View source for Biography:Xi Jinping

{{Short description|General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party since 2012, President of China since 2013}}
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<!-- This article uses explanatory footnote surname clarification. Please do NOT add a family name hatnote here. -->
{{Family name hatnote|Xí ({{lang|zh-Hans|习|italic=no}})}}
{{Infobox officeholder
| honorific_prefix    = 
| name                = Xi Jinping
| native_name         = {{nobold|习近平}}
| native_name_lang    = zh-Hans-CN
| image               = Xi Jinping with Macron and Von der Leyen 2023.jpg
| caption             = Xi in 2023
| office              = General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
| term_start          = 15 November 2012
| term_end            = 
| predecessor         = Hu Jintao
| successor           = 
| office1             = 7th President of the People's Republic of China
| premier1            = {{ubl|Li Keqiang (2013–23)|Li Qiang (since 2023)}}
| vicepresident1      = {{ubl|Li Yuanchao (2013–18)|Wang Qishan (2018–23)|Han Zheng (since 2023)}}
| term_start1         = 14 March 2013
| term_end1           = 
| predecessor1        = Hu Jintao
| successor1          = 
| office2             = Chairman of the Central Military Commission
| deputy2             = {{ubl|Fan Changlong|Xu Qiliang|Zhang Youxia|He Weidong}}
| term_start2         = {{ubl|'''Party Commission''': {{nowrap|15 November 2012}}|'''State Commission''': {{nowrap|14 March 2013}}}}
| term_end2           = 
| predecessor2        = Hu Jintao
| office3             = First-ranked Secretary of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party
| term_start3         = 22 October 2007
| term_end3           = 15 November 2012
| 1blankname3         = {{nowrap|General Secretary}}
| 1namedata3          = Hu Jintao
| predecessor3        = Zeng Qinghong
| successor3          = Liu Yunshan
| office4             = 8th Vice President of the People's Republic of China
| term_start4         = 15 March 2008
| term_end4           = 14 March 2013
| president4          = Hu Jintao
| predecessor4        = Zeng Qinghong
| successor4          = Li Yuanchao
| birth_date          = {{Birth date and age|df=yes|1953|06|15}}
| birth_place         = [[Place:Beijing|Beijing]], China
| death_date          = 
| death_place         = 
| party               = CCP (since 1974)
| allegiance          = 
| branch              = 
| serviceyears        = 
| unit                = 
| rank                = 
| spouse              = {{ubl|{{Marriage|Ke Lingling|1979|1982|end=divorced}}|{{Marriage|Peng Liyuan|1 September 1987}}}}
| children            = Xi Mingze (daughter)
| residence           = Zhongnanhai
| alma_mater          = Tsinghua University
| father              = Xi Zhongxun
| mother              = Qi Xin
| relatives           = {{ubl | Xi Yuanping (brother) | Qi Qiaoqiao (sister) | Deng Jiagui (brother-in-law)  | Zhang Lanlan (sister-in-law)}}
| signature           = Xi Jinping signature (2023).svg
| footnotes           = {{Collapsible list
|titlestyle = background-color:#FCF;text-align:center;
|title = Central institution membership
|bullets = on
| 2007–: 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th Politburo Standing Committee
| 2007–: 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th Politburo
| 2007–2012: Secretary (first-ranked), 17th Central Secretariat
| 2002–: Full member, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th Central Committee
| 1997–2002: Alternate member, 15th Central Committee
| 1998–: Delegate, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th National People's Congress
}}
----
{{Collapsible list
|titlestyle = background-color:#FCF;text-align:center;
|title = Leading Groups and Commissions
|bullets = on
| 2018–present: Director, Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission
| 2018–present: Director, Central Foreign Affairs Commission
| 2018–present: Director, Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission
| 2018–present: Director, Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission
| 2014–present: Leader, Leading Group for Defence and Military Reform
| 2014–2018: Leader, Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization
| 2013–present: Chairman, National Security Commission
| 2013–2018: Leader, Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs
| 2013–2018: Leader, Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms
| 2012–present: Leader, Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs
| 2012–2018: Leader, Foreign Affairs Leading Group
| 2007–2012: Leader Group for Party Building
| c. 2007–2012: Leader, Leading Group for Activities of Deepening the Study and Practice of the Outlook of Scientific Development
| 2007–2012: Leader, Central Coordination Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs
}}
----
{{Collapsible list
|titlestyle = background-color:#FCF; text-align:center;
|title = Other offices held
|bullets = on
| 2016–present: Supreme Commander, Joint Battle Command of the People's Liberation Army
| 2010–2013: Vice Chairman, State Central Military Commission
| 2010–2012: Vice Chairman, Party Central Military Commission
| 2008–2013: Vice President of the People's Republic of China
| 2007–2012: President, Central Party School
| 2007: [[Organization:Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary|Party Committee Secretary]], Shanghai municipality
| 2002–2007: Party Secretary, Zhejiang province, director, Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress
| 2002: Deputy Party Secretary & acting governor, Zhejiang province
| 1999–2002: Governor, Fujian province
| 1995–2002: [[Organization:Chinese Communist Party Deputy Committee Secretary|Deputy Party Secretary]], Fujian province
| 1990–1996: Party Secretary, Fuzhou
| 1990–1996: Chairman, Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress
| 1988–1990: Party Secretary, Ningde
| 1985–1988: Deputy Mayor, Xiamen
| 1983–1985: Party Secretary, Zhengding County
}}
----
{{center|'''[[Social:Paramount leader|Paramount Leader of <br />the People's Republic of China]]''' <br />
{{flatlist|
* {{big|'''←'''}} Hu Jintao
* (''Current holder'')
}}
}}
| module              = {{Infobox scientist
  | embed = yes
  | workplaces  = 
  | field             = 
  | thesis_title      = Research on China's Rural Marketization
  | thesis_url        = https://web.archive.org/web/20231216202120if_/https://yhcw.net/books/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%86%9C%E6%9D%91%E5%B8%82%E5%9C%BA%E5%8C%96%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E2%80%94%E2%80%94%E4%B9%A0%E8%BF%91%E5%B9%B3.pdf
  | thesis_year       = 2001
  | doctoral_advisor  = Liu Meixun
  | academic_advisors = 
  | doctoral_students = 
  | notable_students  = 
  | known_for         = 
  | author_abbrev_bot = 
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  | influenced        = 
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| website             = {{URL|http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2022-10/23/content_5721018.htm|www.gov.cn}} {{in lang|zh}}
| module2             = {{Listen  | embed = yes|pos=center|filename=Xi's voice 2021.ogg|title=Xi Jinping's voice|type=speech|description=Recorded 30 June 2021}}
| module3             = {{Infobox Chinese
| child = yes 
| pic = Xi Jinping (Chinese characters).svg
| piccap = "Xi Jinping" in Simplified (top) and Traditional (bottom) Chinese characters
| picupright = 0.495
| s = 习近平 | t = 習近平
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| p = Xí Jìnpíng
| bpmf = ㄒㄧˊ ㄐㄧㄣˋ ㄆㄧㄥˊ
| gr = Shyi Jinnpyng
| w = Hsi<sup>2</sup> Chin<sup>4</sup>-p῾ing<sup>2</sup>
| tp = Sí Jìnpíng
| wyr = Syí Jìnpíng
| mps = Shí Jìn-píng
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|x|i|2|-|j|in|4|.|p|ing|2}}
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| h = Sip<sup>6</sup> Kiun<sup>4</sup> Pin<sup>2</sup><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.hkilang.org/NEW_WEB/page/dictionary |title=Association for Conversation of Hong Kong Indigenous Languages Online Dictionary |date=1 July 2015 |website=hkilang.org |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150701164520/http://www.hkilang.org/NEW_WEB/page/dictionary|archive-date=1 July 2015 |access-date=12 September 2019 }}</ref>
| phfs = Si̍p Khiun-phìn
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| tl = Si̍p Kīn-pîng
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| buc = Sĭk Gê̤ṳng-ping
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| lmz = Zih⁸ Jin⁶-bin⁶
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}}
'''Xi Jinping''' ({{zh|s=习近平|p=Xí Jìnpíng}}, pronounced {{IPAc-cmn|x|i|2|-|j|in|4|.|p|ing|2}};{{efn|The closest pronunciation using only sounds common in spoken English would be ({{IPAc-en|lang|ˈ|ʃ|iː|_|tʃ|ɪ|n|ˈ|p|ɪ|ŋ}} {{respell|SHEE|_|chin|PING}}.}} born 15 June 1953) is a Chinese politician who has been the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and thus as the [[Social:Paramount leader|paramount leader]] of China, since 2012. Xi has also been the president of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 2013. He belongs to the fifth generation of Chinese leadership.

The son of Chinese Communist veteran Xi Zhongxun, Xi was exiled to rural Yanchuan County as a teenager following his father's purge during the Cultural Revolution. He lived in a yaodong in the village of Liangjiahe, Shaanxi province, where he joined the CCP after several failed attempts and worked as the local [[Organization:Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary|party secretary]]. After studying [[Chemistry:Chemical engineering|chemical engineering]] at Tsinghua University as a worker-peasant-soldier student, Xi rose through the ranks politically in China's coastal provinces. Xi was governor of Fujian from 1999 to 2002, before becoming governor and party secretary of neighboring Zhejiang from 2002 to 2007. Following the dismissal of the party secretary of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu, Xi was transferred to replace him for a brief period in 2007. He subsequently joined the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the CCP the same year and was the first-ranking secretary of the Central Secretariat in October 2007. In 2008, he was designated as Hu Jintao's presumed successor as paramount leader; to that end, Xi was appointed vice president of the PRC and vice chairman of the CMC. He officially received the title of [[Social:Leadership core|leadership core]] from the CCP in 2016.

Xi is the first CCP general secretary born after the establishment of the PRC. Since assuming power, Xi has introduced far-ranging measures to enforce party discipline and to impose internal unity. His anti-corruption campaign led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including former PSC member Zhou Yongkang. He has also enacted or promoted a more aggressive foreign policy, particularly with regard to China's relations with the U.S., the nine-dash line in the South China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border dispute. He has sought to expand China's African and Eurasian influence through the [[Organization:Belt and Road Initiative|Belt and Road Initiative]]. Xi has expanded support for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), advanced [[Social:Military-civil fusion|military-civil fusion]], overseen targeted poverty alleviation programs, and has attempted to reform the property sector. He has also promoted "common prosperity", a series of policies designed with stated goal to increase equality, oversaw a broad crackdown and major slew of regulations against the tech and tutoring sectors in 2021. Xi met with Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou in 2015, the first time PRC and Republic of China leaders met, though relations deteriorated after Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential elections in 2016. He responded to the COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China with a zero-COVID approach from January 2020 until December 2022, afterwards shifting towards a mitigation strategy. Xi also oversaw the passage of a national security law in Hong Kong, clamping down on political opposition in the city, especially [[Social:Pro-democracy camp (Hong Kong)|pro-democracy activists]].

Often described as an authoritarian leader by political and academic observers, Xi's tenure has included an increase of censorship and mass surveillance, deterioration in human rights, including the [[Religion:Xinjiang internment camps|internment of a million Uyghurs in Xinjiang]] (which some observers have described as part of [[Religion:Uyghur genocide|a genocide]]), a cult of personality developing around Xi, and the removal of term limits for the presidency in 2018. Xi's political ideas and principles, known as [[Social:Xi Jinping Thought|Xi Jinping Thought]], have been incorporated into the party and national constitutions. As the central figure of the fifth generation of leadership of the PRC, Xi has centralized institutional power by taking on multiple positions, including new CCP committees on national security, economic and social reforms, military restructuring and modernization, and the Internet. He and the CCP Central Committee passed a "historical resolution" in November 2021. In October 2022, Xi secured a third term as CCP General Secretary, and was reelected state president for a third term in March 2023.


==Early life and education==
Xi Jinping was born in [[Place:Beijing|Beijing]] on 15 June 1953,{{sfn|Wong|2023|p=229}} the third child of Xi Zhongxun and his second wife Qi Xin. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, Xi's father held a series of posts, including Party propaganda chief, vice-premier, and vice chairperson of the National People's Congress.<ref name="Profile-2012">{{Cite news|url=https://www.rferl.org/a/china-profile-xi-jinping/24764283.html|title=Profile: Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping|date=7 November 2012|publisher=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|access-date=26 August 2013|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131019083336/http://www.rferl.org/content/china-profile-xi-jinping/24764283.html|archive-date=19 October 2013}}</ref> Xi had two older sisters, Qiaoqiao, born in 1949 and An'an ({{zh|c=安安|p=Ān'ān|labels=no}}), born in 1952.<ref name="News.cn-2009">{{cite news |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/book/2009-04/28/content_11270872.htm |script-title=zh:與丈夫習仲勛相伴58年 齊心：這輩子無比幸福 |date=28 April 2009 |publisher=Xinhua News Agency |language=zh-Hant|trans-title=With her husband Xi Zhongxun for 58 years: very happy in this life|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130128102212/http://news.xinhuanet.com/book/2009-04/28/content_11270872.htm|archive-date=28 January 2013|access-date=18 March 2013 }}</ref><ref name="laoren2">{{cite web|url=http://book.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2013/0527/c69360-21628126.html |last=Xu|first=Xinyi|date=27 May 2013|website=People's Daily|language=zh-Hant|script-title=zh:習近平"家風"揭秘 齊心自述與習仲勛婚姻往事|trans-title=Xi Jinping's "family traditions" are unmasked: Qi Xin's autobiographical account of her marriage to Xi Zhongxun|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170428053410/http://book.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2013/0527/c69360-21628126.html|archive-date=28 April 2017|access-date=27 April 2017}}</ref> Xi's father was from Fuping County, Shaanxi.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Chan |first=Alfred L. |url= |title=Xi Jinping: Political Career, Governance, and Leadership, 1953-2018 |date=2022-03-24 |publisher=[[Organization:Oxford University Press|Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-761525-6 |language=en |chapter=Childhood and Youth: Privilege and Trauma, 1953–1979 |chapter-url=https://academic.oup.com/book/41435/chapter/352774284}}</ref>

Xi went to the Beijing Bayi School,<ref name=Takahashi>{{cite web|last=Takahashi|first=Tetsushi|url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Beijing-Diary/Connecting-the-dots-of-the-Hong-Kong-law-and-veneration-of-Xi|title=Connecting the dots of the Hong Kong law and veneration of Xi|newspaper=Nikkei Shimbun|date=1 June 2002|access-date=23 October 2020|archive-date=3 December 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211203074351/https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Beijing-Diary/Connecting-the-dots-of-the-Hong-Kong-law-and-veneration-of-Xi|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="newyorker2" /> and then the Beijing No. 25 School,<ref>{{cite web |last1=Li |first1=Cheng |title=Xi Jinping's Inner Circle (Part 2: Friends from Xi's Formative Years) |url=https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm44cl.pdf |access-date=15 July 2020 |website=Hoover Institution |publisher= |pages=6–22 |archive-date=26 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200926055927/https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm44cl.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> in the 1960s. He became friends with Liu He, who attended Beijing No. 101 School in the same district, who later became China's vice premier and a close advisor to Xi after he became China's paramount leader.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/29/power-behind-the-thrones-10-movers-and-shakers-for-2020|title=The power behind the thrones: 10 political movers and shakers who will shape 2020|last=Tisdall|first=Simon|date=29 December 2019|work={{wipe|The Guardian}}|access-date=16 January 2020|language=en-GB|issn=0029-7712|archive-date=5 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211105032127/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/29/power-behind-the-thrones-10-movers-and-shakers-for-2020|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/blessed-by-xi-jinping-the-new-captain-of-chinas-economy-1519688592|title=Who Is 'Uncle He?' The Man in Charge of China's Economy|last=Wei|first=Lingling|date=27 February 2018|work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}}|access-date=16 January 2020|archive-date=3 October 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211003102625/https://www.wsj.com/articles/blessed-by-xi-jinping-the-new-captain-of-chinas-economy-1519688592|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1963, when he was aged 10, his father was purged from the CCP and sent to work in a factory in Luoyang, Henan.{{sfn|Bouée|2010|p=93}} In May 1966, the Cultural Revolution cut short Xi's secondary education when all secondary classes were halted for students to criticise and fight their teachers. Student militants ransacked the Xi family home and one of Xi's sisters, Xi Heping, "was persecuted to death".<ref name="GAPP-2013">{{cite web |url=http://www.gapp.gov.cn/contents/2091/157500.shtml |title=习近平："我坚信我的父亲是一个大英雄" |date=14 October 2013 |website=General Administration of Press and Publication |publisher=国家新闻出版广电总局 |access-date=6 March 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180305150646/http://www.gapp.gov.cn/contents/2091/157500.shtml |archive-date=5 March 2018 |language=zh |quote=女儿习和平...在“文化大革命”中被迫害致死，是习仲勋难以抹去的心痛。 |trans-title=Xi Jinping: "I firmly believe my father is a great hero"}}</ref><ref name="Buckley-2015">{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-cultural-revolution.html |title=Cultural Revolution Shaped Xi Jinping, From Schoolboy to Survivor |last1=Buckley|first1=Chris |last2=Tatlow|first2=Didi Kirsten|date=24 September 2015 |newspaper={{wipe|The New York Times}}|access-date=6 March 2018|url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180305150638/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-cultural-revolution.html |archive-date=5 March 2018 |url-access=limited }}</ref>

Later, his mother was forced to publicly denounce his father, as he was paraded before a crowd as an enemy of the revolution. His father was later imprisoned in 1968 when Xi was aged 15. Without the protection of his father, Xi was sent to work in Liangjiahe Village, Wen'anyi, Yanchuan County, Yan'an, Shaanxi, in 1969 in Mao Zedong's Down to the Countryside Movement.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMzM2NTc1MjAwOA==.html |script-title=zh:不忘初心：是什么造就了今天的习主席？|date=30 January 2018|website=[[Company:Youku|Youku]]|language=zh-Hans |trans-title=What Were His Original Intentions? The President Xi of Today |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180130204306/http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMzM2NTc1MjAwOA==.html |archive-date=30 January 2018 |access-date=30 January 2018}}</ref> He worked as the [[Organization:Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary|party secretary]] of Liangjiahe, where he lived in a cave house.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lim |first=Louisa |date=9 November 2012 |title=For China's Rising Leader, A Cave Was Once Home |work=NPR |publisher= |url=https://www.npr.org/2012/11/09/164684418/for-chinas-rising-leader-a-cave-was-once-home?t=1578589261050 |url-status=live |access-date=27 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180616053635/https://www.npr.org/2012/11/09/164684418/for-chinas-rising-leader-a-cave-was-once-home |archive-date=16 June 2018}}</ref> According to people who knew him, this experience led him to feel affinity with the rural poor.<ref name="Page-2020" /> After a few months, unable to stand rural life, he ran away to Beijing. He was arrested during a crackdown on deserters from the countryside and sent to a work camp to dig ditches, but he later returned to the village. He then spent a total of seven years there.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Demick|first1=Barbara|last2=Pierson|first2=David|date=14 February 2012|title=China's political star Xi Jinping is a study in contrasts|newspaper=Toronto Star|url=https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/02/14/chinas_political_star_xi_jinping_is_a_study_in_contrasts.html|url-status=live|access-date=24 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171013225355/https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/02/14/chinas_political_star_xi_jinping_is_a_study_in_contrasts.html|archive-date=13 October 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author=Matt Rivers |date=19 March 2018 |title=This entire Chinese village is a shrine to Xi Jinping |work=CNN |publisher= |url=https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/19/asia/china-xi-jinping-village-intl/index.html |access-date=11 February 2021 |archive-date=26 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210226054335/https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/19/asia/china-xi-jinping-village-intl/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

The misfortunes and suffering of his family in his early years hardened Xi's view of politics. During an interview in 2000, he said, "People who have little contact with power, who are far from it, always see these things as mysterious and novel. But what I see is not just the superficial things: the power, the flowers, the glory, the applause. I see the bullpens and how people can blow hot and cold. I understand politics on a deeper level." The "bullpens" (牛棚) was a reference to Red Guards' detention houses during the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Page-2020">{{Cite news|last=Page|first=Jeremy|date=23 December 2020|title=How the U.S. Misread China's Xi: Hoping for a Globalist, It Got an Autocrat|language=en-US|work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}}|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-globalist-autocrat-misread-11608735769|access-date=25 December 2020|issn=0099-9660|archive-date=24 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201224233237/https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-globalist-autocrat-misread-11608735769|url-status=live}}</ref>

