusion. By this analogy, it is suggested, the experience of free will emerges from the interaction of finite rules and deterministic parameters that generate nearly infinite and practically unpredictable behavioural responses. In theory, if all these events could be accounted for, and there were a known way to evaluate these events, the seemingly unpredictable behaviour would become predictable.<ref name= "Kenrick"/><ref name= "Nowak"/><ref name= "Axtell"/><ref name= "Epstein"/> Another hands-on example of generative processes is [[Biography:John Horton Conway|John Horton Conway]]'s playable [[Conway's Game of Life|Game of Life]].<ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.bitstorm.org/gameoflife/| title = John Conway's Game of Life}}</ref> [[Biography:Nassim Nicholas Taleb|Nassim Taleb]] is wary of such models, and coined the term "[[Philosophy:Ludic fallacy|ludic fallacy]]."

=== Compatibility with the existence of science ===
Certain [[Philosophy:Philosophy of science|philosophers of science]] argue that, while causal determinism (in which everything including the brain/mind is subject to the laws of causality) is compatible with minds capable of science, fatalism and predestination is not. These philosophers make the distinction that causal determinism means that each step is determined by the step before and therefore allows sensory input from observational data to determine what conclusions the [[Biology:Brain|brain]] reaches, while fatalism in which the steps between do not connect an initial cause to the results would make it impossible for observational data to correct false hypotheses. This is often combined with the argument that if the brain had fixed views and the arguments were mere after-constructs with no causal effect on the conclusions, science would have been impossible and the use of arguments would have been a meaningless waste of energy with no persuasive effect on brains with fixed views.<ref>Karl Popper: Conjectures and refutations{{page needed|date=August 2021}}</ref>

=== Mathematical models ===
Many mathematical models of physical systems are deterministic. This is true of most models involving differential equations (notably, those measuring rate of change over time). Mathematical models that are not deterministic because they involve randomness are called [[Stochastic|stochastic]]. Because of sensitive dependence on initial conditions, some deterministic models may appear to behave non-deterministically; in such cases, a deterministic interpretation of the model may not be useful due to numerical instability and a finite amount of [[Accuracy and precision|precision]] in measurement. Such considerations can motivate the consideration of a stochastic model even though the underlying system is governed by deterministic equations.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Werndl | first1 = Charlotte | year = 2009 | title = Are Deterministic Descriptions and Indeterministic Descriptions Observationally Equivalent? | doi = 10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.06.004 | journal = Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics | volume = 40 | issue = 3| pages = 232–242 | bibcode = 2009SHPMP..40..232W | arxiv = 1310.1615 | s2cid = 11515304 }}</ref><ref>Werndl, Charlotte (2009). ''[http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004775/ Deterministic Versus Indeterministic Descriptions: Not That Different After All?]''. In: A. Hieke and H. Leitgeb (eds), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis, Proceedings of the 31st International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium. Ontos, 63–78.</ref><ref>J. Glimm, D. Sharp, ''Stochastic Differential Equations: Selected Applications in Continuum Physics'', in: R.A. Carmona, B. Rozovskii (ed.) ''Stochastic Partial Differential Equations: Six Perspectives'', American Mathematical Society (1998) {{ISBN|0-8218-0806-0}}{{page needed|date=August 2021}}</ref>

=== Quantum and classical mechanics ===

====Day-to-day physics====
{{further|Physics:Macroscopic quantum phenomena}}
Since the beginning of the 20th century, [[Physics:Quantum mechanics|quantum mechanics]]—the physics of the extremely small—has revealed previously concealed aspects of [[Philosophy:Phenomenon|event]]s. Before that, [[Physics:Classical mechanics|Newtonian physics]]—the physics of everyday life—dominated. Taken in isolation (rather than as an [[Approximation|approximation]] to quantum mechanics), Newtonian physics depicts a universe in which objects move in perfectly determined ways. At the scale where humans exist and interact with the universe, Newtonian mechanics remain useful, and make relatively accurate predictions (e.g. calculating the trajectory of a bullet). But whereas in theory, [[Philosophy:Universality|absolute knowledge]] of the forces accelerating a bullet would produce an absolutely accurate prediction of its path, modern quantum mechanics casts reasonable doubt on this main thesis of determinism.