After seven rejections, Xi joined the Communist Youth League of China in 1971 on his eighth attempt after he befriended a local official.<ref name="newyorker2">{{cite news |last1=Osnos |first1=Evan |date=30 March 2015 |title=Born Red |magazine=The New Yorker |url=http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red |url-status=live |access-date=11 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191004153259/https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red |archive-date=4 October 2019}}</ref> He reunited with his father in 1972, because of a family reunion ordered by premier Zhou Enlai.<ref name="Buckley-2015" /> From 1973, he applied to join the CCP ten times and was finally accepted on his tenth attempt in 1974.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/china_20180318_xi_jinping_profile.pdf |title=Xi Jinping 习近平 |date= |publisher=Brookings Institution |access-date=14 October 2021 |archive-date=27 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210927053240/https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/china_20180318_xi_jinping_profile.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |date=28 February 2018 |title="The Current" – Wednesday February 28, 2018 Full Text Transcript |work=CBC Radio |publisher= |url=http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-february-28-2018-1.4555132/wednesday-february-28-2018-full-text-transcript-1.4556381#segment3 |url-status=live |access-date=28 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180324194159/http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-february-28-2018-1.4555132/wednesday-february-28-2018-full-text-transcript-1.4556381#segment3 |archive-date=24 March 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Zy479_jx11YJ:www.aerospaceindia.org/Issue%2520Briefs/2010/25%2520October%25202010%2520-%2520CHINA%25E2%2580%2599S%2520NEXT%2520CHAIRMAN%25E2%2580%2594XI%2520JINPING.pdf+&hl=en&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjpQjUAtfkdEgw0cxv3UMunFfoLBcy0_po2aPN4xvPoQ-K9lFpIdgtf7PAw5ebYoTd8NwaRSswzfWmws278UPehKckL3Zb0TXlci2R0HsZGceCYRpBiD6EfBrspdjUh8CZzwcMg&sig=AHIEtbRjgFp8BCiHybWUtaP2uVF8BVuVZA |title=China's Next Chairman – Xi Jinping |last=Ranade|first=Jayadva|date=25 October 2010|publisher=Centre for Air Power Studies|access-date=27 May 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130724125447/https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache%3AZy479_jx11YJ%3Awww.aerospaceindia.org%2FIssue%2520Briefs%2F2010%2F25%2520October%25202010%2520-%2520CHINA%25E2%2580%2599S%2520NEXT%2520CHAIRMAN%25E2%2580%2594XI%2520JINPING.pdf+&hl=en&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjpQjUAtfkdEgw0cxv3UMunFfoLBcy0_po2aPN4xvPoQ-K9lFpIdgtf7PAw5ebYoTd8NwaRSswzfWmws278UPehKckL3Zb0TXlci2R0HsZGceCYRpBiD6EfBrspdjUh8CZzwcMg&sig=AHIEtbRjgFp8BCiHybWUtaP2uVF8BVuVZA |archive-date=24 July 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> From 1975 to 1979, Xi studied [[Chemistry:Chemical engineering|chemical engineering]] at Tsinghua University as a worker-peasant-soldier student in Beijing. The engineering majors there spent about 15 percent of their time studying [[Social:Marxism–Leninism–Maoism|Marxism–Leninism–Maoism]] and 5 percent of their time doing farm work and "learning from the People's Liberation Army".{{sfn|Simon|Cong|pp=28–29|2009}}

==Early political career==
From 1979 to 1982, Xi was secretary for his father's former subordinate Geng Biao, the then vice premier and secretary-general of the CMC.<ref name="newyorker2" /> In 1982, he was sent to Zhengding County in Hebei as deputy party secretary of Zhengding County. He was promoted in 1983 to secretary, becoming the top official of the county.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Johnson |first=Ian |date=2012-09-30 |title=Elite and Deft, Xi Aimed High Early in China |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/world/asia/aiming-for-top-xi-jinping-forged-ties-early-in-china.html |access-date=2023-04-04 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=30 September 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120930091232/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/world/asia/aiming-for-top-xi-jinping-forged-ties-early-in-china.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi subsequently served in four provinces during his regional political career: Hebei (1982–1985), Fujian (1985–2002), Zhejiang (2002–2007), and Shanghai (2007).<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/xi-jinping-from-graft-fighting-governor-to-chinas-most-powerful-leader-since-mao|title=Xi Jinping: From graft-fighting governor to China's most powerful leader since Mao Zedong|date=11 March 2018|newspaper=The Straits Times|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190818052957/https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/xi-jinping-from-graft-fighting-governor-to-chinas-most-powerful-leader-since-mao|archive-date=18 August 2019|access-date=18 August 2019}}</ref> Xi held posts in the Fuzhou Municipal Party Committee and became the president of the Party School in Fuzhou in 1990. In 1997, he was named an alternate member of the 15th Central Committee of the CCP. However, of the 151 alternate members of the Central Committee elected at the 15th Party Congress, Xi received the lowest number of votes in favour, placing him last in the rankings of members, ostensibly due to his status as a princeling.{{efn|Liu Yandong, Wang Qishan, and Deng Pufang (Deng Xiaoping's son) all placed among the bottom of the alternate member list. Like Xi, all three were seen as "princelings". Bo Xilai was not elected to the Central Committee at all; that is, Bo placed lower in the vote count than Xi.}}<ref name="canyu2">{{cite news |url=http://www.canyu.org/n24349c6.aspx |script-title=zh:中共十五大习近平位列候补委员最后一名为何 |date=22 April 2011|website=Canyu.org|access-date=7 September 2019|language=zh-Hans|trans-title=Why Is Xi Jinping, At the 15th CCP National Congress, Being Waited On To Fill The Last Committee Member Position?|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612141334/http://www.canyu.org/n24349c6.aspx|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=usurped|title=中共十五大习近平位列候补委员最后一名为何}}</ref>

From 1998 to 2002, Xi studied [[Philosophy:Marxism|Marxist]] theory and ideological education in Tsinghua University,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/6288506.html|title=Xi Jinping – Politburo Standing Committee member of CPC Central Committee |date=22 October 2007|website=People's Daily|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150630190420/http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/6288506.html|archive-date=30 June 2015|access-date=30 October 2019}}</ref> graduating with a doctorate in law and ideology in 2002.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/26/china.uknews4|title=Most corrupt officials are from poor families but Chinese royals have a spirit that is not dominated by money|last=Watts|first=Jonathan|date=26 October 2007|newspaper={{wipe|The Guardian}}|access-date=11 June 2008|location=London, England|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130901014357/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/26/china.uknews4|archive-date=1 September 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1999, he was promoted to the office of Vice Governor of Fujian, and became governor a year later. In Fujian, Xi made efforts to attract investment from Taiwan and to strengthen the private sector of the provincial economy.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/from-fujian-chinas-xi-offers-economic-olive-branch-to-taiwan/|title=From Fujian, China's Xi Offers Economic Olive Branch to Taiwan|last=Tiezzi|first=Shannon|date=4 November 2014|newspaper=The Diplomat|language=en-US|url-access=limited|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160610145941/https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/from-fujian-chinas-xi-offers-economic-olive-branch-to-taiwan/|archive-date=10 June 2016|access-date=17 March 2016}}</ref> In February 2000, he and then-provincial party secretary Chen Mingyi were called before the top members of PSC&nbsp;– general secretary Jiang Zemin, premier Zhu Rongji, vice president Hu Jintao and Discipline Inspection secretary Wei Jianxing&nbsp;– to explain aspects of the Yuanhua scandal.<ref name="scmpxiao2">{{cite news|url=http://www.scmp.com/article/308424/fujian-leaders-face-beijing-top-brass|title=Fujian leaders face Beijing top brass|last=Yu|first=Xiao|date=18 February 2000|newspaper=South China Morning Post|access-date=7 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181029030831/https://www.scmp.com/article/308424/fujian-leaders-face-beijing-top-brass|archive-date=29 October 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2002, Xi left Fujian and took up leading political positions in neighbouring Zhejiang. He eventually took over as provincial Party Committee secretary after several months as acting governor, occupying a top provincial office for the first time in his career. In 2002, he was elected a full member of the 16th Central Committee, marking his ascension to the national stage. While in Zhejiang, Xi presided over reported growth rates averaging 14% per year.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1068825/chinas-leadership-transition-xi-jinpings-time-zhejiang|title=Xi Jinping's time in Zhejiang: doing the business|last=Ho|first=Louise|date=25 October 2012|newspaper=South China Morning Post|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160429160349/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1068825/chinas-leadership-transition-xi-jinpings-time-zhejiang|archive-date=29 April 2016|access-date=9 December 2019}}</ref> His career in Zhejiang was marked by a tough and straightforward stance against corrupt officials. This earned him a name in the national media and drew the attention of China's top leaders.<ref name="wanglei2">{{cite news|url=http://opinion.dwnews.com/news/2014-12-25/59626005.html |script-title=zh:习近平为官之道 拎着乌纱帽干事|last1=Wang|first1=Lei|date=25 December 2014|work=Duowei News|access-date=7 September 2019|language=zh-hans|trans-title=Xi Jinping's Governmental Path – Carries Official Administrative Posts|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150203225014/http://opinion.dwnews.com/news/2014-12-25/59626005.html|archive-date=3 February 2015}}</ref> Between 2004 and 2007, Li Qiang acted as Xi's chief of staff through his position as secretary-general of the Zhejiang Party Committee, where they developed close mutual ties.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Tian |first1=Yew Lun |last2=Chen |first2=Laurie |last3=Cash |first3=Joe |date=11 March 2023 |title=Li Qiang, Xi confidant, takes reins as China's premier |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/li-qiang-xi-confidant-takes-reins-chinas-premier-2023-03-11/ |access-date=24 May 2023 |archive-date=24 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230524163326/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/li-qiang-xi-confidant-takes-reins-chinas-premier-2023-03-11/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

Following the dismissal of Shanghai Party secretary Chen Liangyu in September 2006 due to a social security fund scandal, Xi was transferred to Shanghai in March 2007, where he was the party secretary there for seven months.<ref name="shanghai2">{{cite news|url=http://news.sohu.com/20070324/n248946143.shtml|script-title=zh:习近平任上海市委书记 韩正不再代理市委书记|date=24 March 2007|work=Sohu|access-date=7 September 2019|language=zh-Hans|trans-title=Xi Jinping is Secretary of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee – Han Zheng is No Longer Acting Party Secretary|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071016061557/http://news.sohu.com/20070324/n248946143.shtml|archive-date=16 October 2007|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=15 November 2012 |title=China new leaders: Xi Jinping heads line-up for politburo |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20322288 |url-status=live |access-date=25 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190909102154/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20322288 |archive-date=9 September 2019}}</ref> In Shanghai, Xi avoided controversy and was known for strictly observing party discipline. For example, Shanghai administrators attempted to earn favour with him by arranging a special train to shuttle him between Shanghai and Hangzhou for him to complete handing off his work to his successor as Zhejiang party secretary Zhao Hongzhu. However, Xi reportedly refused to take the train, citing a loosely enforced party regulation that stipulated that special trains can only be reserved for "national leaders".<ref name="ming2">{{cite news|url=http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2013/07/201307110449.shtml#.VTxXVvnF_tU|script-title=zh:从上海到北京 习近平贴身秘书只有钟绍军|date=11 July 2013|work=Mingjing News|access-date=12 September 2019|language=zh-hans|trans-title=From Shanghai to Beijing, Zhong Shaojun Has Been Xi Jinping's Only Personal Secretary|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612141343/http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2013/07/201307110449.shtml#.VTxXVvnF_tU|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> While in Shanghai, he worked on preserving unity of the local party organisation. He pledged there would be no 'purges' during his administration, despite the fact many local officials were thought to have been implicated in the Chen Liangyu corruption scandal.{{sfn|Lam|2015|p=56}} On most issues, Xi largely echoed the line of the central leadership.<ref name="newin2">{{cite news|url=http://www.caijing.com.cn/2007-10-22/100034588.html |script-title=zh:新晋政治局常委：习近平|date=22 October 2007|work=Caijing|access-date=12 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151222175301/http://www.caijing.com.cn/2007-10-22/100034588.html|archive-date=22 December 2015|language=zh-hans|trans-title=Newly Appointed Member of Politburo Standing Committee: Xi Jinping}}</ref>

==Rise to power==
[[File:President George W. Bush with Vice President Xi Jinping.jpg|thumb|Xi Jinping greeting U.S. president George W. Bush in August 2008|left]]
[[File:Dmitry Medvedev in China 28 September 2010-6.jpeg|thumb|Xi Jinping with Russian president Dmitry Medvedev on 28 September 2010|left]]

Xi was appointed to the nine-man PSC at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007. He was ranked above Li Keqiang, an indication that he was going to succeed Hu Jintao as China's next leader. In addition, Xi also held the first secretary of the CCP's Central Secretariat. This assessment was further supported at the 11th National People's Congress in March 2008, when Xi was elected as vice president of the PRC.<ref>{{Cite web |date=16 March 2008 |title=Wen Jiabao re-elected China PM |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/3/16/wen-jiabao-re-elected-china-pm |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=[[Engineering:Al Jazeera English|Al Jazeera]] |language=en |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813171805/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/3/16/wen-jiabao-re-elected-china-pm |url-status=live }}</ref> Following his elevation, Xi held a broad range of portfolios. He was put in charge of the comprehensive preparations for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, as well as being the central government's leading figure in Hong Kong and Macau affairs. In addition, he also became the new president of the Central Party School of the CCP, its cadre-training and ideological education wing. In the wake of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, Xi visited disaster areas in Shaanxi and Gansu. He made his first foreign trip as vice president to North Korea, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Yemen from 17 to 25 June 2008.<ref>{{cite web |date=5 June 2008 |title=Vice-President Xi Jinping to Visit DPRK, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Yemen |url=http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wsrc/t462294.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110723214209/http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wsrc/t462294.htm |archive-date=23 July 2011 |access-date=20 October 2010 |website=Ministry of Foreign Affairs |publisher=}}</ref> After the Olympics, Xi was assigned the post of committee chair for the preparations of the 60th Anniversary Celebrations of the founding of the PRC. He was also reportedly at the helm of a top-level CCP committee dubbed the 6521 Project, which was charged with ensuring social stability during a series of politically sensitive anniversaries in 2009.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/world/asia/10china.html|title=China's Leaders See a Calendar Full of Anniversaries, and Trouble|last=Wines|first=Michael|date=9 March 2009|work={{wipe|The New York Times}}|access-date=8 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160721045913/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/world/asia/10china.html|archive-date=21 July 2016|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|url-access=limited}}</ref>

Xi's position as the apparent successor to become the paramount leader was threatened with the rapid rise of Bo Xilai, the party secretary of [[Place:Chongqing|Chongqing]] at the time. Bo was expected to join the PSC at the 18th Party Congress, with most expecting that he would try to eventually maneuver himself into replacing Xi.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/d67b90f0-d140-11e1-8957-00144feabdc0|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221204/https://www.ft.com/content/d67b90f0-d140-11e1-8957-00144feabdc0|archive-date=11 December 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Bo Xilai: power, death and politics|last=Anderlini|first=Jamil|date=20 July 2012|work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]]|access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref> Bo's policies in Chongqing inspired imitations throughout China and received praise from Xi himself during Xi's visit to Chongqing in 2010. Records of praises from Xi were later erased after he became paramount leader. Bo's downfall would come with the Wang Lijun incident, which opened the door for Xi to come to power without challengers.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/19/the-resistible-rise-of-xi-jinping/|title=The Resistible Rise of Xi Jinping|last=Palmer|first=James|date=19 October 2017|work=Foreign Policy|access-date=11 January 2020|archive-date=6 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200206195505/https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/19/the-resistible-rise-of-xi-jinping/|url-status=live}}</ref>

Xi is considered one of the most successful members of the Princelings, a quasi-clique of politicians who are descendants of early Chinese Communist revolutionaries. Former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, when asked about Xi, said he felt he was "a thoughtful man who has gone through many trials and tribulations".<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.newsweek.com/xi-jinping-chinas-new-boss-and-l-word-95021|title=Xi Jinping: China's New Boss And The 'L' Word|last=Ansfield|first=Jonathan|date=22 December 2007|work=Newsweek|access-date=20 October 2010|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100330064319/http://www.newsweek.com/id/81558|archive-date=30 March 2010}}</ref> Lee also commented: "I would put him in the [[Biography:Nelson Mandela|Nelson Mandela]] class of persons. A person with enormous emotional stability who does not allow his personal misfortunes or sufferings affect his judgment. In other words, he is impressive".<ref>{{cite news|url=http://china.blogs.time.com/2007/11/19/chinas_nelson_mandela/|title=China's Nelson Mandela|last=Elegant|first=Simon|date=19 November 2007|magazine={{wipe|Time (magazine)}}|access-date=8 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090728171010/http://china.blogs.time.com/2007/11/19/chinas_nelson_mandela/|archive-date=28 July 2009|url-status=live}}</ref> Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson described Xi as "the kind of guy who knows how to get things over the goal line".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aDpLoVnlKn6E&refer=home|title=China Appoints Xi Vice President, Heir Apparent to Hu|last=Elegant|first=Simon|date=15 March 2008|newspaper={{wipe|Bloomberg News}}|url-access=limited|access-date=20 October 2010}}</ref> Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd said that Xi "has sufficient reformist, party and military background to be very much his own man".<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/rudd-seeks-to-pre-empt-pms-china-white-paper-with-his-own-version/story-fn59niix-1226488505695|title=Rudd seeks to pre-empt PM's China white paper with his own version|last=Uren|first=David|date=5 October 2012|work=The Australian|access-date=8 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121122083821/http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/rudd-seeks-to-pre-empt-pms-china-white-paper-with-his-own-version/story-fn59niix-1226488505695|archive-date=22 November 2012}}</ref>

===Trips as Vice President===
In February 2009, in his capacity as vice-president, Xi Jinping embarked on a tour of Latin America, visiting Mexico,<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90883/6589461.html|title=Chinese vice president arrives in Mexico for official visit|date=10 February 2009|work=People's Daily|access-date=11 September 2019|archive-date=3 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200203050935/http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90883/6589461.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> Jamaica,<ref name="JIS-2009">{{cite news |date=15 February 2009 |title=Chinese VP Receives Key to the City of Montego Bay |publisher=Jamaica Information Service |url=http://jis.gov.jm/chinese-vp-receives-key-to-the-city-of-montego-bay/ |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190714065907/https://jis.gov.jm/chinese-vp-receives-key-to-the-city-of-montego-bay/ |archive-date=14 July 2019}}</ref> Colombia,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90883/6594636.html|title=Chinese vice president continues visit in Colombia|date=17 February 2009|website=People's Daily|access-date=11 September 2019|archive-date=3 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200203050932/http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90883/6594636.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> Venezuela,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cctv.com/english/20090218/112381.shtml|title=Chinese VP praises friendly cooperation with Venezuela, Latin America|agency=Xinhua|date=18 February 2009|work=CCTV|access-date=20 October 2022|archive-date=21 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221021011922/http://www.cctv.com/english/20090218/112381.shtml|url-status=live}}</ref> Brazil,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.china.org.cn/international/2009-02/20/content_17311463.htm|title=Xi Jinping proposes efforts to boost cooperation with Brazil |date=20 February 2009|website=China Daily|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110206063031/http://china.org.cn/international/2009-02/20/content_17311463.htm|archive-date=6 February 2011|access-date=11 September 2019}}</ref> and Malta, after which he returned to China.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/chinese-vice-president-begins-official-visit.245968|title=Chinese vice president begins official visit|date=22 February 2009|newspaper=Times of Malta|language=en-gb|access-date=11 September 2019|archive-date=3 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200203050934/https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/chinese-vice-president-begins-official-visit.245968|url-status=live}}</ref> On 11 February 2009, while visiting Mexico, Xi spoke in front of a group of overseas Chinese and explained China's contributions during the international financial crisis, saying that it was "the greatest contribution towards the whole of human race, made by China, to prevent its 1.3&nbsp;billion people from hunger".{{efn|Original {{zh|s=在国际金融风暴中，中国能基本解决13亿人口吃饭的问题，已经是对全人类最伟大的贡献|t=在國際金融風暴中，中國能基本解決13億人口吃飯的問題，已經是對全人類最偉大的貢獻}}|}} He went on to remark: "There are some bored foreigners, with full stomachs, who have nothing better to do than point fingers at us. First, China doesn't export revolution; second, China doesn't export hunger and poverty; third, China doesn't come and cause you headaches.  What more is there to be said?"{{efn|Original: {{zh|s=有些吃饱没事干的外国人，对我们的事情指手画脚。中国一不输出革命，二不输出饥饿和贫困，三不折腾你们，还有什么好说的？|t=有些吃飽沒事干的外國人，對我們的事情指手畫腳。中國一不輸出革命，二不輸出飢餓和貧困，三不折騰你們，還有什麽好說的？}}}}<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20090214-121872.html|title=Chinese VP blasts meddlesome foreigners|last=Sim|first=Chi Yin|date=14 February 2009|newspaper=AsiaOne|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110711171035/http://news.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20090214-121872.html|archive-date=11 July 2011|access-date=20 October 2010}}</ref> The story was reported on some local television stations. The news led to a flood of discussions on Chinese Internet forums and it was reported that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was caught off-guard by Xi's remarks, as the actual video was shot by some accompanying Hong Kong reporters and broadcast on Hong Kong TV, which then turned up on various Internet video websites.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://udn.com/NEWS/MAINLAND/MAI1/4742366.shtml |script-title=zh:習近平出訪罵老外 外交部捏冷汗|last1=Lai|first1=Jinhong|date=18 February 2009|newspaper=United Daily News|access-date=27 February 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090221023838/http://udn.com/NEWS/MAINLAND/MAI1/4742366.shtml|archive-date=21 February 2009|language=zh-hans|trans-title=Xi Jinping Goes and Scolds at Foreigners, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cold Sweat}}</ref>
[[File:Xi Jinping Iowa house.jpg|thumb|right|The Muscatine, Iowa house where Xi stayed with an American family during a 1985 agricultural visit to the United States. The home was turned into a museum decades later.]]
In the [[Social:European Union|European Union]], Xi visited Belgium, Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania from 7 to 21 October 2009.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.china-un.ch/eng/xwdt/t622138.htm|title=A Journey of Friendship, Cooperation and Culture – Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun Sums Up Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping's Trip to 5 European Countries|date=21 October 2009|publisher=Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations|access-date=11 September 2019|archive-date=3 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200203050934/http://www.china-un.ch/eng/xwdt/t622138.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> He visited Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, and Myanmar on his Asian trip from 14 to 22 December 2009.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3566.html|title=China's Cousin-Cousin Relations with Myanmar|last=Raman|first=B.|date=25 December 2009|publisher=South Asia Analysis Group|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100317074826/http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3566.html|archive-date=17 March 2010|access-date=14 February 2012}}</ref> He later visited the United States, Ireland and Turkey in February 2012. This visit included meeting with then U.S. president [[Biography:Barack Obama|Barack Obama]] at the White House and vice president Joe Biden (with Biden as the official host);<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Bull |first1=Alister |author2=Chris Buckley |date=24 January 2012 |title=China leader-in-waiting Xi to visit White House next month |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |publisher= |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-xi-idUSTRE80N06E20120124 |access-date=28 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131029201614/https://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/24/us-usa-china-xi-idUSTRE80N06E20120124 |archive-date=29 October 2013}}</ref> and stops in California and Iowa. In Iowa, he met with the family that previously hosted him during his 1985 tour as a Hebei provincial official.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/world/asia/xi-jinping-of-china-makes-a-return-trip-to-iowa.html|title=Xi Jinping of China Makes a Return Trip to Iowa|last=Johnson|first=Kirk|date=15 February 2012|work={{wipe|The New York Times}}|access-date=12 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190621114147/https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/world/asia/xi-jinping-of-china-makes-a-return-trip-to-iowa.html|archive-date=21 June 2019|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|url-access=limited}}</ref>

===Accession to top posts===

A few months before his ascendancy to the party leadership, Xi disappeared from official media coverage and cancelled meeting with foreign officials for several weeks beginning on 1 September 2012, causing rumors.<ref name="newyorker2" /> He then reappeared on 15 September.<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Beech |first=Hannah |date=15 September 2012 |title=China's Heir Apparent Xi Jinping Reappears in Public After a Two-Week Absence |url=https://world.time.com/2012/09/15/chinas-heir-apparent-xi-jinping-reappears-in-public-after-a-two-week-absence/ |magazine={{wipe|Time (magazine)}} |language=en-US |issn=0040-781X |access-date=20 August 2022 |archive-date=14 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814104509/https://world.time.com/2012/09/15/chinas-heir-apparent-xi-jinping-reappears-in-public-after-a-two-week-absence/ |url-status=live }}</ref> On 15 November 2012, Xi was elected to the posts of general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC by the 18th Central Committee of the CCP. This made him, informally, the [[Social:Paramount leader|paramount leader]] and the first to be born after the founding of the PRC. The following day Xi led the new line-up of the PSC  onto the stage in their first public appearance.<ref name="BBCconfirm2">{{cite news |date=17 November 2012 |title=China Confirms Leadership Change |work=BBC News |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20322288 |access-date=15 November 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160729201558/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20322288 |archive-date=29 July 2016}}</ref> The PSC was reduced from nine to seven, with only Xi and Li Keqiang retaining their seats; the other five members were new.<ref>{{Cite news |date=15 November 2012 |title=Xi Jinping: China's 'princeling' new leader |newspaper=Hindustan Times |url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/xi-jinping-china-s-princeling-new-leader/story-uKjI60ipqpRSEew3Zi7jzL.html |url-status=live |access-date=28 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181028230023/https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/xi-jinping-china-s-princeling-new-leader/story-uKjI60ipqpRSEew3Zi7jzL.html |archive-date=28 October 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Wong |first1=Edward |date=14 November 2012 |title=Ending Congress, China Presents New Leadership Headed by Xi Jinping |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/asia/communists-conclude-party-congress-in-china.html?ref=asia&_r=0 |url-status=live |url-access=limited |access-date=16 November 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121208103006/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/asia/communists-conclude-party-congress-in-china.html?ref=asia&_r=0 |archive-date=8 December 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=FlorCruz |first1=Jaime A |last2=Mullen |first2=Jethro |date=16 November 2012 |title=After months of mystery, China unveils new top leaders |work=CNN |publisher= |url=http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/14/world/asia/china-leadership-transition/index.html |url-status=live |access-date=16 November 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121115195006/http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/14/world/asia/china-leadership-transition/index.html |archive-date=15 November 2012}}</ref> In a marked departure from the common practice of Chinese leaders, Xi's first speech as general secretary was plainly worded and did not include any political slogans or mention his predecessors.<ref name="nytimes22">{{cite news |last1=Johnson |first1=Ian |date=15 November 2012 |title=A Promise to Tackle China's Problems, but Few Hints of a Shift in Path |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/asia/new-chinese-leader-offers-few-hints-of-a-shift-in-direction.html?pagewanted=all |url-status=live |url-access=limited |access-date=16 July 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140726121506/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/asia/new-chinese-leader-offers-few-hints-of-a-shift-in-direction.html?pagewanted=all |archive-date=26 July 2014}}</ref> Xi mentioned the aspirations of the average person, remarking, "Our people ... expect better education, more stable jobs, better income, more reliable social security, medical care of a higher standard, more comfortable living conditions, and a more beautiful environment." Xi also vowed to tackle corruption at the highest levels, alluding that it would threaten the CCP's survival; he was reticent about far-reaching economic reforms.<ref>{{cite news |date=15 November 2012 |title=Full text: China's new party chief Xi Jinping's speech |work=BBC News |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586 |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190914232334/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586 |archive-date=14 September 2019}}</ref>

In December 2012, Xi visited Guangdong in his first trip outside Beijing since taking the Party leadership. The overarching theme of the trip was to call for further economic reform and a strengthened military. Xi visited the statue of Deng Xiaoping and his trip was described as following in the footsteps of [[Biography:Deng Xiaoping#Resignation and 1992 southern tour|Deng's own southern trip in 1992]], which provided the impetus for further economic reforms in China after conservative party leaders stalled many of Deng's reforms in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. On his trip, Xi consistently alluded to his signature slogan, the "Chinese Dream". "This dream can be said to be the dream of a strong nation. And for the military, it is a dream of a strong military", Xi told sailors.<ref>{{cite news |last=Page |first=Jeremy |date=13 March 2013 |title=New Beijing Leader's 'China Dream' |newspaper={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324128504578348774040546346 |url-status=live |access-date=8 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191011195356/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324128504578348774040546346 |archive-date=11 October 2019}}</ref> Xi's trip was significant in that he departed from the established convention of Chinese leaders' travel routines in multiple ways. Rather than dining out, Xi and his entourage ate regular hotel buffet. He travelled in a large van with his colleagues rather than a fleet of limousines, and did not restrict traffic on the parts of the highway he travelled.<ref name="bbc2">{{cite news |last1=Chen |first1=Zhuang |date=10 December 2012 |title=The symbolism of Xi Jinping's trip south |work=BBC News |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20662947 |url-status=live |access-date=22 July 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140708094339/http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20662947 |archive-date=8 July 2014}}</ref>

Xi was elected president on 14 March 2013, in a confirmation vote by the 12th National People's Congress in Beijing. He received 2,952 for, one vote against, and three abstentions.<ref name="BBCconfirm2" /> He replaced Hu Jintao, who retired after serving two terms.<ref name="Demick2">{{cite news |last=Demick |first=Barbara |date=3 March 2013 |title=China's Xi Jinping formally assumes title of president |newspaper={{wipe|Los Angeles Times}} |url=http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-china-xi-presidency-20130313,0,1240600.story |url-status=live |access-date=16 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130316021753/http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-china-xi-presidency-20130313,0,1240600.story |archive-date=16 March 2013}}</ref> In his new capacity as president, on 16 March 2013 Xi expressed support for non-interference in China–Sri Lanka relations amid a United Nations Security Council vote to condemn that country over government abuses during the Sri Lankan Civil War.<ref>{{cite news |date=16 March 2013 |title=China's Xi Jinping hints at backing Sri Lanka against UN resolution |work=NDTV |publisher= |agency=Press Trust of India |url=http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/china-s-xi-jinping-hints-at-backing-sri-lanka-against-un-resolution-343378 |url-status=live |access-date=16 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130316222016/http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/china-s-xi-jinping-hints-at-backing-sri-lanka-against-un-resolution-343378 |archive-date=16 March 2013}}</ref> On 17 March, Xi and his new ministers arranged a meeting with the chief executive of Hong Kong, CY Leung, confirming his support for Leung.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Cheung |first1=Tony |last2=Ho |first2=Jolie |date=17 March 2013 |title=CY Leung to meet Xi Jinping in Beijing and explain cross-border policies |work=South China Morning Post |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1192587/cy-leung-meet-xi-jinping-beijing-and-explain-cross-border-policies |url-status=live |access-date=16 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130318073700/http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1192587/cy-leung-meet-xi-jinping-beijing-and-explain-cross-border-policies |archive-date=18 March 2013}}</ref> Within hours of his election, Xi discussed cyber security and North Korea with U.S. President Barack Obama over the phone. Obama announced the visits of treasury and state secretaries Jacob Lew and John F. Kerry to China the following week.<ref>{{cite news |date=15 March 2013 |title=China names Xi Jinping as new president |website=Inquirer.net |agency=Agence France-Presse |url=http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/373967/china-names-xi-jinping-as-new-president |url-status=live |access-date=16 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130317020402/http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/373967/china-names-xi-jinping-as-new-president |archive-date=17 March 2013}}</ref>

==Leadership==

===Anti-corruption campaign===
{{Quote box
| quote = “To speak the truth” means to focus on the nature of things, to speak frankly, and follow the truth. This is an important embodiment of a leading official’s characteristics of truth seeking, embodying justice, devotion to public interests, and uprightness. Moreover, he highlighted that the premise of telling the truth is to listen to the truth.
| source = — Xi Jinping during a speech in 2012<ref name="People’s Daily 2019 pp. 3–39">{{cite book | work=People’s Daily | title=Narrating China's Governance | chapter=Stories of Incorrupt Government: “The Corruption and Unjustness of Officials Give Birth to the Decline of Governance” | publisher=Springer Singapore | publication-place=Singapore | date=20 Nov 2019 | isbn=978-981-329-177-5 | doi=10.1007/978-981-32-9178-2_1 | pages=3–39}}</ref><ref name="香港文匯網 2012 l006">{{cite web | title=習近平:不提不切實際的口號 - 快訊-文匯網 | website=香港文匯網 | date=29 May 2012 | url=http://news.wenweipo.com/2012/05/29/IN1205290017.htm | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230928143655/http://news.wenweipo.com/2012/05/29/IN1205290017.htm | archive-date=28 Sep 2023 | url-status=live | access-date=28 Sep 2023}}</ref>
| align = right
| width = 25em
}}
Xi vowed to crack down on corruption almost immediately after he ascended to power at the 18th Party Congress. In his inaugural speech as general secretary, Xi mentioned that fighting corruption was one of the toughest challenges for the party.<ref name="inaug2">{{cite news |date=15 November 2012 |title=Xi Jinping's inaugural Speech |work=BBC News |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586 |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190914232334/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586 |archive-date=14 September 2019}}</ref> A few months into his term, Xi outlined the Eight-point Regulation, listing rules intended to curb corruption and waste during official party business; it aimed at stricter discipline on the conduct of party officials. Xi also vowed to root out "tigers and flies", that is, high-ranking officials and ordinary party functionaries.<ref name="elite2">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/world/asia/xi-jinping-imposes-austerity-measures-on-chinas-elite.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0|title=Elite in China Face Austerity Under Xi's Rule|last=Jacobs|first=Andrew|date=27 March 2013|work={{wipe|The New York Times}}|access-date=7 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181130054920/https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/world/asia/xi-jinping-imposes-austerity-measures-on-chinas-elite.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0|archive-date=30 November 2018|}}</ref>

Xi initiated cases against former CMC vice-chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, former PSC member and security chief Zhou Yongkang and former Hu Jintao chief aide Ling Jihua.<ref name="bloom2">{{cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-03/china-s-xi-broadens-graft-crackdown-to-boost-influence.html|title=President Xi's Anti-Corruption Campaign Biggest Since Mao|last=Oster|first=Shai|date=4 March 2014|publisher={{wipe|Bloomberg News}}|access-date=7 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141209164917/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-03/china-s-xi-broadens-graft-crackdown-to-boost-influence.html|archive-date=9 December 2014|author-link=Shai Oster}}</ref> Along with new disciplinary chief Wang Qishan, Xi's administration spearheaded the formation of "centrally-dispatched inspection teams" ({{lang|zh-hans|中央巡视组}}). These were essentially cross-jurisdictional squads of officials whose main task was to gain more in-depth understanding of the operations of provincial and local party organizations, and in the process, also enforce party discipline mandated by Beijing. Many of the work teams also had the effect of identifying and initiating investigations of high-ranking officials. Over one hundred provincial-ministerial level officials were implicated during a massive nationwide anti-corruption campaign. These included former and current regional officials (Su Rong, Bai Enpei, Wan Qingliang), leading figures of state-owned enterprises and central government organs (Song Lin, Liu Tienan), and highly ranked generals in the military (Gu Junshan). In June 2014, the Shanxi provincial political establishment was decimated, with four officials dismissed within a week from the provincial party organization's top ranks. Within the first two years of the campaign alone, over 200,000 low-ranking officials received warnings, fines, and demotions.{{sfn|Heilmann|2017|pp=62–75}}

The campaign has led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including members of the PSC.<ref name="lam20142">{{cite news|url=http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43160&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=d5d24d2f82c5981963c0180d300e62cd#.VOOBN_nF9uM|title=China's Soft-Power Deficit Widens as Xi Tightens Screws Over Ideology|date=5 December 2014|access-date=7 September 2019|publisher=Brookings Institution|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304041925/http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43160&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=d5d24d2f82c5981963c0180d300e62cd#.VOOBN_nF9uM|archive-date=4 March 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Xi's anti-corruption campaign is seen by critics, such as ''[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]]'', as a political tool with the aim of removing potential opponents and consolidating power.<ref>{{Cite news |date=22 October 2017 |title=Charting China's 'great purge' under Xi |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162 |access-date=7 January 2022 |archive-date=6 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210606041942/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=11 December 2014 |title=Tiger in the net |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2014/12/11/tiger-in-the-net |access-date=17 August 2022 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=17 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220817202459/https://www.economist.com/china/2014/12/11/tiger-in-the-net |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi's establishment of a new anti-corruption agency, the National Supervision Commission, ranked higher than the supreme court, has been described by Amnesty International's East Asia director as a "systemic threat to human rights" that "places tens of millions of people at the mercy of a secretive and virtually unaccountable system that is above the law."<ref>{{cite news |title=China's former military chief of staff jailed for life for corruption |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/20/chinas-former-military-chief-of-staff-jailed-for-life-for-corruption |access-date=13 September 2019 |work={{wipe|The Guardian}}|date=20 February 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191010131232/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/20/chinas-former-military-chief-of-staff-jailed-for-life-for-corruption |archive-date=10 October 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |date=20 March 2018 |title=China's anti-corruption campaign expands with new agency |work=BBC News |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-43453769 |url-status=live |access-date=13 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190924060145/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-43453769 |archive-date=24 September 2019}}</ref>

Xi has overseen significant reforms of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), CCP's highest internal control institution.<ref name="xinj">{{cite news |date=13 June 2014 |title=31个省级纪委改革方案获批复 12省已完成纪委"重建" |trans-title=31 Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection Reform Plans Approved 12 Provinces Have Completed "Reconstruction" |work=Xinhua News Agency |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-06/13/c_126612534.htm |url-status=dead |access-date=7 January 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140703204141/http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-06/13/c_126612534.htm |archive-date=3 July 2014}}</ref> He and CCDI Secretary Wang Qishan further institutionalized CCDI's independence from the day-to-day operations of the CCP, improving its ability to function as a ''bona fide'' control body.<ref name="xinj" /> According to ''The Wall Street Journal'', any anti-corruption punishment to officials at or above the vice ministerial level need approval from Xi.<ref name="Chin-2021">{{Cite news |last=Chin |first=Josh |date=15 December 2021 |title=Xi Jinping's Leadership Style: Micromanagement That Leaves Underlings Scrambling |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinpings-leadership-style-micromanagement-that-leaves-underlings-scrambling-11639582426 |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813143342/https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinpings-leadership-style-micromanagement-that-leaves-underlings-scrambling-11639582426 |url-status=live }}</ref> Another article from ''The Wall Street Journal'' said that when he wants to neutralize a political rival, he asks inspectors to prepare hundreds of pages of evidence. The article also said that he sometimes authorizes investigations on close associates of a high-ranking politician to replace them with his own proteges and puts political rivals in less important positions to separate them from their political bases. Reportedly, these tactics have even been used against Wang Qishan, Xi's close friend.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wong |first=Chun Han |date=16 October 2022 |title=Xi Jinping's Quest for Control Over China Targets Even Old Friends |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-china-anticorruption-11665925166 |access-date=17 October 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=16 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221016230010/https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-china-anticorruption-11665925166 |url-status=live }}</ref>

According to historian and sinologist Wang Gungwu, Xi Jinping inherited a political party that was faced with pervasive corruption.<ref name="Jesus College-2021">{{Cite web |date=19 March 2021 |title=China re-connects: joining a deep-rooted past to a new world order |url=https://www.jesus.cam.ac.uk/articles/china-re-connects-joining-deep-rooted-past-new-world-order |access-date=2023-02-11 |website=[[Organization:Jesus College, Cambridge|Jesus College, Cambridge]] |language=en |archive-date=11 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230211132318/https://www.jesus.cam.ac.uk/articles/china-re-connects-joining-deep-rooted-past-new-world-order |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Wang |first=Gungwu |date=7 September 2019 |title=Ancient past, modern ambitions: historian Wang Gungwu's new book on China's delicate balance |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3026041/ancient-past-modern-ambitions-historian-wang-gungwus-new-book |access-date=11 February 2023 |archive-date=11 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230211175223/https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3026041/ancient-past-modern-ambitions-historian-wang-gungwus-new-book |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi believed that the amount of corruption at the higher levels of the CCP put both the party and the country at risk of collapse.<ref name="Jesus College-2021" /> Wang further adds that Xi has a belief that only the CCP is capable of governing China, and that a collapse of the party would be disastrous for the Chinese people. Xi and the new generational leaders reacted by launching the anti-corruption campaign to eliminate corruption at the higher levels of the government.<ref name="Jesus College-2021" />