====Quantum realm====
Quantum physics works differently in many ways from Newtonian physics. Physicist [[Biography:Aaron D. O'Connell|Aaron D. O'Connell]] explains that understanding our universe, at such [[Quantum realm|small scales as atoms]], requires a different logic than day-to-day life does. O'Connell does not deny that it is all interconnected: the scale of human existence ultimately does emerge from the quantum scale. O'Connell argues that we must simply use different models and constructs when dealing with the quantum world.<ref>{{cite web| url = http://blog.ted.com/2011/06/02/struggling-with-quantum-logic-qa-with-aaron-oconnell/| title = Struggling with quantum logic: Q&A with Aaron O'Connell}}</ref> Quantum mechanics is the product of a careful application of the [[Scientific method|scientific method]], [[Logic|logic]] and [[Philosophy:Empiricism|empiricism]]. The [[Physics:Heisenberg uncertainty principle|Heisenberg uncertainty principle]] is frequently confused with the [[Physics:Observer effect|observer effect]]. The uncertainty principle actually describes how precisely we may measure the [[Position (vector)|position]] and [[Physics:Momentum|momentum]] of a particle at the same time—if we increase the accuracy in measuring one quantity, we are forced to lose accuracy in measuring the other. "These uncertainty relations give us that measure of freedom from the limitations of classical concepts which is necessary for a consistent description of atomic processes."<ref name="Heisenberg1930">{{cite book |first=Werner |last=Heisenberg |year=1949 |title=Physikalische Prinzipien der Quantentheorie |trans-title=Physical Principles of Quantum Theory |location=Leipzig |publisher=Hirzel/University of Chicago Press |page=4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NzMBh4ZxKJsC&pg=PA4|isbn=9780486601137}}</ref>

[[File:Double-slit experiment results Tanamura 2.jpg|thumb|right|Although it is not possible to predict the trajectory of any one particle, they all obey determined probabilities which do permit some prediction.]]
This is where [[Physics:Statistical mechanics|statistical mechanics]] come into play, and where physicists begin to require rather unintuitive mental models: A particle's path simply cannot be exactly specified in its full quantum description. "Path" is a classical, practical attribute in our everyday life, but one that quantum particles do not meaningfully possess. The probabilities discovered in quantum mechanics do nevertheless arise from measurement (of the perceived path of the particle). As [[Biography:Stephen Hawking|Stephen Hawking]] explains, the result is not traditional determinism, but rather determined probabilities.<ref name=GDesign>Grand Design (2010), p. 32: "the molecular basis of biology shows that biological processes are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry and therefore are as determined as the orbits of the planets...so it seems that we are no more than biological machines and that free will is just an illusion", and p. 72: "Quantum physics might seem to undermine the idea that nature is governed by laws, but that is not the case. Instead it leads us to accept a new form of determinism: Given the state of a system at some time, the laws of nature determine the probabilities of various futures and pasts rather than determining the future and past with certainty." (discussing a Many worlds interpretation)</ref> In some cases, a quantum particle may indeed trace an exact path, and the probability of finding the particles in that path is one (certain to be true). In fact, as far as prediction goes, the quantum development is at least as predictable as the classical motion, but the key is that it describes [[Wave function|wave function]]s that cannot be easily expressed in ordinary language. As far as the thesis of determinism is concerned, these probabilities, at least, are quite determined. These findings from quantum mechanics have found many [[Physics:Quantum mechanics#Applications|applications]], and allow us to build transistors and lasers. Put another way: personal computers, Blu-ray players and the Internet all work because humankind discovered the determined probabilities of the quantum world.<ref name="WhatIsItGoodFor?">{{cite web| url = http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=everyday-quantum-physics| title = Scientific American, "What is Quantum Mechanics Good For?"| website = Scientific American}}</ref>

On the topic of predictable probabilities, the [[Physics:Double-slit experiment|double-slit experiment]]s are a popular example. [[Physics:Photon|Photon]]s are fired one-by-one through a double-slit apparatus at a distant screen. They do not arrive at any single point, nor even the two points lined up with the slits (the way it might be expected of bullets fired by a fixed gun at a distant target). Instead, the light arrives in varying concentrations at widely separated points, and the distribution of its collisions with the target can be calculated reliably. In that sense the behavior of light in this apparatus is deterministic, but there is no way to predict where in the resulting interference pattern any individual [[Physics:Photon|photon]] will make its contribution (although, there may be ways to use [[Weak measurement|weak measurement]] to acquire more information without violating the [[Physics:Uncertainty principle|uncertainty principle]]).