===Censorship===
Since Xi became the CCP general secretary, censorship, including internet censorship, has been significantly stepped up.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-communist-party-unveils-new-leadership-with-no-obvious-successor-to-xi-jinping/2017/10/25/efe67876-b8fc-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html|title=China's Xi Jinping unveils his top party leaders, with no successor in sight|last=Denyer|first=Simon|date=25 October 2017|newspaper={{wipe|The Washington Post}}|access-date=25 October 2017|quote=Censorship has been significantly stepped up in China since Xi took power.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190813203127/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-communist-party-unveils-new-leadership-with-no-obvious-successor-to-xi-jinping/2017/10/25/efe67876-b8fc-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html|archive-date=13 August 2019|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|ref=none|url=https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/the-great-firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internet-shutdown|title=The great firewall of China: Xi Jinping's internet shutdown|last=Economy|first=Elizabeth|date=29 June 2018|newspaper={{wipe|The Guardian}}|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191010172129/https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/the-great-firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internet-shutdown|archive-date=10 October 2019|access-date=4 November 2019|quote=Before Xi Jinping, the internet was becoming a more vibrant political space for Chinese citizens. But today the country has the largest and most sophisticated online censorship operation in the world.}}</ref> Chairing the 2018 China Cyberspace Governance Conference on 20 and 21 April 2018, Xi committed to "fiercely crack down on criminal offenses including hacking, telecom fraud, and violation of citizens' privacy."<ref>{{cite news |date=21 April 2018 |title=Xi outlines blueprint to develop China's strength in cyberspace |work=Xinhua News Agency |publisher= |url=http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/21/c_137127374.htm |url-status=dead |access-date=22 April 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180421162040/http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/21/c_137127374.htm |archive-date=21 April 2018}}</ref> During a visit to Chinese state media, Xi stated that "party and government-owned media must hold the family name of the party" ({{zh|labels=no|s=党和政府主办的媒体必须姓党|p=}}) and that the state media "must embody the party's will, safeguard the party's authority".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Zhuang |first=Pinghui |date=19 February 2016 |title=China's top party mouthpieces pledge 'absolute loyalty' as president makes rare visits to newsrooms |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1914136/chinas-top-party-mouthpieces-pledge-absolute-loyalty |access-date=14 August 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=31 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230331170900/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1914136/chinas-top-party-mouthpieces-pledge-absolute-loyalty |url-status=live }}</ref>

His administration has overseen more Internet restrictions imposed in China, and is described as being "stricter across the board" on speech than previous administrations.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/06/03/tiananmen-censorship-reflects-crackdown-under-xi-jinping|title=Tiananmen Censorship Reflects Crackdown Under Xi Jinping|last=Risen|first=Tom|date=3 June 2014|work=U.S. News & World Report|access-date=8 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190411190520/https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/06/03/tiananmen-censorship-reflects-crackdown-under-xi-jinping|archive-date=11 April 2019}}</ref> Xi has taken a very strong stand to control internet usage inside China, including [[Company:Google|Google]] and [[Company:Facebook|Facebook]],{{sfn|Bougon|pp=157–65|2018}} advocating Internet censorship in the country under the concept of [[Social:Network sovereignty|internet sovereignty]].<ref name="Tiezzi-2014">{{Cite news|last=Tiezzi|first=Shannon|date=24 June 2014|title=China's 'Sovereign Internet'|language=en-US|work=The Diplomat|url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-sovereign-internet/|url-status=live|access-date=4 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170804053110/https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-sovereign-internet/|archive-date=4 August 2017}}</ref><ref name="Ford-2015">{{Cite news|last=Ford|first=Peter|date=18 December 2015|title=On Internet freedoms, China tells the world, 'leave us alone'|work=The Christian Science Monitor|url=https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2015/1218/On-Internet-freedoms-China-tells-the-world-leave-us-alone|url-status=live|access-date=4 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170804055927/https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2015/1218/On-Internet-freedoms-China-tells-the-world-leave-us-alone|archive-date=4 August 2017|issn=0882-7729}}</ref> The censorship of Wikipedia has also been stringent; in April 2019, all versions of Wikipedia were blocked in China.<ref>{{cite news|date=14 May 2019|title=Wikipedia blocked in China in all languages|publisher=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48269608|url-status=live|access-date=15 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190515001341/https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48269608|archive-date=15 May 2019}}</ref> Likewise, the situation for users of [[Social:Sina Weibo|Weibo]] has been described as a change from fearing that individual posts would be deleted, or at worst one's account, to fear of arrest.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/china-xi-jinping-crackdown-liberal-academics-minor-cultural-revolution|title='It's getting worse': China's liberal academics fear growing censorship|last=Phillips|first=Tom|date=6 August 2015|work={{wipe|The Guardian}}|access-date=8 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190918070042/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/china-xi-jinping-crackdown-liberal-academics-minor-cultural-revolution|archive-date=18 September 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

A law enacted in September 2013 authorized a three-year prison term for bloggers who shared more than 500 times any content considered "defamatory".<ref name="Grigg2">{{cite news|url=http://www.afr.com/technology/social-media/how-china-stopped-its-bloggers-20150701-gi34za|title=How China stopped its bloggers|last=Grigg|first=Angus|date=4 July 2015|newspaper=The Australian Financial Review|access-date=8 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180626001441/https://www.afr.com/technology/social-media/how-china-stopped-its-bloggers-20150701-gi34za|archive-date=26 June 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> The State Internet Information Department summoned a group of influential bloggers to a seminar instructing them to avoid writing about politics, the CCP, or making statements contradicting official narratives. Many bloggers stopped writing about controversial topics, and Weibo went into decline, with much of its readership shifting to [[Software:WeChat|WeChat]] users speaking to very limited social circles.<ref name="Grigg2" /> In 2017, telecommunications carriers in China were instructed by the government to block individuals' use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) by February 2018.<ref>{{Cite news |date=10 July 2017 |title=China Tells Carriers to Block Access to Personal VPNs by February |language=en |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/china-is-said-to-order-carriers-to-bar-personal-vpns-by-february |access-date=12 August 2022 |archive-date=1 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190501104638/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/china-is-said-to-order-carriers-to-bar-personal-vpns-by-february |url-status=live }}</ref>

Xi has spoken out against "historical nihilism", meaning historical viewpoints that challenge the official line of the CCP.{{Sfn|Wong|2023|p=181}} Xi said that one of the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union has been historical nihilism.<ref>{{Cite news |title=China is struggling to keep control over its version of the past |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2016/10/29/china-is-struggling-to-keep-control-over-its-version-of-the-past |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=14 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180714135236/https://www.economist.com/china/2016/10/29/china-is-struggling-to-keep-control-over-its-version-of-the-past |url-status=live }}</ref> The [[Organization:Cyberspace Administration of China|Cyberspace Administration of China]] (CAC) has established a telephone hotline for people to report acts of historical nihilism, while Toutiao and [[Software:TikTok|Douyin]] urged its users to report instances of historical nihilism.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ma |first=Josephine |date=27 April 2022 |title=Chinese web users told to report 'historical nihilism' against party line |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3175604/web-users-china-told-report-posts-guilty-historical-nihilism |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=28 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220428195249/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3175604/web-users-china-told-report-posts-guilty-historical-nihilism |url-status=live }}</ref> In May 2021, the CAC reported that it removed two million online posts for historical nihilism.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Jun |first=Mai |date=11 May 2021 |title=2 million posts deleted for 'historical nihilism' as party centenary nears |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3132957/china-deletes-2-million-online-posts-historical-nihilism |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=5 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220105031021/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3132957/china-deletes-2-million-online-posts-historical-nihilism |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Consolidation of power===
[[File:抗战胜利70周年阅兵演练.jpg|thumb|Portrait of Xi in Beijing, September 2015]]

Political observers have called Xi the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, especially since the ending of presidential two-term limits in 2018.<ref name="PhillipsGuardian2">{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/xi-jinping-mao-thought-on-socialism-china-constitution|title=Xi Jinping becomes most powerful leader since Mao with China's change to constitution|last=Phillips|first=Tom|date=24 October 2017|work={{wipe|The Guardian}}|access-date=24 October 2017|issn=0261-3077|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171024053607/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/xi-jinping-mao-thought-on-socialism-china-constitution|archive-date=24 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="CBC-2017">{{cite news |date=24 October 2017 |title=China elevates Xi to most powerful leader in decades |work=CBC News |publisher= |url=http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/china-congress-xi-jinping-1.4368588 |url-status=live |access-date=22 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180501062515/http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/china-congress-xi-jinping-1.4368588 |archive-date=1 May 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/world-news/china-elevates-xi-jinpings-status-making-him-the-most-powerful-leader-since-mao-36256294.html|title=China elevates Xi Jinping's status, making him the most powerful leader since Mao|date=24 October 2017|work=Irish Independent|access-date=22 June 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180622220327/https://www.independent.ie/world-news/china-elevates-xi-jinpings-status-making-him-the-most-powerful-leader-since-mao-36256294.html|archive-date=22 June 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Collins |first1=Stephen |date=9 November 2017 |title=Xi's up, Trump is down, but it may not matter |work=CNN |publisher= |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/08/politics/president-donald-trump-xi-jinping-china/index.html |url-status=live |access-date=22 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180623004701/https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/08/politics/president-donald-trump-xi-jinping-china/index.html |archive-date=23 June 2018}}</ref> Xi has notably departed from the [[Social:Collective leadership|collective leadership]] practices of his post-Mao predecessors. He has centralised his power and created working groups with himself at the head to subvert government bureaucracy, making himself become the unmistakable central figure of the new administration.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2018/0228/Xi-for-life-China-turns-its-back-on-collective-leadership|title=Xi for life? China turns its back on collective leadership.|last1=Holtz|first1=Michael|date=28 February 2018|work=The Christian Science Monitor|access-date=23 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624035940/https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2018/0228/Xi-for-life-China-turns-its-back-on-collective-leadership|archive-date=24 June 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> Beginning in 2013, the CCP under Xi has created a series of Central Leading Groups: supra-ministerial steering committees, designed to bypass existing institutions when making decisions, and ostensibly make policy-making a more efficient process. The most notable new body is the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms. It has broad jurisdiction over economic restructuring and social reforms, and is said to have displaced some of the power previously held by the State Council and its premier.<ref name="keck2">{{cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/is-li-keqiang-being-marginalized/|title=Is Li Keqiang Being Marginalized?|last1=Keck|first1=Zachary|date=7 January 2014|work=The Diplomat|access-date=7 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181029152046/https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/is-li-keqiang-being-marginalized/|archive-date=29 October 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

Xi also became the leader of the Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization, in charge of cyber-security and Internet policy. The Third Plenum held in 2013 also saw the creation of the National Security Commission of the CCP, another body chaired by Xi, which commentators have said would help Xi consolidate over national security affairs.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/30/chinas-much-heralded-national-security-council-has-disappeared-nsc-xi-jinping/|title=China's Much-Heralded NSC Has Disappeared|last=Wuthnow|first=Joel|date=30 June 2016|newspaper=Foreign Policy|language=en-US|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190825180323/https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/30/chinas-much-heralded-national-security-council-has-disappeared-nsc-xi-jinping/|archive-date=25 August 2019|access-date=25 August 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lampton|first=David M.|date=3 September 2015|title=Xi Jinping and the National Security Commission: policy coordination and political power|journal=Journal of Contemporary China|volume=24|issue=95|pages=759–777|doi=10.1080/10670564.2015.1013366|s2cid=154685098|issn=1067-0564|doi-access=free}}</ref> In the opinion of at least one political scientist, Xi "has surrounded himself with cadres he met while stationed on the coast, Fujian and [[Place:Shanghai|Shanghai]] and in Zhejiang."<ref name="andresy15">{{cite book |last1=Andrésy |first1=Agnès |title=Xi Jinping: Red China, The Next Generation |date=2015 |publisher=UPA |page=88 |isbn=9780761866015 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=F6jTCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA88}}</ref> Control of Beijing is seen as crucial to Chinese leaders; Xi has selected Cai Qi, one of the cadres mentioned above, to manage the capital.<ref name="economistcai">{{cite news |date=13 July 2017 |title=Xi Jinping has chosen an unusual man to lead the capital city |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2017/07/13/xi-jinping-has-chosen-an-unusual-man-to-lead-the-capital-city |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=26 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231026231021/https://www.economist.com/china/2017/07/13/xi-jinping-has-chosen-an-unusual-man-to-lead-the-capital-city |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi was also believed to have diluted the authority of premier Li Keqiang, taking authority over the economy which has generally been considered to be the domain of the premier.<ref>{{Cite news |date=28 September 2020 |title=Li Keqiang: China's marginalised premier |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-19870221 |access-date=17 October 2022 |archive-date=17 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221017104619/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-19870221 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Wei |first=Lingling |date=11 May 2022 |title=China's Forgotten Premier Steps Out of Xi's Shadow as Economic Fixer |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-premier-li-keqiang-xi-jinping-11652277107 |access-date=17 October 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=31 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230531130648/https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-premier-li-keqiang-xi-jinping-11652277107 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Since coming to power, various observers have said that Xi has seriously diluted the influence of the once-dominant "Tuanpai", also called the Youth League Faction, which were CCP officials who rose through the Party's Communist Youth League (CYLC).<ref name=":10">{{Cite news |last=Pollard |first=Martin |date=26 October 2022 |title=China's Xi deals knockout blow to once-powerful Youth League faction |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-deals-knockout-blow-once-powerful-youth-league-faction-2022-10-26/ |access-date=24 May 2023 |archive-date=24 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230524163327/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-deals-knockout-blow-once-powerful-youth-league-faction-2022-10-26/ |url-status=live }}</ref> He criticized the cadres of the CYLC, saying that [these cadres] can't talk about science, literature and art, work or life [with young people]. All they can do is just repeat the same old bureaucratic, stereotypical talk."<ref name="SCMP">{{cite news |last=Gan |first=Nectar |date=23 September 2017 |title=Latest Xi Jinping book gives clues on decline of Communist Party's youth wing |newspaper=South China Morning Post |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2112461/latest-xi-jinping-book-gives-clues-decline-communist?mc_cid=1f9bc1ec42&mc_eid=1f9d28130a |url-status=live |access-date=8 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171014163041/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2112461/latest-xi-jinping-book-gives-clues-decline-communist?mc_cid=1f9bc1ec42&mc_eid=1f9d28130a |archive-date=14 October 2017}}</ref> Its budget was also cut, dropping from around 700 million yuan ($96 million) in 2012 to 260 million yuan ($40 million) in 2021, while its membership dropped from 90 million to 74 million in the same period.<ref name=":10" /> He also led to the closure of the Central School of the Communist Youth League of China, merging it with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and effectively demoted Qin Yizhi, first secretary of the CYLC, in 2017.<ref name="veconomist">{{cite news |date=14 October 2017 |title=Xi Jinping has been good for China's Communist Party; less so for China |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21730138-contradicting-deng-xiaoping-mr-xi-has-concentrated-vast-power-his-own-hands-xi-jinping-has |url-status=live |access-date=14 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171013225837/https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21730138-contradicting-deng-xiaoping-mr-xi-has-concentrated-vast-power-his-own-hands-xi-jinping-has |archive-date=13 October 2017}}</ref>

In March 2018, the National People's Congress (NPC) passed a set of constitutional amendments including removal of term limits for the president and vice president, the creation of a National Supervisory Commission, as well as enhancing the central role of the CCP.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Shi |first1=Jiangtao |last2=Huang |first2=Kristin |date=26 February 2018 |title=End to term limits at top 'may be start of global backlash for China' |work=South China Morning Post |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2134791/end-term-limits-top-may-be-start-global-backlash-china |url-status=live |access-date=28 February 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227155138/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2134791/end-term-limits-top-may-be-start-global-backlash-china |archive-date=27 February 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Phillips |first=Tom |date=4 March 2018 |title=Xi Jinping's power play: from president to China's new dictator? |website={{wipe|The Guardian}} |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/04/xi-jinping-from-president-to-china-new-dictator |url-status=live |access-date=4 March 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180304005848/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/04/xi-jinping-from-president-to-china-new-dictator |archive-date=4 March 2018}}</ref> On 17 March 2018, the Chinese legislature reappointed Xi as president, now without term limits; Wang Qishan was appointed vice president.<ref>{{cite news |last=Wen |first=Philip |date=17 March 2018 |title=China's parliament re-elects Xi Jinping as president |publisher={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-xi/chinas-parliament-re-elects-xi-jinping-as-president-idUSKCN1GT03C |url-status=live |access-date=17 March 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180317042406/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-xi/chinas-parliament-re-elects-xi-jinping-as-president-idUSKCN1GT03C |archive-date=17 March 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Bodeen |first1=Christopher |date=17 March 2018 |title=Xi reappointed as China's president with no term limits |publisher=Associated Press |url=https://apnews.com/78ea5b0646564a6eb98d9d20d5fbcbb6 |url-status=live |access-date=17 March 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180317190611/https://apnews.com/78ea5b0646564a6eb98d9d20d5fbcbb6 |archive-date=17 March 2018}}</ref> The following day, Li Keqiang was reappointed premier and longtime allies of Xi, Xu Qiliang and Zhang Youxia, were voted in as vice-chairmen of the CMC.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Zhou |first1=Xin |date=18 March 2018 |title=Li Keqiang endorsed as China's premier; military leaders confirmed |newspaper=South China Morning Post |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2137707/li-keqiang-endorsed-chinas-premier-while-military-commission |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190827155325/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2137707/li-keqiang-endorsed-chinas-premier-while-military-commission |archive-date=27 August 2019}}</ref> Foreign minister Wang Yi was promoted to state councillor and General Wei Fenghe was named defence minister.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Ng |first1=Teddy |date=19 March 2018 |title=China's foreign minister gains power in new post as state councillor |newspaper=South China Morning Post |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2137769/china-promotes-foreign-minister-wang-yi-state |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190305121632/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2137769/china-promotes-foreign-minister-wang-yi-state |archive-date=5 March 2019}}</ref> According to the ''[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]]'', Xi expressed his views of constitutional amendment at meetings with Chinese officials and foreign dignitaries. Xi explained the decision in terms of needing to align two more powerful posts—general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC—which have no term limits. However, Xi did not say whether he intended to be party general secretary, CMC chairman and state president, for three or more terms.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Mitchell |first1=Tom |date=7 September 2019 |title=China's Xi Jinping says he is opposed to life-long rule |newspaper=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/2b449400-413a-11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b |url-status=live |access-date=17 April 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180417192157/https://www.ft.com/content/2b449400-413a-11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b |archive-date=17 April 2018 |quote=President insists term extension is necessary to align government and party posts}}</ref>

In its sixth plenary session in November 2021, CCP adopted a historical resolution, a kind of document that evaluated the party's history. This was the third of its kind after ones adopted by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Cat |date=7 November 2021 |title=The significance of Xi Jinping's upcoming 'historical resolution' |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3154996/xi-jinpings-historical-resolution-what-it-and-why-it-important |access-date=11 August 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=10 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220810013800/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3154996/xi-jinpings-historical-resolution-what-it-and-why-it-important |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Ni |first=Vincent |date=11 November 2021 |title=Chinese Communist party elevates Xi's status in 'historical resolution' |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/11/chinese-communist-party-elevates-xi-jinping-status-historical-resolution |access-date=11 August 2022 |website={{wipe|The Guardian}} |language=en |archive-date=25 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220625192901/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/11/chinese-communist-party-elevates-xi-jinping-status-historical-resolution |url-status=live }}</ref> and the document for the first time credited Xi as being the "main innovator" of Xi Jinping Thought<ref>{{Cite news  |date=12 November 2021 |title=China's Communist Party passes resolution amplifying President Xi's authority |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-communist-party-passes-resolution-party-history-achievements-2021-11-11/ |access-date=11 August 2022 |archive-date=10 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220810125237/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-communist-party-passes-resolution-party-history-achievements-2021-11-11/ |url-status=live }}</ref> while also declaring Xi's leadership as being "the key to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation".<ref>{{Cite news |date=11 November 2021 |title=Chinese Communist party clears way for Xi to tighten grip on power |work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/77f8dd89-fd16-42f9-b2a5-0f5e9ee93ace |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221219/https://www.ft.com/content/77f8dd89-fd16-42f9-b2a5-0f5e9ee93ace |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=11 August 2022 }}</ref> In comparison with the other historical resolutions, Xi's one did not herald a major change in how the CCP evaluated its history.<ref>{{Cite news |author1=Wong, Chun Han |author2=Zhai, Keith |date=17 November 2021 |title=How Xi Jinping Is Rewriting China's History to Put Himself at the Center |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-xi-jinping-is-rewriting-chinas-history-to-put-himself-at-the-center-11637157022 |access-date=11 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=10 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220810135113/https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-xi-jinping-is-rewriting-chinas-history-to-put-himself-at-the-center-11637157022 |url-status=live }}</ref> To accompany the historical resolution, the CCP promoted the terms Two Establishes and Two Safeguards, calling the CCP to unite around and protect Xi's core status within the party.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Bandurski |first=David |date=8 February 2022 |title=Two Establishes |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/two-establishes/ |access-date=12 August 2022 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US |archive-date=29 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220729191420/https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/two-establishes/ |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2022, Xi appointed his close ally Wang Xiaohong as the Minister of Public Security, giving him further control over the security establishment.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Lau |first=Jack |date=24 June 2022 |title=Close Xi Jinping ally appointed as China's new public security chief |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3183027/close-xi-jinping-ally-appointed-chinas-new-public-security |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813013831/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3183027/close-xi-jinping-ally-appointed-chinas-new-public-security |url-status=live }}</ref>

The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held between 16 and 22 October 2022, has overseen amendments in the CCP constitution and the re-election of Xi as general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC for a third term, with the overall result of the Congress being further strengthening of Xi's power.<ref name="Davidson-2022">{{Cite news |last1=Davidson |first1=Helen |last2=Graham-Harrison |first2=Emma |date=23 October 2022 |title=China's leader Xi Jinping secures third term and stacks inner circle with loyalists |work={{wipe|The Guardian}} |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/23/xi-jinping-to-rule-china-for-precedent-breaking-third-term |access-date=23 October 2022 |archive-date=23 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221023041913/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/23/xi-jinping-to-rule-china-for-precedent-breaking-third-term |url-status=live }}</ref> The newly amended CCP constitution included the term two safeguards, reinforcing Xi's power.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ruwitch |first=John |date=23 October 2022 |title=China's Xi Jinping emerges from the Communist Party congress with dominance |language=en |work=NPR |url=https://www.npr.org/2022/10/23/1130771668/china-xi-jinping-third-term-leader |access-date=23 October 2022 |archive-date=23 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221023054341/https://www.npr.org/2022/10/23/1130771668/china-xi-jinping-third-term-leader |url-status=live }}</ref> It also included concepts promoted by Xi like common prosperity, "Chinese-style modernization" and "[[Social:Whole-process people's democracy|whole-process people's democracy]]".<ref>{{Cite news |date=22 October 2022 |title=Factbox: China's Communist Party amends its charter, strengthens Xi's power |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-communist-party-amends-its-charter-strengthens-xi-power-2022-10-22/ |access-date=23 October 2022 |archive-date=23 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221023100717/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-communist-party-amends-its-charter-strengthens-xi-power-2022-10-22/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi's re-election made him the first party leader since Mao Zedong to be chosen for a third term, though Deng Xiaoping ruled the country informally for a longer period.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wingfield-Hayes |first=Rupert |date=23 October 2022 |title=Xi Jinping's party is just getting started |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-63225277 |access-date=23 October 2022 |archive-date=17 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230317004249/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-63225277 |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi was further re-elected as the PRC president and chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission on 10 March 2023 during the opening of the 14th National People's Congress.<ref>{{Cite news |date=10 March 2023 |title=Xi Jinping unanimously elected Chinese president, PRC CMC chairman |work=Xinhua News Agency |url=https://english.news.cn/20230310/0fb19441ee4145a588911118edd300a3/c.html |access-date=10 March 2023 |archive-date=10 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230310033619/https://english.news.cn/20230310/0fb19441ee4145a588911118edd300a3/c.html |url-status=live }}</ref>
[[File:Xi Jinping leads CPC leadership in meeting the press.webm|thumb|Xi Jinping and other members of the 20th Politburo Standing Committee meeting the press, October 2022]]
The new Politburo Standing Committee elected just after the CCP Congress was filled almost completely with people close to Xi, with four out of the seven members of the previous PSC including premier Li Keqiang and CPPCC chairman Wang Yang stepping down.<ref>{{Cite web |date=22 October 2022 |title=Shake-up at the top of China's Communist Party as Xi Jinping starts new term |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3196911/shake-top-chinas-communist-party-xi-jinping-starts-new-term |access-date=23 October 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=22 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221022234719/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3196911/shake-top-chinas-communist-party-xi-jinping-starts-new-term |url-status=live }}</ref> Li Qiang, a close Xi ally, became the second-ranking member of the PSC, and was further promoted to premier in 2023.<ref name="Davidson-2022" /><ref>{{Cite news |date=11 March 2023 |title=Xi signs presidential order to appoint Li Qiang as premier |work=Xinhua News Agency |url=https://english.news.cn/20230311/d1ab797dbec745e28f9ee7ba9c2f5c7e/c.html |access-date=11 March 2023 |archive-date=11 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230311063145/https://english.news.cn/20230311/d1ab797dbec745e28f9ee7ba9c2f5c7e/c.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Other allies of Xi, including Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi have also joined the PSC, and became the first secretary of the CCP Secretariat, first vice premier, and secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection respectively.<ref name="Chun-2022">{{Cite web |last1=Wong |first1=Chun Han |last2=Zhai |first2=Keith |date=23 October 2022 |title=China's Leaders: Xi Jinping and His Men |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-leaders-xi-jinping-and-his-men-11666538145 |access-date=23 October 2022 |website={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |language=en-US |archive-date=23 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221023152248/https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-leaders-xi-jinping-and-his-men-11666538145 |url-status=live }}</ref> The only remaining members of the previous PSC except Xi were Zhao Leji and Wang Huning, though their ranking and positions changed,<ref name="Chun-2022" /> and became the NPC Standing Committee and CPPCC chairmen respectively on 10 March 2023.<ref>{{Cite news |date=10 March 2023 |title=Wang Huning elected chairman of China's top political advisory body |work=Xinhua News Agency |url=https://english.news.cn/20230310/9e6225b04bf847a2a33df1b36dbdd8d0/c.html |access-date=10 March 2023 |archive-date=11 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230311113114/https://english.news.cn/20230310/9e6225b04bf847a2a33df1b36dbdd8d0/c.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=10 March 2023 |title=Zhao Leji elected chairman of China's 14th National People's Congress Standing Committee |work=Xinhua News Agency |url=https://english.news.cn/20230310/4efa98a60cf7400c8164e8264a9bdc53/c.html |access-date=10 March 2023 |archive-date=11 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230311084107/https://english.news.cn/20230310/4efa98a60cf7400c8164e8264a9bdc53/c.html |url-status=live }}</ref> {{wipe|Reuters}} remarked that the retirement of Wang Yang and Li Keqiang, as well as the demotion of vice premier Hu Chunhua from the Politburo meant the wipeout of Tuanpai,<ref name=":10" /> while Willy Wo-Lap Lam wrote that there were no representatives from the Tuanpai or the Shanghai clique, leading to a total dominance of Xi's own faction.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lam |first=Willy Wo-Lap |date=24 October 2022 |title=The 20th Party Congress: Xi Jinping Exerts Overwhelming Control Over Personnel, but Offers No Clues on Reviving the Economy |url=https://jamestown.org/program/the-20th-party-congress-xi-jinping-exerts-overwhelming-control-over-personnel-but-offers-no-clues-on-reviving-the-economy/ |access-date=24 May 2023 |website=The Jamestown Foundation |language=en-US |archive-date=24 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230524163326/https://jamestown.org/program/the-20th-party-congress-xi-jinping-exerts-overwhelming-control-over-personnel-but-offers-no-clues-on-reviving-the-economy/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Cult of personality====

Xi has had a [[Social:Cult of personality|cult of personality]] constructed around himself since entering office<ref name="EconomistCultPersonality">{{Cite news |date=18 September 2014 |title=The power of Xi Jinping |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/news/china/21618882-cult-personality-growing-around-chinas-president-what-will-he-do-his-political |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=20 September 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171107055514/https://www.economist.com/news/china/21618882-cult-personality-growing-around-chinas-president-what-will-he-do-his-political |archive-date=7 November 2017}}</ref><ref name="ForeignPolicyCultPersonality">{{Cite news |last1=Jiayang |first1=Fan |last2=Taisu |first2=Zhang |last3=Ying |first3=Zhu |date=8 March 2016 |title=Behind the Personality Cult of Xi Jinping |language=en-US |newspaper=Foreign Policy |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/08/the-personality-cult-of-xi-jinping-china-leader-communist-party/ |url-status=live |access-date=26 July 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190726173241/https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/08/the-personality-cult-of-xi-jinping-china-leader-communist-party/ |archive-date=26 July 2019}}</ref> with books, cartoons, pop songs and dance routines honouring his rule.<ref name="PhilGuard12">{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/19/xi-jinping-does-china-truly-love-big-daddy-xi-or-fear-him|title=Xi Jinping: Does China truly love 'Big Daddy Xi' – or fear him?|last=Phillips|first=Tom|date=19 September 2015|work={{wipe|The Guardian}}|access-date=31 August 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190427001038/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/19/xi-jinping-does-china-truly-love-big-daddy-xi-or-fear-him|archive-date=27 April 2019|issn=0261-3077}}</ref> Following Xi's ascension to the [[Social:Leadership core|leadership core]] of the CCP, he had been referred to as ''Xi Dada'' ({{zh|s=习大大|labels=no}}, Uncle or Papa Xi),<ref name="PhilGuard12" /><ref>{{cite news |last1=Blanchard |first1=Ben |date=28 October 2016 |title=All hail the mighty uncle – Chinese welcome Xi as the 'core' |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |publisher= |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-xi-idUSKCN12S0AA |url-status=live |access-date=23 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624010629/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-xi-idUSKCN12S0AA |archive-date=24 June 2018}}</ref> though this stopped in April 2016.<ref>{{Cite news |date=28 April 2015 |title=Xi's Nickname Becomes Out of Bounds for China's Media |language=en |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-28/no-more-big-daddy-xi-as-china-s-spin-doctors-revise-playbook |access-date=11 August 2022 |archive-date=12 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012225210/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-28/no-more-big-daddy-xi-as-china-s-spin-doctors-revise-playbook |url-status=live }}</ref> The village of Liangjiahe, where Xi was sent to work, has become a "modern-day shrine" decorated with CCP propaganda and murals extolling the formative years of his life.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Rivers |first1=Matt |date=19 March 2018 |title=This entire Chinese village is a shrine to Xi Jinping |work=CNN |publisher= |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/19/asia/china-xi-jinping-village-intl/index.html |url-status=live |access-date=23 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624010733/https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/19/asia/china-xi-jinping-village-intl/index.html |archive-date=24 June 2018}}</ref> The CCP's Politburo named Xi Jinping ''lingxiu'' ({{zh|s=领袖|labels=no}}), a reverent term for "leader" and a title previously only given to Mao Zedong and his immediate successor Hua Guofeng.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2117421/xi-jinpings-latest-grandiose-title-aims-take|title=Why China is reviving Mao's grandiose title for Xi Jinping|last=Gan|first=Nectar|date=28 December 2017|newspaper=South China Morning Post|language=en|access-date=26 July 2019|archive-date=24 July 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190724182232/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2117421/xi-jinpings-latest-grandiose-title-aims-take|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/china/2018/02/17/xi-jinping-is-no-longer-any-old-leader|title=Xi Jinping is no longer any old leader|date=17 February 2018|newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]]|access-date=26 July 2019|issn=0013-0613|archive-date=24 July 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190724182222/https://www.economist.com/china/2018/02/17/xi-jinping-is-no-longer-any-old-leader|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Shepherd |first1=Christian |last2=Wen |first2=Philip |date=20 October 2017 |title=With tears and song, China welcomes Xi as great, wise leader |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |publisher= |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-idUSKBN1CO0AV |access-date=26 July 2019 |archive-date=26 July 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190726171857/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-idUSKBN1CO0AV |url-status=live }}</ref> He is also sometimes called the "pilot at the helm" ({{zh|s=领航掌舵|labels=no}}).<ref>{{Cite web |last=Qian |first=Gang |date=2 November 2020 |title=A Brief History of the Helmsmen |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/2020/11/02/a-brief-history-of-the-helmsman/ |access-date=16 August 2022 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US |archive-date=16 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220816101848/https://chinamediaproject.org/2020/11/02/a-brief-history-of-the-helmsman/ |url-status=live }}</ref> On 25 December 2019, the Politburo officially named Xi as "People's Leader" ({{zh|s=人民领袖|labels=no|c=|t=|p=rénmín lǐngxiù}}), a title only Mao had held previously.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/China-crowns-Xi-with-special-title-citing-rare-crisis|title=China crowns Xi with special title, citing rare crisis|last=Nakazawa|first=Katsuji|date=9 January 2020|work=Nikkei Asian Review|access-date=10 January 2020|archive-date=9 January 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200109211043/https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/China-crowns-Xi-with-special-title-citing-rare-crisis|url-status=live}}</ref>

=== Economy and technology ===

Xi was initially seen as a market reformist,<ref name="Whyte-2021">{{Cite journal |last=Whyte |first=Martin K. |date=15 March 2021 |title=China's economic development history and Xi Jinping's "China dream:" an overview with personal reflections |journal=Chinese Sociological Review |volume=53 |issue=2 |pages=115–134 |doi=10.1080/21620555.2020.1833321 |s2cid=228867589 |issn=2162-0555|doi-access=free }}</ref> and the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee under him announced that "market forces" would begin to play a "decisive" role in allocating resources.<ref name="brook2" /> This meant that the state would gradually reduce its involvement in the distribution of capital, and restructure China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to allow further competition, potentially by attracting foreign and private sector players in industries that were previously highly regulated. This policy aimed to address the bloated state sector that had unduly profited from an earlier round of re-structuring by purchasing assets at below-market prices, assets that were no longer being used productively. Xi also launched the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone in August 2013, which was seen as part of the economic reforms.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Denyer |first=Simon |date=25 August 2013 |title=Creeping reforms as China gives Shanghai Free Trade Zone go-ahead |newspaper={{wipe|The Washington Post}} |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/creeping-reforms-as-china-gives-shanghai-free-trade-zone-go-ahead/2013/08/25/95f66472-0bf7-11e3-89fe-abb4a5067014_story.html |access-date=4 January 2023 |archive-date=3 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230603015413/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/creeping-reforms-as-china-gives-shanghai-free-trade-zone-go-ahead/2013/08/25/95f66472-0bf7-11e3-89fe-abb4a5067014_story.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In However, by 2017, Xi's promise of economic reforms has been said to stall by experts.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |last2=Bradsher |first2=Keith |date=4 March 2017 |title=Xi Jinping's Failed Promises Dim Hopes for Economic Change in 2nd Term |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-economic-reform.html |access-date=22 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=22 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220822135411/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-economic-reform.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Whyte-2021" /> In 2015, the [[Finance:2015–2016 Chinese stock market turbulence|Chinese stock market bubble popped]], which led Xi to use state forces to fix the issue.{{Sfn|Wong|2023|p=146}} From 2012 to 2022, the share of the market value of private sector firms in China's top listed companies has increased from around 10% to over 40%.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news |last1=Orlik |first1=Tom |last2=Hancock |first2=Tom |date=3 March 2023 |title=What Wall Street Gets Wrong About Xi Jinping's New Money Men |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-03-03/xi-s-new-money-men-worry-investors-but-could-push-chinese-economic-reform?srnd=premium&leadSource=uverify%20wall |access-date=4 March 2023}}</ref> He has also overseen the relaxation of restrictions on [[Finance:Foreign direct investment|foreign direct investment]] (FDI) and increased cross-border holdings of stocks and bonds.<ref name=":0" />

Xi has increased state control over China's economy, voicing support for SOEs,<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2166261/chinese-president-xi-jinpings-show-support-state-owned-firms|title=Chinese President Xi Jinping's show of support for state-owned firms 'no surprise', analysts say|last1=Wang|first1=Orange|date=28 September 2018|work=South China Morning Post|access-date=31 January 2020|last2=Leng|first2=Sidney|archive-date=9 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201109022556/https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2166261/chinese-president-xi-jinpings-show-support-state-owned-firms|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Whyte-2021" /> while also supporting the country's private sector.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2166108/xi-jinping-reassures-chinas-state-owned-enterprises-and-private|title=Xi says it's wrong to 'bad mouth' China's state firms... but country needs private sector as well|last=Gan|first=Nectar|date=28 September 2018|work=South China Morning Post|access-date=31 January 2020|archive-date=31 January 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200131193729/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2166108/xi-jinping-reassures-chinas-state-owned-enterprises-and-private|url-status=live}}</ref> CCP control of SOEs has increased under Xi, while some limited steps towards market liberalization, such as increasing mixed ownership of SOEs were also undertaken.{{sfn|Pieke|Hofman|2022|p=48}} Under Xi, "government guidance funds", public-private investment funds set up by or for government bodies, have raised more than $900 billion for early funding to companies that work in sectors the government deems as strategic.<ref name="Lockett-2022">{{Cite news |last=Lockett |first=Hudson |date=2022-06-12 |title=How Xi Jinping is reshaping China's capital markets |work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/d5b81ea0-5955-414c-b2eb-886dfed4dffe |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221237/https://www.ft.com/content/d5b81ea0-5955-414c-b2eb-886dfed4dffe |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=2022-11-21 }}</ref> Xi has increased the role of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission at the expense of the State Council.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/57371736-4b69-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221251/https://www.ft.com/content/57371736-4b69-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a|archive-date=11 December 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Xi's China: The rise of party politics|last=Mitchell|first=Tom|date=25 July 2016|work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]]|access-date=31 January 2020}}</ref> His administration made it easier for banks to issue [[Finance:Mortgage loan|mortgages]], increased foreign participation in the bond market, and increased the national currency [[Finance:Renminbi|renminbi's]] global role, helping it to join [[Organization:International Monetary Fund|IMF's]] basket of [[Finance:Special drawing rights|special drawing right]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/business/china-xi-jinping-economic-reform-scorecard.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170305071055/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/business/china-xi-jinping-economic-reform-scorecard.html |archive-date=5 March 2017 |url-access=limited |url-status=live|title=China and Economic Reform: Xi Jinping's Track Record|last=Bradsher|first=Keith|date=4 March 2017|work={{wipe|The New York Times}}|access-date=31 January 2020|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> In the 40th anniversary of the launching of Chinese economic reforms in 2018, he has promised to continue reforms but has warned that nobody "can dictate to the Chinese people".<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/658e78ce-0287-11e9-99df-6183d3002ee1|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221207/https://www.ft.com/content/658e78ce-0287-11e9-99df-6183d3002ee1|archive-date=11 December 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Xi says no one can 'dictate to the Chinese people'|last=Wildau|first=Gabriel|date=18 December 2018|work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]]|access-date=31 January 2020}}</ref>

Xi has also personally made eradicating extreme poverty through "targeted poverty alleviation" a key goal.<ref>{{Cite news |date=25 February 2021 |title=Xi Puts His Personal Stamp on China's Fight Against Poverty |language=en |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-25/china-s-xi-puts-personal-stamp-on-nation-s-fight-against-poverty |access-date=14 August 2022 |archive-date=18 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220218100001/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-25/china-s-xi-puts-personal-stamp-on-nation-s-fight-against-poverty |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2021, Xi declared a "complete victory" over extreme poverty, saying that nearly 100 million people have been lifted out of poverty under his tenure, though some experts said that China's [[Finance:Poverty threshold|poverty threshold]] was relatively lower than the one set by the [[Organization:World Bank|World Bank]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=25 February 2021 |title=China's Xi declares victory in ending extreme poverty |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56194622 |access-date=14 August 2022 |archive-date=28 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220728095225/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56194622 |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2020, premier Li Keqiang, citing the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) said that China still had 600 million people living with less than 1000 yuan ($140) a month, although an article from ''The Economist'' said that the methodology NBS used was flawed, stating that the figure took the combined income, which was then equally divided.<ref>{{Cite news |date=18 June 2020 |title=China's poverty line is not as stingy as commentators think |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |location=Hong Kong |url=https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/06/18/chinas-poverty-line-is-not-as-stingy-as-commentators-think |access-date=14 August 2022 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=14 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814221948/https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/06/18/chinas-poverty-line-is-not-as-stingy-as-commentators-think |url-status=live }}</ref> When Xi took office in 2012, 51.4% of people in China were living on less than $6.85 per day, in 2020, 7 years into Xi's tenure, this figure had fallen by more than half to 24.7%.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.UMIC | title=World Bank Open Data }}</ref>