Some (including [[Biography:Albert Einstein|Albert Einstein]]) have argued that the inability to predict any more than probabilities is simply due to ignorance.<ref>[[Biography:Albert Einstein|Albert Einstein]] insisted that, "I am convinced God does not play dice" in a private letter to [[Biography:Max Born|Max Born]], 4 December 1926, [http://www.alberteinstein.info/db/ViewDetails.do?DocumentID=38009 Albert Einstein Archives] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100819045822/http://www.alberteinstein.info/db/ViewDetails.do?DocumentID=38009 |date=19 August 2010 }} reel 8, item 180</ref> The idea is that, beyond the conditions and laws can be observed or deduced, there are also hidden factors or "hidden variables" that determine ''absolutely'' in which order photons reach the detector screen. They argue that the course of the universe is absolutely determined, but that humans are screened from knowledge of the determinative factors. So, they say, it only ''appears'' that things proceed in a merely probabilistically determinative way. In actuality, they proceed in an absolutely deterministic way.

John S. Bell criticized Einstein's work in his famous [[Bell's theorem]], which, under a strict set of assumptions, demonstrates that quantum mechanics can make statistical predictions that would be violated if local hidden variables really existed. A number of experiments have tried to verify such predictions, and so far they do not appear to be violated. Current experiments continue to verify the result, including the 2015 "[[Physics:Bell test experiments#Hensen et al..2C Giustina et al..2C Shalm et al. .282015.29: .22loophole-free.22 Bell tests|Loophole Free Test]]" that plugged all known sources of error and the 2017 "[[Physics:Bell test experiments#Johannes Handsteiner et al. .282017.29: .22Cosmic Bell Test.22 - Measurement Settings from Milky Way Stars|Cosmic Bell Test]]" experiment that used cosmic data streaming from different directions toward the Earth, precluding the possibility the sources of data could have had prior interactions. 

Bell's theorem has been criticized from the perspective of its strict set of assumptions. A foundational assumption to quantum mechanics is the [[Physics:Principle of locality|Principle of locality]]. To abandon this assumption would require the construction of a non-local hidden variable theory. Therefore, it is possible to augment quantum mechanics with non-local hidden variables to achieve a deterministic theory that is in agreement with experiment.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jabs |first=Arthur |year=2016 |title=A conjecture concerning determinism, reduction, and measurement in quantum mechanics |journal=Quantum Studies: Mathematics and Foundations |volume=3 |issue=4 |pages=279–292 |arxiv=1204.0614 |doi=10.1007/s40509-016-0077-7 |s2cid=32523066}}</ref> An example is the Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics. Bohm's Interpretation, though, violates special relativity and it is highly controversial whether or not it can be reconciled without giving up on determinism. 

Another foundational assumption to quantum mechanics is that of [[Philosophy:Free will|free will]],<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zeilinger |first=Anton |title=Dance of the Photons: From Einstein to Quantum Teleportation |publisher=Farrar, Straus and Giroux |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-374-23966-4 |edition=1st |location=18 West 18th Street, New York 10011 |pages=261 |quote=A new picture of the world must encompass three properties that evidently seem to play a significant role in quantum experiments[...]The second important property of the world that we always implicitly assume is the freedom of the individual experimentalist. This is the assumption of free will. It is a free decision what measurement one wants to perform.}}</ref> which has been argued<ref>{{Cite book |last=Gisin |first=Nicolas |title=Quantum Chance: Nonlocality, Teleportation and Other Quantum Marvels |publisher=Sringer International Publishing |year=2014 |isbn=978-3-319-05472-8 |location=Switzerland |pages=90 |quote=not only does free will exist, but it is a prerequisite for science, philosophy, and our very ability to think rationally in a meaningful way. Without free will, there could be no rational thought. As a consequence, it is quite simply impossible for science and philosophy to deny free will.}}</ref> to be foundational to the scientific method as a whole. Bell acknowledged that abandoning this assumption would both allow for the maintenance of determinism as well as locality.<ref>BBC Radio interview with Paul Davies, 1985: "''There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the 'decision' by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears."''