China's economy has grown under Xi, with [[Finance:Gross domestic product|GDP in nominal terms]] more than doubling from $8.53 trillion in 2012 to $17.73 trillion in 2021,<ref>{{Cite web |title=GDP (current US$) – China {{!}} Data |url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=[[Organization:World Bank|World Bank]] |archive-date=6 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190906052638/https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN |url-status=live }}</ref> while China's nominal GDP per capita surpassed the world average in 2021,<ref name=":52">{{cite web |author= |date=April 2023 |title=World Economic Outlook Database, April 2023 |url=https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April |access-date=16 May 2023 |website=[[Organization:International Monetary Fund|International Monetary Fund]] |publisher= |archive-date=13 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230413194731/https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April |url-status=live }}</ref> though the rate of growth has slowed from 7.9% in 2012 to 6% in 2019.<ref>{{Cite web |title=GDP growth (annual %) – China {{!}} Data |url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=[[Organization:World Bank|World Bank]] |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813205801/https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi has stressed the importance of "high-quality growth" rather than "inflated growth".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Hui |first=Mary |date=16 February 2022 |title=What China means when it says it wants "high quality" GDP growth |url=https://qz.com/2119395/what-china-means-by-high-quality-economic-growth/ |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=Quartz |language=en |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813205819/https://qz.com/2119395/what-china-means-by-high-quality-economic-growth/ |url-status=live }}</ref> He has additionally stated that China will focus on quality of economic growth and that it has abandoned a growth-at-all-costs strategy which Xi refers to as "GDP heroism".<ref name=":7">{{Cite book |last1=Marquis |first1=Christopher |url= |title=Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise |last2=Qiao |first2=Kunyuan |date=2022 |publisher=Yale University Press |others=Kunyuan Qiao |isbn=978-0-300-26883-6 |location=New Haven |oclc=1348572572 |author-link=Christopher Marquis}}</ref>{{Rp|page=22}} Instead, Xi said that other social issues such as environmental protection are important.<ref name=":7" />{{Rp|page=22}} His administration pursued a debt-deleveraging campaign, seeking to slow and cut the unsustainable amount of debt China has accrued during its economic growth.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tran |first=Hung |date=14 March 2023 |title=China's debt-reduction campaign is making progress, but at a cost |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/chinas-debt-reduction-campaign-is-making-progress-but-at-a-cost/ |website=[[Organization:Atlantic Council|Atlantic Council]] |access-date=14 March 2023 |archive-date=14 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230314200320/https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/chinas-debt-reduction-campaign-is-making-progress-but-at-a-cost/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Though China's total non-financial-sector debt-to-GDP ratio reached a record 270.9% by 2020 during the COVID-19 crisis, it fell to reach around 262.5% by 2021 before going up again to 273.2% in 2022, mainly due to the pressure put by the zero-COVID policy to local finances.<ref>{{Cite news |date=21 February 2023 |title=China Likely to See Slowdown in Debt Ratio as Economy Recovers |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-21/china-likely-to-see-slowdown-in-debt-ratio-as-economy-recovers |access-date=14 March 2023 |archive-date=7 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231107173508/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-21/china-likely-to-see-slowdown-in-debt-ratio-as-economy-recovers |url-status=live }}</ref>

Xi has circulated a policy called "dual circulation", meaning reorienting the economy towards domestic consumption while remaining open to foreign trade and investment.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wei |first=Lingling |date=12 August 2020 |title=China's Xi Speeds Up Inward Economic Shift |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-speeds-up-inward-economic-shift-11597224602 |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813205801/https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-speeds-up-inward-economic-shift-11597224602 |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi has also made boosting [[Finance:Productivity|productivity]] in the economy a priority.<ref>{{Cite news |date=14 August 2021 |title=China's future economic potential hinges on its productivity |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/08/14/chinas-future-economic-potential-hinges-on-its-productivity |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=12 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812223255/https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/08/14/chinas-future-economic-potential-hinges-on-its-productivity |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi has attempted to reform the property sector to combat the steep increase in the property prices and to cut Chinese economy's dependence on the real estate sector.<ref>{{Cite news |date=27 July 2021 |title=China's Escalating Property Curbs Point to Xi's New Priority |language=en |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-27/china-s-escalating-property-curbs-underline-xi-s-new-priority |access-date=11 August 2022 |archive-date=28 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221128122733/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-27/china-s-escalating-property-curbs-underline-xi-s-new-priority |url-status=live }}</ref> In the 19th CCP National Congress, Xi declared "Houses are built to be inhabited, not for speculation".<ref>{{Cite news |date=18 October 2017 |title=Housing Should Be for Living In, Not for Speculation, Xi Says |language=en |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-18/xi-renews-call-housing-should-be-for-living-in-not-speculation |access-date=11 August 2022 |archive-date=25 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220425013308/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-18/xi-renews-call-housing-should-be-for-living-in-not-speculation |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2020, Xi's government formulated the "three red lines" policy that aimed to deleverage the heavily indebted property sector.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Lin |first1=Andy |last2=Hale |first2=Thomas |last3=Hudson |first3=Hudson |date=8 October 2021 |title=Half of China's top developers crossed Beijing's 'red lines' |work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/d5803d64-5cc5-46f0-bed0-1bc207440f9c |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221223/https://www.ft.com/content/d5803d64-5cc5-46f0-bed0-1bc207440f9c |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=11 August 2022 }}</ref> Xi additionally has supported a property tax, for which he has faced resistance from members of the CCP.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wei |first=Lingling |date=19 October 2021 |title=In Tackling China's Real-Estate Bubble, Xi Jinping Faces Resistance to Property-Tax Plan |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-tackling-chinas-real-estate-bubble-xi-jinping-faces-resistance-to-property-tax-plan-11634650751 |access-date=11 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=8 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220808195428/https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-tackling-chinas-real-estate-bubble-xi-jinping-faces-resistance-to-property-tax-plan-11634650751 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Xi's administration has promoted "Made in China 2025" plan that aims to make China self-reliant in key technologies, although publicly China de-emphasised this plan due to the outbreak of a trade war with the U.S. Since the outbreak of the trade war in 2018, Xi has revived calls for "self-reliance", especially on the matters of technology.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Fifield |first=Anna |date=2 November 2018 |title=As China settles in for trade war, leader Xi emphasizes 'self reliance' |newspaper={{wipe|The Washington Post}} |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-china-settles-in-for-trade-war-leader-xi-emphasizesself-reliance/2018/11/01/2961b2b2-d8de-11e8-9559-712cbf726d1c_story.html |access-date=31 January 2020 |archive-date=31 January 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200131193728/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-china-settles-in-for-trade-war-leader-xi-emphasizesself-reliance/2018/11/01/2961b2b2-d8de-11e8-9559-712cbf726d1c_story.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Domestic spending on R&D has significantly increased under Xi, surpassing the total of the [[Social:European Union|European Union]] (EU) and reaching a record $564 billion in 2020.<ref name=":8" /> In August 2022, Xi's administration has allocated more than $100 billion to support China's efforts at [[Engineering:Semiconductor industry in China|semiconductor]] independence.<ref>{{Cite news |date=9 August 2022 |title=China Graft Probes Stem From Anger Over Failed Chip Plans |language=en |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-09/china-corruption-probes-stem-from-anger-over-failed-chip-plans |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=10 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220810130135/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-09/china-corruption-probes-stem-from-anger-over-failed-chip-plans |url-status=live }}</ref> The Chinese government has also supported technology companies like [[Company:Huawei|Huawei]] through grants, tax breaks, credit facilities and other forms of assistance, enabling their rise but also leading to countermeasures by the U.S.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yap |first=Chuin-Wei |date=25 December 2019 |title=State Support Helped Fuel Huawei's Global Rise |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweis-global-rise-11577280736 |access-date=16 September 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=25 December 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191225174935/https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweis-global-rise-11577280736 |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2023, Xi put forwarded "new [[Social:Productive forces|productive forces]]" during his inspection tour to northeast China, refers to a new form of productive forces derived from continuous sci-tech breakthroughs and innovation that drive strategic emerging industries and future industries in a more intelligent [[Philosophy:Information Age|information era]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://english.news.cn/20230921/f52c169eb15e4e0da59b59c6f0c862b8/c.html|date=2023-09-21|title=Xinhua Commentary: "New productive forces" a winning formula for China's future|work=Xinhuanet}}</ref> Xi has also been personally involved in the development of Xiong'an, a new area announced in 2017, planned to become a major metropolis near Beijing and Tianjin in Hebei province; the relocation aspect is estimated to last until 2035 while it is planned to developed into a "modern socialist city" by 2050.<ref>{{Cite news |date=18 May 2023 |title=Xiongan is Xi Jinping's pet project |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/18/xiongan-is-xi-jinpings-pet-project |access-date=19 May 2023 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=19 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230519023705/https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/18/xiongan-is-xi-jinpings-pet-project |url-status=live }}</ref>

{{Quote box
| quote = Common prosperity is an essential requirement of socialism and a key feature of Chinese-style modernization. The common prosperity we are pursuing is for all, affluence both in material and spiritual life, but not for a small portion nor for uniform egalitarianism.
| source = — Xi Jinping during a speech in 2021<ref name="Caixin Global-2021" />
| align = right
| width = 25em
}}

In November 2020, ''{{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}}'' reported that Xi personally ordered a halt to Ant Group's [[Finance:Initial public offering|initial public offering]] (IPO), in reaction to its founder Jack Ma criticizing government regulation in finance.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wei |first=Jing Yang and Lingling |date=12 November 2020 |title=China's President Xi Jinping Personally Scuttled Jack Ma's Ant IPO |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-president-xi-jinping-halted-jack-ma-ant-ipo-11605203556 |access-date=11 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=13 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201113061215/https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-president-xi-jinping-halted-jack-ma-ant-ipo-11605203556 |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi's administration has also overseen a decrease in offshore IPOs by Chinese companies, with most Chinese IPOs taking place either in Shanghai or Shenzhen {{As of|2022|lc=y}}, and has increasingly directed funding to IPOs of companies that works in sectors it deems as strategic, including electric vehicles, [[Medicine:Biotechnology industry in China|biotechnology]], renewable energy, [[Artificial intelligence industry in China|artificial intelligence]], semiconductors and other high-technology manufacturing.<ref name="Lockett-2022" />

Since 2021, Xi has promoted the term "common prosperity", a term which he defined as an "essential requirement of socialism",  described as affluence for all and said entailed reasonable adjustments to excess incomes.<ref name="Caixin Global-2021">{{Cite web |date=19 October 2021 |title=Full Text: Xi Jinping's Speech on Boosting Common Prosperity – Caixin Global |url=https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-10-19/full-text-xi-jinpings-speech-on-boosting-common-prosperity-101788302.html |access-date=11 August 2022 |website=Caixin Global |language=en |archive-date=30 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221030001458/https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-10-19/full-text-xi-jinpings-speech-on-boosting-common-prosperity-101788302.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Hass |first=Ryan |date=9 September 2021 |title=Assessing China's "common prosperity" campaign |language=en-US |work=Brookings Institution |url=https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/09/assessing-chinas-common-prosperity-campaign/ |access-date=11 August 2022 |archive-date=3 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220703091105/https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/09/assessing-chinas-common-prosperity-campaign/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Common prosperity has been used as the justification for large-scale crackdowns and regulations towards the perceived "excesses" of several sectors, most prominently tech and tutoring industries.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Shen |first1=Samuel |last2=Ranganathan |first2=Vidya |date=3 November 2021 |title=China stock pickers reshape portfolios on Xi's 'common prosperity' |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-stock-pickers-reshape-portfolios-xis-common-prosperity-2021-11-02/ |access-date=11 August 2022 |archive-date=8 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220808115133/https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-stock-pickers-reshape-portfolios-xis-common-prosperity-2021-11-02/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The examples of actions taken against tech companies have included fining large tech companies<ref>{{cite news |last1=Moore |first1=Elena |date=10 April 2021 |title=China Fines Alibaba $2.8 Billion For Breaking Anti-Monopoly Law |language=en |publisher=NPR |url=https://www.npr.org/2021/04/10/986112628/china-fines-alibaba-2-8-billion-for-breaking-anti-monopoly-law |access-date=16 September 2021 |archive-date=16 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210916024333/https://www.npr.org/2021/04/10/986112628/china-fines-alibaba-2-8-billion-for-breaking-anti-monopoly-law |url-status=live }}</ref> and passing of laws such as the Data Security Law. China also banned private tutoring companies from making profits and teaching school syllabus during weekends and holidays, effectively destroying the whole industry.<ref>{{Cite news |date=12 August 2021 |title=China's Education Crackdown Pushes Costly Tutors Underground |language=en |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-12/china-s-education-crackdown-pushes-costly-tutors-underground |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=24 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220324173146/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-12/china-s-education-crackdown-pushes-costly-tutors-underground |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi additionally opened a new stock exchange in Beijing targeted for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which was another part of his common prosperity campaign.<ref>{{Cite news |date=15 November 2021 |title=Trading kicks off on Beijing Stock Exchange, 10 stocks surge |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trading-kicks-off-beijing-stock-exchange-10-stocks-surge-2021-11-15/ |access-date=22 August 2022 |archive-date=27 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211127204552/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trading-kicks-off-beijing-stock-exchange-10-stocks-surge-2021-11-15/ |url-status=live }}</ref> There have also been other numerous cultural regulations, such as limiting video game usage by minors to 90 minutes during weekdays and 3 hours during weekends,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=30 August 2021 |title=China Tightens Limits for Young Online Gamers and Bans School Night Play |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/30/business/media/china-online-games.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=18 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818212528/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/30/business/media/china-online-games.html |url-status=live }}</ref> complete banning of [[Finance:Cryptocurrency|cryptocurrency]],<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wallace |first=Elaine Yu and Joe |date=24 September 2021 |title=China Declares Cryptocurrency Transactions Illegal; Bitcoin Price Falls |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-declares-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrency-transactions-illegal-11632479288 |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813055125/https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-declares-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrency-transactions-illegal-11632479288 |url-status=live }}</ref> cracking down on idol worship, fandom and celebrity culture<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Stevenson |first1=Alexandra |last2=Chien |first2=Amy Chang |last3=Li |first3=Cao |date=27 August 2021 |title=China's Celebrity Culture Is Raucous. The Authorities Want to Change That. |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/27/business/media/china-celebrity-culture.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=12 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812152735/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/27/business/media/china-celebrity-culture.html |url-status=live }}</ref> and cracking down on "sissy men".<ref>{{Cite web |last=McDonald |first=Joe |date=2 September 2021 |title=China bans 'sissy men' from TV in new cultural crackdown |url=https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-09-02/china-bans-sissy-men-tv-new-crackdown-culture |access-date=17 September 2022 |website={{wipe|Los Angeles Times}} |language=en-US |archive-date=16 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220916181454/https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-09-02/china-bans-sissy-men-tv-new-crackdown-culture |url-status=live }}</ref> ''The Wall Street Journal'' has also reported in October 2021 that Xi had launched a round of inspections of the country's financial institutions, including state-owned banks, investment funds and financial regulators, on whether their ties to private firms had become too close, with the investigations being led by Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wei |first=Lingling |date=11 October 2021 |title=Xi Jinping Scrutinizes Chinese Financial Institutions' Ties With Private Firms |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-scrutinizes-chinese-financial-institutions-ties-with-private-firms-11633972484 |access-date=4 March 2023 |archive-date=4 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230304155639/https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-scrutinizes-chinese-financial-institutions-ties-with-private-firms-11633972484 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Reforms===
In November 2013, at the conclusion of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, the Communist Party delivered a far-reaching reform agenda that alluded to changes in both economic and social policy. Xi signaled at the plenum that he was consolidating control of the massive internal security organization that was formerly the domain of Zhou Yongkang.<ref name="brook2">{{cite news |last1=Kroeber |first1=Arthur R. |date=17 November 2013 |title=Xi Jinping's Ambitious Agenda for Economic Reform in China |work=Brookings Institution |publisher= |url=http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/17-xi-jinping-economic-agenda-kroeber |url-status=live |access-date=21 July 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140727211348/http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/17-xi-jinping-economic-agenda-kroeber |archive-date=27 July 2014}}</ref> A new National Security Commission was formed with Xi at its helm. The Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms—another ''ad hoc'' policy coordination body led by Xi upgraded to a commission in 2018—was also formed to oversee the implementation of the reform agenda.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Jun |first=Mai |date=21 March 2018 |title=China unveils bold overhaul to tighten Communist Party control |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2138291/china-unveils-bold-overhaul-tighten-communist-party |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813171805/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2138291/china-unveils-bold-overhaul-tighten-communist-party |url-status=live }}</ref> Termed "comprehensive deepening reforms" ({{zh|labels=no|s=全面深化改革|p=quánmiàn shēnhuà gǎigé}}), they were said to be the most significant since Deng Xiaoping's 1992 Southern Tour. The plenum also announced economic reforms and resolved to abolish the ''laogai'' system of "re-education through labour", which was largely seen as a blot on China's human rights record. The system has faced significant criticism for years from domestic critics and foreign observers.<ref name="brook2" /> In January 2016, a two-child policy replaced the one-child policy,<ref>{{cite news|last=Sridahan|first=Vasudevan|date=27 December 2015|title=China formally abolishes decades-old one-child policy|newspaper=International Business Times|url=http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/china-formally-abolishes-decades-old-one-child-policy-1535006|url-status=live|access-date=7 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828224908/https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/china-formally-abolishes-decades-old-one-child-policy-1535006|archive-date=28 August 2019}}</ref> which was in turn was replaced with a three-child policy in May 2021.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wee |first=Sui-Lee |date=31 May 2021 |title=China Says It Will Allow Couples to Have 3 Children, Up From 2 |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/31/world/asia/china-three-child-policy.html |access-date=11 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=4 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211104064050/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/31/world/asia/china-three-child-policy.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In July 2021, all family size limits as well as penalties for exceeding them were removed.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Cheng |first=Evelyn |date=21 July 2021 |title=China scraps fines, will let families have as many children as they'd like |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/21/china-scraps-fines-for-families-violating-childbirth-limits.html |access-date=29 April 2022 |website={{wipe|CNBC}} |language=en |archive-date=28 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230128131149/https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/21/china-scraps-fines-for-families-violating-childbirth-limits.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Political reforms ====
Xi's administration taken a number of changes to the structure of the CCP and state bodies, especially in a large overhaul in 2018. In March 2014, the CCP Central Committee merged the Office for External Propaganda (OEP), externally known as the State Council Information Office (SCIO), to the CCP's Central Propaganda Department. SCIO is now used by the Central Propaganda Department as an external name under an arrangement called "one institution with two names".<ref name="Lulu-2021">{{Cite web |last1=Lulu |first1=Jichang |last2=Jirouš |first2=Filip |last3=Lee |first3=Rachel |date=2021-01-25 |title=Xi's centralisation of external propaganda: SCIO and the Central Propaganda Department |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220203220603/https://sinopsis.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/scio.pdf |archive-date=3 Feb 2022 |url=https://sinopsis.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/scio.pdf |url-status=live |access-date=2021-11-20 |website=Sinopsis |language=en-US}}</ref> February earlier that year oversaw the creation of the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization. The State Internet Information Office (SIIO), previously under the OEP and SCIO, was transferred to the central leading group and renamed in English into the [[Organization:Cyberspace Administration of China|Cyberspace Administration of China]].<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Attrill |first1=Nathan |last2=Fritz |first2=Audrey |date=24 November 2021 |title=China's cyber vision: How the Cyberspace Administration of China is building a new consensus on global internet governance |url=https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2021-11/Chinas%20cyber%20vision.pdf?VersionId=M0ePH4Ij3w7WRJrLlhyxVvt269MWSYOs |access-date=29 December 2022 |website=Australian Strategic Policy Institute |archive-date=29 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221229145556/https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2021-11/Chinas%20cyber%20vision.pdf?VersionId=M0ePH4Ij3w7WRJrLlhyxVvt269MWSYOs |url-status=live }}</ref> As part of managing the financial system, the Financial Stability and Development Committee, a State Council body, was established in 2017. Chaired by vice premier Liu He during its existence, the committee was disestablished by the newly established Central Financial Commission during the 2023 Party and state reforms.<ref name=":3">{{Cite news |last1=Chen |first1=Laurie |last2=Tang |first2=Ziyi |date=16 March 2023 |title=China to create powerful financial watchdog run by Communist Party |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-create-powerful-financial-watchdog-run-by-communist-party-2023-03-16/ |access-date=17 March 2023 |archive-date=16 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230316162813/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-create-powerful-financial-watchdog-run-by-communist-party-2023-03-16/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

2018 has seen larger reforms to the bureaucracy. In that year, several central leading groups including reform, cyberspace affairs, finance and economics. and foreign affairs were upgraded to commissions.<ref>{{Cite news |date=22 March 2018 |title=CPC releases plan on deepening reform of Party and state institutions |work=People's Daily |url=http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0322/c90000-9440252.html |access-date=29 December 2022 |archive-date=5 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210205013244/http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0322/c90000-9440252.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Buckley-2018">{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=2018-03-21 |title=China Gives Communist Party More Control Over Policy and Media |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/world/asia/china-communist-party-xi-jinping.html |access-date=2022-12-29 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=12 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211112211222/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/world/asia/china-communist-party-xi-jinping.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In the area of media, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) was renamed into the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) with its film, news media and publications being transferred to the Central Propaganda Department.<ref name="Buckley-2018" /> Additionally, the control of China Central Television (CCTV, including its international edition, China Global Television), China National Radio (CNR) and China Radio International (CRI) were transferred to the newly established China Media Group (CMG) under the control of the Central Propaganda Department.<ref name="Buckley-2018" /><ref>{{Cite news |date=22 March 2018 |title=三台合一，发出更强"中国之声" |trans-title=Merge of Three Stations into One, Sending Out a Stronger "Voice of China" |work=People's Daily |url=http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/n1/2018/0322/c1001-29883390.html |access-date=29 December 2022 |archive-date=10 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210910022043/http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/n1/2018/0322/c1001-29883390.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Two State Council departments. one dealing with overseas Chinese, and other one dealing with religious affairs, were merged into the United Front Work Department while another commission dealing with ethnic affairs was brought under formal UFWD leadership.<ref name="Buckley-2018" />

2023 has seen further reforms to the CCP and state bureaucracy, most notably the strengthening of Party control over the financial and technology domains.<ref name=":4">{{Cite news |last1=Wong |first1=Chun Han |last2=Zhai |first2=Keith |date=16 March 2023 |title=China's Communist Party Overhaul Deepens Control Over Finance, Technology |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-communist-party-overhaul-deepens-control-over-finance-technology-6acdd43c?mod=world_lead_pos5 |access-date=16 March 2023 |archive-date=16 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230316221649/https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-communist-party-overhaul-deepens-control-over-finance-technology-6acdd43c?mod=world_lead_pos5 |url-status=live }}</ref> This included the creation of two CCP bodies for overseeing finance; the Central Financial Commission (CFC), as well as the revival of the Central Financial Work Commission (CFWC) that was previously dissolved in 2002.<ref name=":4" /> The CFC would broadly manage the financial system while the CFWC would focus on strengthening the ideological and political role of the CCP in the sector.<ref name=":3" /> Additionally, a new CCP Central Science and Technology Commission would be established to broadly oversee the technology sector, while a newly created Social Work Department was tasked with CCP interactions with several sectors, including civic groups, chambers of commerce and industry groups, as well as handling public petition and grievance work.<ref name=":4" /> A new Central Hong Kong and Macau Work Office would also be established, with the State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office being turned into the new body's external name.<ref name=":4" />

At the State Council, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission was replaced by the National Administration of Financial Regulation (NAFR), which is taking a much larger responsibility on financial regulation, effectively overseeing all financial activities except the securities industry, which was continued to be regulated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, now elevated to a government body.<ref>{{Cite news |date=7 March 2023 |title=China Overhauls Financial Regulatory Regime to Control Risks |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-07/china-to-set-up-enlarged-financial-regulatory-authority |access-date=17 March 2023 |archive-date=4 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404200523/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-07/china-to-set-up-enlarged-financial-regulatory-authority |url-status=live }}</ref> Several regulatory responsibilities were also transferred from the [[Company:People's Bank of China|People's Bank of China]] (PBoC) to the SAFS, while the PBoC will also reopen offices around the country that were closed in a previous reorganization.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Bradsher |first1=Keith |last2=Che |first2=Chang |date=2023-03-10 |title=Why China Is Tightening Its Oversight of Banking and Tech |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/09/business/china-peoples-congress-financial-regulation.html |access-date=2023-03-16 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=16 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230316221649/https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/09/business/china-peoples-congress-financial-regulation.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Legal reforms====
{{Quote box
| quote = Efforts should be made to enable the people to see that justice is served in every judicial case.
| source = — Xi Jinping during a speech in November 2020<ref name="Chinadaily.com.cn 2020 l441">{{cite web | title=习近平出席中央全面依法治国工作会议并发表重要讲话 | website=Chinadaily.com.cn | date=18 Nov 2020 | url=https://language.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202011/18/WS5fb4ad35a31024ad0ba94eb8.html | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210119151727/https://language.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202011/18/WS5fb4ad35a31024ad0ba94eb8.html | archive-date=19 Jan 2021 | url-status=live | access-date=21 Sep 2023}}</ref>
| align = right
| width = 25em
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The party under Xi announced a raft of [[Philosophy:Law reform|legal reforms]] at the Fourth Plenum held in the fall 2014, and he called for "Chinese socialistic rule of law" immediately afterwards. The party aimed to reform the legal system, which had been perceived as ineffective at delivering justice and affected by corruption, local government interference and lack of constitutional oversight. The plenum, while emphasizing the absolute leadership of the party, also called for a greater role of the constitution in the affairs of state and a strengthening of the role of the National People's Congress Standing Committee in interpreting the constitution.<ref name="scm32">{{cite news|url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1623286/communist-party-pledges-greater-role-constitution-rights-fourth-plenum|title=Communist Party pledges greater role for constitution, rights in fourth plenum|last1=Zhou|first1=Laura|date=24 October 2014|work=South China Morning Post|access-date=7 September 2019|last2=Huang|first2=Cary|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181030035405/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1623286/communist-party-pledges-greater-role-constitution-rights-fourth-plenum|archive-date=30 October 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> It also called for more transparency in legal proceedings, more involvement of ordinary citizens in the legislative process, and an overall "professionalization" of the legal workforce. The party also planned to institute cross-jurisdictional circuit legal tribunals as well as giving provinces consolidated administrative oversight over lower level legal resources, which is intended to reduce local government involvement in legal proceedings.<ref name="dww2">{{cite news |last1=Doyon |first1=Jerome |last2=Winckler |first2=Hugo |date=20 November 2014 |title=The Fourth Plenum, Party Officials and Local Courts |work=Jamestown Foundation |publisher= |url=https://jamestown.org/program/the-fourth-plenum-party-officials-and-local-courts/ |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-date=18 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200518221059/https://jamestown.org/program/the-fourth-plenum-party-officials-and-local-courts/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Military reforms====
{{see also|Modernization of the People's Liberation Army|2015 People's Republic of China military reform|}}Since taking power in 2012, Xi has undertaken an overhaul of the People's Liberation Army, including both political reform and its modernization.<ref name="Lague-2019">{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-xi/|title=How China is replacing America as Asia's military titan|last1=Lague|first1=David|date=23 April 2019|work={{wipe|Reuters}}|access-date=10 January 2020|last2=Lim|first2=Benjamin Kang|archive-date=21 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210121184056/https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-xi/|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Social:Military-civil fusion|Military-civil fusion]] has advanced under Xi.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bitzinger |first=Richard A. |date=2021 |title=China's Shift from Civil-Military Integration to Military-Civil Fusion |url= |journal=Asia Policy |language=en |volume=28 |issue=1 |pages=5–24 |doi=10.1353/asp.2021.0001 |s2cid=234121234 |issn=1559-2960}}</ref><ref name="cnas">{{cite journal |last1=B. Kania |first1=Elsa |last2=Laskai |first2=Lorand |date=28 January 2021 |title=Myths and Realities of China's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy |url=https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/myths-and-realities-of-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy |website=Center for a New American Security |jstor=resrep28654 |jstor-access=free |access-date=30 August 2022 |archive-date=16 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230216154559/https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/myths-and-realities-of-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi has been active in his participation in military affairs, taking a direct hands-on approach to military reform. In addition to being the Chairman of the CMC and leader of the Central Leading Group for Military Reform founded in 2014 to oversee comprehensive military reforms, Xi has delivered numerous high-profile pronouncements vowing to clean up malfeasance and complacency in the military. Xi has repeatedly warned that the depoliticization of the PLA from the CCP would lead to a collapse similar to that of the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Fifield |first=Anna |date=29 September 2019 |title=China's Communist Party has one more reason to celebrate – a year longer in power than the U.S.S.R. |newspaper={{wipe|The Washington Post}} |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-communist-party-has-one-more-reason-to-celebrate--a-year-longer-in-power-than-the-soviet-union/2019/09/28/993bb832-dfc0-11e9-be7f-4cc85017c36f_story.html |access-date=31 January 2020 |archive-date=1 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200201101821/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-communist-party-has-one-more-reason-to-celebrate--a-year-longer-in-power-than-the-soviet-union/2019/09/28/993bb832-dfc0-11e9-be7f-4cc85017c36f_story.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi held the New Gutian Conference in 2014, gathering China's top military officers, re-emphasizing the principle of "the party has absolute control over the army" first established by Mao at the 1929 Gutian Conference.<ref name="meng2">{{cite news|url=http://china.dwnews.com/news/2014-11-04/59616798.html|last1=Meng|first1=Chuan|date=4 November 2014|work=Duowei News|access-date=8 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150121184703/http://china.dwnews.com/news/2014-11-04/59616798.html|archive-date=21 January 2015|language=zh-hans|script-title=zh:习近平军中"亮剑" 新古田会议一箭多雕|trans-title=Xi Jinping And Central Army's New "Bright Sword" Conference In Gutian Killed Many Birds With Only A Single Stone}}</ref>

{{Quote box
| quote = In the USSR, where the military was depoliticized, separated from the party and nationalized, the party was disarmed. When the Soviet Union came to crisis point, a big party was gone just like that. Proportionally, the Soviet Communist Party had more members than we do, but nobody was man enough to stand up and resist.
| source = — Xi Jinping during a speech<ref name=":12aa">{{Cite news |last=Grammaticas |first=Damian |date=14 March 2013 |title=President Xi Jinping: A man with a dream |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21790384 |access-date=31 January 2020 |archive-date=20 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200520161800/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21790384 |url-status=live }}</ref>
| align = right
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Though predating Xi, his administration has taken a more assertive stance towards maritime affairs, and has boosted CCP control over the maritime security forces.<ref name=":9">{{Cite web |last=Miura |first=Kacie |title=The Domestic Sources of China's Maritime Assertiveness Under Xi Jinping |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Miura_The%20Domestic%20Sources%20of%20China%27s%20Maritime%20Assertiveness%20Under%20Xi%20Jinping.pdf |access-date=19 May 2023 |website=Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars |archive-date=19 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230519151838/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Miura_The%20Domestic%20Sources%20of%20China%27s%20Maritime%20Assertiveness%20Under%20Xi%20Jinping.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2013, the previously separate rival maritime law enforcements of China were merged into the China Coast Guard. Initially under the joint administration of the State Oceanic Administration and the Ministry of Public Security, it was placed squarely under the administration of the People's Armed Police (PAP) in 2018.<ref name=":9" />

Xi announced a reduction of 300,000 troops from the PLA in 2015, bringing its size to 2 million troops. Xi described this as a gesture of peace, while analysts such as Rory Medcalf have said that the cut was done to reduce costs as well as part of PLA's modernization.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/world/asia/beijing-turns-into-ghost-town-as-it-gears-up-for-military-parade.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150902221802/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/world/asia/beijing-turns-into-ghost-town-as-it-gears-up-for-military-parade.html |archive-date=2 September 2015 |url-access=limited |url-status=live|title=China Announces Cuts of 300,000 Troops at Military Parade Showing Its Might|last1=Wong|first1=Edward|date=2 September 2015|work={{wipe|The New York Times}}|access-date=10 January 2020|last2=Perlez|first2=Jane|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|last3=Buckley|first3=Chris}}</ref> On 2016, he reduced the number of theater commands of the PLA from seven to five.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/its-official-chinas-military-has-5-new-theater-commands/|title=It's Official: China's Military Has 5 New Theater Commands|last=Tiezzi|first=Shannon|date=2 February 2016|work=The Diplomat|access-date=10 January 2020|archive-date=6 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200806062854/https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/its-official-chinas-military-has-5-new-theater-commands/|url-status=live}}</ref> He has also abolished the four autonomous general departments of the PLA, replacing them with 15 agencies directly reporting to the CMC.<ref name="Lague-2019" /> Two new branches of the PLA were created under his reforms, the Strategic Support Force<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/chinas-strategic-support-force-a-force-for-innovation/|title=China's Strategic Support Force: A Force for Innovation?|last=Kania|first=Elsa|date=18 February 2017|work=The Diplomat|access-date=31 January 2020|archive-date=11 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201111233353/https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/chinas-strategic-support-force-a-force-for-innovation/|url-status=live}}</ref> and the Joint Logistics Support Force.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Blanchard |first=Ben |date=14 September 2016 |title=China sets up new logistics force as part of military reforms |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |publisher= |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence-idUSKCN11K05F |access-date=31 January 2020 |archive-date=24 December 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201224052700/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence-idUSKCN11K05F |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2018, the PAP was placed under the sole control of the CMC; the PAP was previously under the joint command of the CMC and the State Council through the Ministry of Public Security.<ref name="Wuthnow2019">{{cite book |last=Wuthnow |first=Joel |url=https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf |title=China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform |date=16 April 2019 |publisher=Institute for National Strategic Studies |location=Washington |access-date=3 October 2019 |archive-date=4 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200704193636/https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|15}}

On 21 April 2016, Xi was named commander-in-chief of the country's new Joint Operations Command Center of the PLA by Xinhua News Agency and the broadcaster China Central Television.<ref name="Guardian21Apr162">{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/21/xi-jinping-named-commander-in-chief-chinese-state-media|title=Xi Jinping named as 'commander in chief' by Chinese state media|date=21 April 2016|work={{wipe|The Guardian}}|access-date=25 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160425012825/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/21/xi-jinping-named-commander-in-chief-chinese-state-media|archive-date=25 April 2016}}</ref><ref name="Independent21Apr162">{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/chinese-president-xi-jinping-commander-in-chief-military-armed-forces-a6997396.html|title=Chinese President Xi Jinping named as military's 'commander-in-chief'|last1=Kayleigh|first1=Lewis|date=23 April 2016|work=The Independent|access-date=25 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160427091000/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/chinese-president-xi-jinping-commander-in-chief-military-armed-forces-a6997396.html|archive-date=27 April 2016}}</ref> Some analysts interpreted this move as an attempt to display strength and strong leadership and as being more "political than military".<ref name="ChinaTopix22Apr162">{{cite news|url=http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/84000/20160422/president-xi-jinping-is-new-commander-in-chief-of-the-military.htm|title=President Xi Jinping is New Commander-in-Chief of the Military|last1=Sison|first1=Desiree|date=22 April 2016|work=China Topix|access-date=25 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160423120421/http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/84000/20160422/president-xi-jinping-is-new-commander-in-chief-of-the-military.htm|archive-date=23 April 2016}}</ref> According to Ni Lexiong, a military affairs expert, Xi "not only controls the military but also does it in an absolute manner, and that in wartime, he is ready to command personally".<ref name="ColuDaily24Apr20162">{{cite news|url=http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/perspectives/china-s-xi-moves-to-take-more-direct-command-over/article_b5e96afb-97e6-533e-b33e-db5beab72bf3.html|title=China's Xi moves to take more direct command over military|date=24 April 2016|work=Columbia Daily Tribune|access-date=25 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160425105101/http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/perspectives/china-s-xi-moves-to-take-more-direct-command-over/article_b5e96afb-97e6-533e-b33e-db5beab72bf3.html|archive-date=25 April 2016}}</ref> According to a [[Organization:University of California, San Diego|University of California, San Diego]] expert on Chinese military, Xi "has been able to take political control of the military to an extent that exceeds what Mao and Deng have done".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/world/asia/xi-jinping-military-china-purge.html|title=Xi Jinping Presses Military Overhaul, and Two Generals Disappear|last1=Buckley|first1=Chris|date=11 October 2017|newspaper={{wipe|The New York Times}}|access-date=26 October 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171025083913/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/world/asia/xi-jinping-military-china-purge.html|archive-date=25 October 2017|last2=Myers|first2=Steven Lee}}</ref>

Under Xi, China's official military budget has more than doubled,<ref name=":8">{{Cite news |last1=Han |first1=Chen |last2=Allen-Ebrahimian |first2=Bethany |date=2022-10-15 |title=What China looks like after a decade of Xi Jinping's rule |url=https://www.axios.com/2022/10/15/china-party-congress-2022-xi-jinping-third-term |access-date=2023-04-19 |website=Axios |language=en |archive-date=19 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230419151133/https://www.axios.com/2022/10/15/china-party-congress-2022-xi-jinping-third-term |url-status=live }}</ref> reaching a record $224 billion in 2023.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=He |first1=Laura |last2=McCarthy |first2=Simone |last3=Chang |first3=Wayne |date=7 March 2023 |title=China to increase defense spending 7.2%, sets economic growth target of 'around 5%' for 2023 |work=CNN |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/04/economy/china-two-sessions-gdp-growth-target-military-spending-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=19 April 2023 |archive-date=19 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230419085526/https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/04/economy/china-two-sessions-gdp-growth-target-military-spending-intl-hnk/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> The PLA Navy has grown rapidly under Xi, with China adding more warships, submarines, support ships and major amphibious vessels than the than the entire number of ships under the United Kingdom navy between 2014 and 2018.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Lague |first1=David |last2=Kang Lim |first2=Benjamin |date=30 April 2019 |title=China's vast fleet is tipping the balance in the Pacific |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-navy/ |access-date=19 April 2023 |archive-date=16 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220516230034/https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-navy/ |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2017, China established the navy's first overseas base in Djibouti.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sun |first1=Degang |last2=Zoubir |first2=Yahia H. |date=2021-07-04 |title=Securing China's 'Latent Power': The Dragon's Anchorage in Djibouti |journal=Journal of Contemporary China |language=en |volume=30 |issue=130 |pages=677–692 |doi=10.1080/10670564.2020.1852734 |issn=1067-0564 |s2cid=229393446}}</ref> Xi has also undertaken an expansion of China's nuclear arsenal, with him calling China to "establish a strong system of strategic deterrence". The [[Organization:Federation of American Scientists|Federation of American Scientists]] (FAS) has estimated China's total amount of nuclear arsenals to be 410 in 2023, with the US Department of Defense estimating that China's arsenal could reach 1,000 by 2030.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Jacobs |first1=Andrew |last2=Perlez |first2=Jane |date=2017-02-25 |title=U.S. Wary of Its New Neighbor in Djibouti: A Chinese Naval Base |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/world/africa/us-djibouti-chinese-naval-base.html |access-date=2023-04-19 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=14 May 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170514232101/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/world/africa/us-djibouti-chinese-naval-base.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Foreign policy===