</ref> This perspective is known as [[Physics:Superdeterminism|superdeterminism]], and is defended by some physicists such as [[Biography:Sabine Hossenfelder|Sabine Hossenfelder]] and Tim Palmer.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hossenfelder|first1=Sabine|last2=Palmer|first2=Tim|date=2020|title=Rethinking Superdeterminism|journal=Frontiers in Physics|volume=8|page=139|language=English|doi=10.3389/fphy.2020.00139|arxiv=1912.06462|bibcode=2020FrP.....8..139P|issn=2296-424X|doi-access=free}}</ref>

More advanced variations on these arguments include [[Physics:Quantum contextuality|quantum contextuality]], by Bell, [[Biography:Simon B. Kochen|Simon B. Kochen]] and [[Biography:Ernst Specker|Ernst Specker]], which argues that hidden variable theories cannot be "sensible", meaning that the values of the hidden variables inherently depend on the devices used to measure them.

This debate is relevant because there are possibly specific situations in which the arrival of an electron at a screen at a certain point and time would trigger one event, whereas its arrival at another point would trigger an entirely different event (e.g. see [[Physics:Schrödinger's cat|Schrödinger's cat]] – a thought experiment used as part of a deeper debate).

Thus, quantum physics casts reasonable doubt on the traditional determinism of classical, Newtonian physics in so far as reality does not seem to be absolutely determined. This was the subject of the famous [[Physics:Bohr–Einstein debates|Bohr–Einstein debates]] between Einstein and [[Biography:Niels Bohr|Niels Bohr]] and there is [[Physics:Interpretations of quantum mechanics#Comparisons|still no consensus]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bishop |first1=Robert C. |editor1-first=Robert |editor1-last=Kane |title=The Oxford Handbook of Free Will |edition=Second |year=2011 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford, New York |isbn=9780195399691 | oclc=653483691 |page=90 |chapter=Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kzcFDsWg0GEC&pg=PA90 |quote=The key question is whether to understand the nature of this probability as epistemic or ontic. Along epistemic lines, one possibility is that there is some additional factor (i.e., a hidden mechanism) such that once we discover and understand this factor, we would be able to predict the observed behavior of the quantum stoplight with certainty (physicists call this approach a "hidden variable theory"; see, e.g., Bell 1987, 1–13, 29–39; Bohm 1952a, 1952b; Bohm and Hiley 1993; Bub 1997, 40–114, Holland 1993; see also the preceding essay in this volume by Hodgson). Or perhaps there is an interaction with the broader environment (e.g., neighboring buildings, trees) that we have not taken into account in our observations that explains how these probabilities arise (physicists call this approach decoherence or consistent histories<sup>15</sup>). Under either of these approaches, we would interpret the observed indeterminism in the behavior of stoplights as an expression of our ignorance about the actual workings. Under an ignorance interpretation, indeterminism would not be a fundamental feature of quantum stoplights, but merely epistemic in nature due to our lack of knowledge about the system. Quantum stoplights would turn to be deterministic after all.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Baggott|first1=Jim E.|title=Beyond Measure: Modern Physics, Philosophy, and the Meaning of Quantum Theory|year=2004|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford, New York|isbn=978-0-19-852536-3|oclc=52486237|page=203|chapter=Complementarity and Entanglement|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uVdjwsqrgz8C&q=scientific+consensus+determinism+bell+theorem&pg=PA203|quote=So, was Einstein wrong? In the sense that the EPR paper argued in favor of an objective reality for each quantum particle in an entangled pair independent of the other and of the measuring device, the answer must be yes. But if Einstein was wrong to hold to the realist's belief that the physics of the universe should be objective and deterministic, it must be acknowledged that no answer exists for such a question. It is in the nature of theoretical science that there can be no such thing as certainty. A theory is only "true" for as long as the majority of the scientific community maintain a consensus view that the theory is the one best able to explain the observations. And the story of quantum theory is not over yet.}}</ref>

Adequate determinism (see Varieties, above) is the reason that Stephen Hawking calls [[Philosophy:Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarian free will]] "just an illusion".<ref name="GDesign"/>

== See also ==
{{cols|colwidth=21em}}
* ''[[Philosophy:Amor fati|Amor fati]]''
* [[Religion:Calvinism|Calvinism]]
* [[Physics:Digital physics|Digital physics]]
* [[Social:False necessity|False necessity]]
* [[Fractal]]
* [[Game theory]]
* [[Biography:Ilya Prigogine|Ilya Prigogine]]
* [[Physics:Interpretations of quantum mechanics|Interpretations of quantum mechanics]]
* [[Philosophy:Lazy reason|Lazy reason]]
* Naturalism (literature)
* ''[[Philosophy:Notes from Underground|Notes from Underground]]''
* [[Religion:Open theism|Open theism]]
* [[Physics:Philosophical interpretation of classical physics|Philosophical interpretation of classical physics]]
* [[Philosophy:Positivism|Positivism]]
* [[Philosophy:Radical behaviorism|Radical behaviorism]]
* [[Philosophy:Voluntarism#Metaphysical voluntarism|Voluntarism]]
* [[Physics:Wheeler–Feynman absorber theory|Wheeler–Feynman absorber theory]]
{{colend}}

==References==

===Notes===
{{Reflist}}

===Bibliography===
* [[Biography:Daniel Dennett|Daniel Dennett]] (2003) ''Freedom Evolves''. Viking Penguin.
* [[Biography:John Earman|John Earman]] (2007) "Aspects of Determinism in Modern Physics" in Butterfield, J., and Earman, J., eds., ''Philosophy of Physics, Part B''. North Holland: 1369–1434.
* George Ellis (2005) "Physics and the Real World", ''Physics Today''.
* {{cite journal | last1 = Epstein | first1 = J.M. | year = 1999 | title = Agent Based Models and Generative Social Science | journal = Complexity | volume = IV | issue = 5| pages = 41–60 | doi=10.1002/(sici)1099-0526(199905/06)4:5<41::aid-cplx9>3.0.co;2-f| bibcode = 1999Cmplx...4e..41E| citeseerx = 10.1.1.118.546 }}
* Epstein, J.M. and Axtell R. (1996) ''Growing Artificial Societies – Social Science from the Bottom''. MIT Press.
*Harris, James A. (2005) ''Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy.'' Clarendon Press.
* {{cite journal | last1 = Kenrick | first1 = D. T. | last2 = Li | first2 = N. P. | last3 = Butner | first3 = J. | year = 2003 | title = Dynamical evolutionary psychology: Individual decision rules and emergent social norms | url = http://www.mysmu.edu/faculty/normanli/KenrickLiButner2003.pdf| journal = Psychological Review | volume = 110 | issue = 1| pages = 3–28 | doi=10.1037/0033-295x.110.1.3 | pmid=12529056| citeseerx = 10.1.1.526.5218 | s2cid = 43306158 }}
* [[Biography:Albert Messiah|Albert Messiah]], ''Quantum Mechanics'', English translation by G. M. Temmer of ''Mécanique Quantique'', 1966, John Wiley and Sons, vol. I, chapter IV, section III.
* {{cite journal |author=Ernest Nagel |title=Determinism in history
|journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
|volume=20
|issue=3
|pages=291–317
|date=3 March 1960 
|doi=10.2307/2105051
 |jstor=2105051}} (Online version [http://www.drabruzzi.com/NAGEL_Determinism%20In%20History.pdf found here])
* {{cite book |title=The Philosophy of Science: A-M |editor1=Sahotra Sarkar |editor2=Jessica Pfeifer |author=John T Roberts |chapter=Determinism |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UchIDBrAQEMC&pg=PA197 |pages=197 ''ff'' |isbn=978-0415977098 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year=2006}}
* Nowak A., Vallacher R.R., Tesser A., Borkowski W., (2000) "Society of Self: The emergence of collective properties in self-structure", ''Psychological Review'' 107.

==Further reading==
* George Musser, "Is the Cosmos Random?  ([[Biography:Albert Einstein|Einstein]]'s assertion that God does not play dice with the universe has been misinterpreted)", ''Scientific American'', vol. 313, no. 3 (September 2015), pp.&nbsp;88–93.

== External links ==
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Causal Determinism]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20050404080900/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv2-02 Determinism in History] from the ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas''
*[http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwIntroIndex.htm Philosopher Ted Honderich's Determinism web resource]
*[http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/determinism.html Determinism on Information Philosopher]
*[http://www.determinism.com The Society of Natural Science] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126101052/http://www.determinism.com/ |date=26 January 2021 }}
*[http://www.chabad.org/article.asp?AID=3017 Determinism and Free Will in Judaism]
*[http://www.jottings.ca/john/cogitations.html Snooker, Pool, and Determinism]
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