Xi has promoted "major-country diplomacy" ({{zh|s=大国外交|labels=no}}), stating that China is already a "big power" and breaking away from previous Chinese leaders who had a more precautious diplomacy.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hu |first=Weixing |date=2 January 2019 |title=Xi Jinping's 'Major Country Diplomacy': The Role of Leadership in Foreign Policy Transformation |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1497904 |journal=Journal of Contemporary China |volume=28 |issue=115 |pages=1–14 |doi=10.1080/10670564.2018.1497904 |s2cid=158345991 |issn=1067-0564 |access-date=29 August 2022 |archive-date=7 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231107173600/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2018.1497904 |url-status=live }}</ref> He has adopted a hawkish foreign policy posture called "wolf warrior diplomacy",<ref>{{Cite web |last=Auto |first=Hermes |date=5 April 2021 |title=China's 'wolf warrior' diplomats back to howl at Xinjiang critics |url=https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-back-to-howl-at-xinjiang-critics |access-date=11 August 2022 |website=The Straits Times |language=en |archive-date=11 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220811202130/https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-back-to-howl-at-xinjiang-critics |url-status=live }}</ref> while his foreign policy thoughts are collectively known as "Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy".<ref>{{Cite news |last=Bishop |first=Bill |date=8 March 2019 |title=Xi's thought on diplomacy is "epoch-making" |url=https://www.axios.com/2019/03/08/xis-diplomacy-epoch-making |access-date=11 August 2022 |website=Axios |language=en |archive-date=11 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220811202130/https://www.axios.com/2019/03/08/xis-diplomacy-epoch-making |url-status=live }}</ref> In March 2021, he said that "the East is rising and the West is declining" ({{zh|s=东升西降|labels=no}}), saying that the power of the Western world was in decline and their COVID-19 response was an example of this, and that China was entering a period of opportunity because of this.<ref name="Buckley-2021a">{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=3 March 2021 |title='The East Is Rising': Xi Maps Out China's Post-Covid Ascent |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/world/asia/xi-china-congress.html |access-date=12 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=12 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812104749/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/world/asia/xi-china-congress.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi has frequently alluded to "[[Social:Community of Common Destiny|community with a shared future for mankind]]", which Chinese diplomats have said doesn't imply an intention to change the international order,<ref name="Zhang">{{cite journal |last=Zhang |first=Denghua |date=May 2018 |title=The Concept of 'Community of Common Destiny' in China's Diplomacy: Meaning, Motives and Implications |journal=Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=196–207 |doi=10.1002/app5.231 |doi-access=free|hdl=1885/255057 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> but which foreign observers say China wants a new order that puts it more at the centre.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Tobin |first=Liza |date=2018 |others=The University Of Texas At Austin, The University Of Texas At Austin |title=Xi's Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and Its Allies (November 2018) |url=https://tnsr.org/2018/11/xis-vision-for-transforming-global-governance-a-strategic-challenge-for-washington-and-its-allies/ |journal=Texas National Security Review |language=en |doi=10.26153/TSW/863 |doi-access=free |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813212508/https://tnsr.org/2018/11/xis-vision-for-transforming-global-governance-a-strategic-challenge-for-washington-and-its-allies/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Under Xi, China has, along with Russia, also focused on increasing relations with the [[Global North and Global South|Global South]] in order to blunt the effect of Western sanctions.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Seib |first=Gerald F. |date=15 July 2022 |title=Putin and Xi's Bet on the Global South |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-and-xis-bet-on-the-global-south-11657897521 |access-date=21 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=21 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220821143216/https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-and-xis-bet-on-the-global-south-11657897521 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Xi has put an emphasis on increasing China's "international discourse power" ({{zh|s=国际话语权|labels=no}}) to create a more favorable global opinion of China in the world.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Jones |first=Hugo |date=24 November 2021 |title=China's Quest for Greater 'Discourse Power' |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/chinas-quest-for-greater-discourse-power/ |access-date=29 August 2022 |website=The Diplomat |language=en-US |archive-date=29 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220829000458/https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/chinas-quest-for-greater-discourse-power/ |url-status=live }}</ref> In this pursuit, Xi has emphasised the need to "tell China's story well" ({{zh|s=讲好中国故事|labels=no}}), meaning expanding China's external propaganda ({{zh|s=外宣|labels=no}}) and communications.<ref>{{Cite web |date=16 April 2021 |title=Telling China's Story Well |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/telling-chinas-story-well/ |access-date=29 August 2022 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US |archive-date=28 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220828224140/https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/telling-chinas-story-well/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi has expanded the focus and scope of the united front, which aims to consolidate support for CCP in non-CCP elements both inside and outside China, and has accordingly expanded the United Front Work Department.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Kynge |first1=James |last2=Hornby |first2=Lucy |last3=Anderlini |first3=Jamil |date=26 October 2017 |title=Inside China's secret 'magic weapon' for worldwide influence |work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/fb2b3934-b004-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221240/https://www.ft.com/content/fb2b3934-b004-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4 |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=21 August 2022 }}</ref> Xi has unveiled the Global Development Initiative (GDI),<ref name=":02">{{Cite news |date=9 June 2022 |title=China's Global Development Initiative is not as innocent as it sounds |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2022/06/09/chinas-global-development-initiative-is-not-as-innocent-as-it-sounds |access-date=7 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306172739/https://www.economist.com/china/2022/06/09/chinas-global-development-initiative-is-not-as-innocent-as-it-sounds |url-status=live }}</ref> the Global Security Initiative (GSI),<ref name=":11" /> and the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI), in 2021, 2022 and 2023, respectively, aiming to increase China's influence in the international order.<ref name=":12">{{Cite news |last=Cai |first=Jane |date=12 June 2023 |title=How China's Xi Jinping promotes mix of Marxism and traditional culture to further Communist Party and 'Chinese dream' |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3223805/how-chinas-xi-jinping-promotes-mix-marxism-and-traditional-culture-further-communist-party-and |access-date=12 June 2023 |archive-date=12 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230612111635/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3223805/how-chinas-xi-jinping-promotes-mix-marxism-and-traditional-culture-further-communist-party-and |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Security ====
Under Xi, China has promoted reformation of the international system, with Xi calling for a "rejection of hegemonic power structures in global governance".<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yao |first=Kevin |last2= |first2= |date=2021-04-20 |title=China's Xi calls for fairer world order as rivalry with U.S. deepens |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-president-xi-says-global-governance-system-should-be-more-equitable-fair-2021-04-20/ |access-date=2023-03-15 |archive-date=15 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230315155216/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-president-xi-says-global-governance-system-should-be-more-equitable-fair-2021-04-20/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Addressing a regional conference in Shanghai on 21 May 2014, he called on Asian countries to unite and forge a way together, rather than get involved with third party powers, seen as a reference to the United States. "Matters in Asia ultimately must be taken care of by Asians. Asia's problems ultimately must be resolved by Asians and Asia's security ultimately must be protected by Asians", he told the conference.<ref name="TerritorialDisputes2">{{cite news |date=21 May 2014 |title=Asian nations should avoid military ties with third party powers, says China's Xi |newspaper=China National News |url=http://www.chinanationalnews.com/index.php/sid/222207019/scat/9366300fc9319e9b/ht/Asian-nations-should-avoid-military-ties-with-third-party-powers-says-Chinas-Xi |access-date=21 May 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140522071827/http://www.chinanationalnews.com/index.php/sid/222207019/scat/9366300fc9319e9b/ht/Asian-nations-should-avoid-military-ties-with-third-party-powers-says-Chinas-Xi |archive-date=22 May 2014}}</ref> His proposed Global Security Initiative has been aiming to create a new global security architecture, incorporating the term "indivisible security", a concept also supported by Russia.<ref name=":11">{{Cite news |last1=Yao |first1=Kevin |last2=Tian |first2=Yew Lun |date=22 April 2022 |title=China's Xi proposes 'global security initiative', without giving details |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-says-unilateral-sanctions-will-not-work-2022-04-21/ |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=5 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220805003810/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-says-unilateral-sanctions-will-not-work-2022-04-21/ |url-status=live }}</ref> He has also advocated for international security cooperation; during a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in September 2021, he spoke out against "interference in other countries' internal affairs", and called for joint cooperation in warding off against "colour revolutions".<ref name=":1">{{Cite news |last=Chik |first=Holly |date=16 September 2022 |title=SCO summit: China urges member states to ward off foreign-backed 'colour revolutions' |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3192817/sco-summit-china-urges-member-states-ward-foreign-backed |access-date=14 March 2023 |archive-date=14 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230314190909/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3192817/sco-summit-china-urges-member-states-ward-foreign-backed |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Africa====

Under Xi, China has cut back lending to Africa after fears that African countries couldn't repay their debts to China.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Hille |first1=Kathrin |last2=Pilling |first2=David |date=11 January 2022 |title=China applies brakes to Africa lending |work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/64b4bcd5-032e-4be5-aa3b-e902f5b1345e |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211/https://www.ft.com/content/64b4bcd5-032e-4be5-aa3b-e902f5b1345e |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=21 August 2022}}</ref> Xi has also promised that China would write off debts of some African countries.<ref>{{Cite web |last=He |first=Laura |title=China is promising to write off some loans to Africa. It may just be a drop in the ocean |url=https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/19/economy/china-xi-jinping-africa-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=21 August 2022 |website=CNN |date=19 June 2020 |archive-date=7 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200707050058/https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/19/economy/china-xi-jinping-africa-intl-hnk/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In November 2021, Xi promised African nations 1 billion doses of China's COVID-19 vaccines, which was in addition to the 200 million already supplied before. This has been said to be part of China's [[Biology:Vaccine diplomacy|vaccine diplomacy]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=29 November 2021 |title=China's Xi promises 1bn COVID-19 vaccine doses to Africa |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/29/chinas-xi-promises-1-billion-covid-19-vaccine-doses-to-africa |access-date=21 August 2022 |website=[[Engineering:Al Jazeera English|Al Jazeera]] |language=en |archive-date=21 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220821143216/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/29/chinas-xi-promises-1-billion-covid-19-vaccine-doses-to-africa |url-status=live }}</ref>

====European Union====
[[File:Wspólne oświadczenie w sprawie ustanowienia wszechstronnego strategicznego partnerstwa.jpg|thumb|Xi in an official visit to [[Place:Warsaw|Warsaw]], where he and Poland's president Andrzej Duda signed a declaration on strategic partnership.]]China's efforts under Xi has been for the European Union (EU) to stay in a neutral position in their contest with the U.S.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |last2=Bradsher |first2=Keith |date=15 April 2022 |title=Faced With a Changed Europe, China Sticks to an Old Script |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/15/world/asia/china-europe-russia-ukraine.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813163209/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/15/world/asia/china-europe-russia-ukraine.html |url-status=live }}</ref> China and the EU announced the [[Finance:Comprehensive Agreement on Investment|Comprehensive Agreement on Investment]] (CAI) in 2020, although the deal was later frozen due to mutual sanctions over Xinjiang.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Miller |first=Michael E. |title=China says Macron and Merkel support reviving E.U.-China investment pact. Not so fast. |language=en-US |newspaper={{wipe|The Washington Post}} |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/07/06/china-europe-investment-uyghurs/ |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0190-8286 |archive-date=26 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210926205033/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/07/06/china-europe-investment-uyghurs/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi has supported calls for EU to achieve "strategic autonomy",<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Amber |date=14 December 2021 |title=Dangers for China in the EU drive for strategic autonomy: analyst |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3159657/dangers-china-eu-drive-strategic-autonomy-analyst |access-date=12 August 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=12 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812110716/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3159657/dangers-china-eu-drive-strategic-autonomy-analyst |url-status=live }}</ref> and has also called on the EU to view China "independently".<ref>{{Cite news |date=1 April 2022 |title=China's Xi calls on EU to view China 'independently' -state media |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-calls-eu-view-china-independently-state-media-2022-04-01/ |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=12 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812151733/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-calls-eu-view-china-independently-state-media-2022-04-01/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

====India====

[[File:PM in a family photograph during the BRICS Leaders Retreat Meeting, at Johannesburg, in South Africa on August 23, 2023 (1).jpg|thumb|The [[Organization:BRICS|BRICS]] leaders in 2023, from left to right: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Xi Jinping,  Cyril Ramaphosa, Narendra Modi and Sergey Lavrov (representing Vladimir Putin).]]
Relations between China and India had ups and downs under Xi, later deteriorating due to various factors. In 2013, the two countries had a standoff in Depsang for three weeks, which ended with no border change.<ref>{{Cite news |date=6 May 2013 |title=India says China agrees retreat to de facto border in faceoff deal |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-china-idUSBRE9440B220130506 |access-date=29 August 2022 |archive-date=24 September 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924181040/http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/06/us-india-china-idUSBRE9440B220130506 |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2017, the two countries again had a standoff over a Chinese construction of a road in Doklam, a territory both claimed by Bhutan, India's ally, and China,<ref>{{Cite news |date=3 July 2017 |title=China says India violates 1890 agreement in border stand-off |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-india-idUSKBN19O109 |access-date=29 August 2022 |archive-date=15 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170815072409/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-india-idUSKBN19O109 |url-status=live }}</ref> though by 28 August, both countries mutually disengaged.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Gettleman |first1=Jeffrey |last2=Hernández |first2=Javier C. |date=28 August 2017 |title=China and India Agree to Ease Tensions in Border Dispute |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/world/asia/china-india-standoff-withdrawal.html |access-date=29 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=28 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170828234241/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/world/asia/china-india-standoff-withdrawal.html |url-status=live }}</ref> The most serious crisis in the relationship came when the two countries had a deadly clash in 2020 at the Line of Actual Control, leaving some soldiers dead.<ref>{{cite news |last=Janjua |first=Haroon |date=10 May 2020 |title=Chinese and Indian troops injured in border brawl |newspaper=The Times |url=https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/chinese-and-indian-troops-injured-in-border-brawl-3gsfwp37r |url-status=live |access-date=12 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200512042352/https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/chinese-and-indian-troops-injured-in-border-brawl-3gsfwp37r |archive-date=12 May 2020 |issn=0140-0460}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |agency=Agence France-Presse |date=11 May 2020 |title=Indian and Chinese soldiers injured in cross-border fistfight, says Delhi |work={{wipe|The Guardian}} |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/11/indian-and-chinese-soldiers-injured-in-cross-border-fistfight-says-delhi |url-status=live |access-date=12 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200512035152/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/11/indian-and-chinese-soldiers-injured-in-cross-border-fistfight-says-delhi |archive-date=12 May 2020 |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> The clashes created a serious deterioration in relations, with China seizing 2,000 sq km territory that India controlled.<ref name="Siddiqui 2023 v704">{{cite web | last=Siddiqui | first=Imran Ahmed | title='Subjugation and surrender': Military veterans slam Modi government's continuing silence on Galwan | website=Telegraph India | date=2023-06-16 | url=https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/subjugation-and-surrender-military-veterans-slam-modi-governments-continuing-silence-on-galwan/cid/1945450}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Myers |first1=Steven Lee |last2=Abi-Habib |first2=Maria |last3=Gettleman |first3=Jeffrey |date=17 June 2020 |title=In China-India Clash, Two Nationalist Leaders With Little Room to Give |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/world/asia/china-india-border.html |access-date=29 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=17 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200617221351/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/world/asia/china-india-border.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Japan====

China–Japan relations have initially soured under Xi's administration; the most thorny issue between the two countries remains the dispute over the Senkaku islands, which China calls Diaoyu. In response to Japan's continued robust stance on the issue, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone in November 2013.<ref name="osawa2">{{cite news |last1=Osawa |first1=Jun |date=17 December 2013 |title=China's ADIZ over the East China Sea: A "Great Wall in the Sky"? |publisher=Brookings Institution |url=http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-air-defense-identification-zone-osawa |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160714181744/http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-air-defense-identification-zone-osawa |archive-date=14 July 2016}}</ref> However, the relations later started to improve, with Xi being invited to visit in 2020,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Albert |first=Eleanor |date=16 March 2019 |title=China and Japan's Rapprochement Continues – For Now |url=https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/china-and-japans-rapprochement-continues-for-now/ |access-date=12 August 2022 |website=The Diplomat |language=en-US |archive-date=5 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220705150016/https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/china-and-japans-rapprochement-continues-for-now/ |url-status=live }}</ref> though the trip was later delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Kelly |first=Tim |date=28 February 2021 |title=China's Xi will not make a state visit to Japan this year -Sankei |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-japan-china-xi-idUKKCN2AS0SU |access-date=12 August 2022 |archive-date=12 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812112359/https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-japan-china-xi-idUKKCN2AS0SU |url-status=live }}</ref> In August 2022, Kyodo News reported that Xi personally decided to let ballistic missiles land within Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) during the military exercises held around Taiwan, to send a warning to Japan.<ref>{{Cite web |date=11 August 2022 |title=Xi let missiles fall in Japan EEZ during Taiwan drills: sources |url=https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/08/2e93a85c08b8-urgent-xi-decided-to-let-missiles-fall-in-japan-eez-during-taiwan-drills.html |access-date=12 August 2022 |website=Kyodo News |archive-date=11 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220811095031/https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/08/2e93a85c08b8-urgent-xi-decided-to-let-missiles-fall-in-japan-eez-during-taiwan-drills.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Middle East====
[[File:Ali Khamenei met with Xi Jinping in Tehran 2016 (1).jpg|thumb|Xi with Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei, 23 January 2016]]

While China has historically been wary of getting closer to the [[Place:Middle East|Middle East]] countries, Xi has changed this approach.<ref name="Vohra-2022">{{Cite web |last=Vohra |first=Anchal |date=1 February 2022 |title=Xi Jinping Has Transformed China's Middle East Policy |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/xi-jinping-has-transformed-chinas-middle-east-policy/ |access-date=8 September 2022 |website=Foreign Policy |language=en-US |archive-date=8 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220908141215/https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/xi-jinping-has-transformed-chinas-middle-east-policy/ |url-status=live }}</ref> China has grown closer to both Iran and Saudi Arabia under Xi.<ref name="Vohra-2022" /> During a visit to Iran in 2016, Xi proposed a large cooperation program with Iran,<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Fassihi |first1=Farnaz |last2=Myers |first2=Steven Lee |date=11 July 2020 |title=Defying U.S., China and Iran Near Trade and Military Partnership |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/world/asia/china-iran-trade-military-deal.html |access-date=14 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=29 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210429110901/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/world/asia/china-iran-trade-military-deal.html |url-status=live }}</ref> a deal that was later signed in 2021.<ref>{{Cite news |date=27 March 2021 |title=Iran and China sign 25-year cooperation agreement |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-china-idUSKBN2BJ0AD |access-date=14 August 2022 |archive-date=14 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814093758/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-china-idUSKBN2BJ0AD |url-status=live }}</ref> China has also sold ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia and is helping build 7,000 schools in Iraq.<ref name="Vohra-2022" /> In 2013, Xi proposed a peace deal between Israel and Palestine that entails a [[Two-state solution|two-state solution]] based on the 1967 borders.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Figueroa |first=William |date=25 May 2021 |title=Can China's Israel-Palestine Peace Plan Work? |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/can-chinas-israel-palestine-peace-plan-work/ |access-date=8 September 2022 |website=The Diplomat |language=en-US |archive-date=8 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220908141209/https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/can-chinas-israel-palestine-peace-plan-work/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Turkey, with whom relations were long strained over Uyghurs, has also grown closer to China.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Tepe |first1=Sultan |last2=Alemdaroglu |first2=Ayca |date=16 September 2020 |title=Erdogan Is Turning Turkey Into a Chinese Client State |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/16/erdogan-is-turning-turkey-into-a-chinese-client-state/ |access-date=8 September 2022 |website=Foreign Policy |language=en-US |archive-date=8 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220908141211/https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/16/erdogan-is-turning-turkey-into-a-chinese-client-state/ |url-status=live }}</ref> On 10 March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic ties cut in 2016 after a deal brokered between the two countries by China following secret talks in Beijing.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Kalin |first1=Stephen |last2=Faucon |first2=Benoit |date=10 March 2023 |title=Saudi Arabia, Iran Restore Relations in Deal Brokered by China |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-iran-restore-relations-in-deal-brokered-by-china-406393a1?mod=world_major_2_pos1 |access-date=10 March 2023 |archive-date=10 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230310145643/https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-iran-restore-relations-in-deal-brokered-by-china-406393a1?mod=world_major_2_pos1 |url-status=live }}</ref>

====North Korea====

Under Xi, China initially took a more critical stance on North Korea due to its nuclear tests.<ref name="chengli2">{{cite news |last1=Li |first1=Cheng |date=26 September 2014 |title=A New Type of Major Power Relationship? |publisher=Brookings Institution |url=http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2014/09/26-new-type-power-relationship-li |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160708161643/http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2014/09/26-new-type-power-relationship-li |archive-date=8 July 2016}}</ref> However, starting in 2018, the relations started to improve due to meetings between Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Shi |first1=Jiangtao |last2=Chan |first2=Minnie |last3=Zheng |first3=Sarah |date=27 March 2018 |title=Kim's visit evidence China, North Korea remain allies, analysts say |language=en |newspaper=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2139178/rumours-china-and-north-korea-were-no-longer-allies-put |url-status=live |access-date=26 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190725192608/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2139178/rumours-china-and-north-korea-were-no-longer-allies-put |archive-date=25 July 2019}}</ref> Xi has also supported denuclearization of North Korea,<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Song |first1=Jung-a |last2=Shepherd |first2=Christian |date=21 June 2019 |title=Xi Jinping vows active role in Korea denuclearisation talks |work=Financial Times |url=https://www.ft.com/content/13aa8bd2-93c9-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221202/https://www.ft.com/content/13aa8bd2-93c9-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271 |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |access-date=14 August 2022 |url-status=live }}</ref> and has voiced support for economic reforms in the country.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Bodeen |first=Christopher |date=20 April 2021 |title=China's Xi pushes economic reform at North Korea summit |url=https://apnews.com/article/weapons-programs-ap-top-news-north-korea-international-news-nuclear-weapons-8d5f00b17403495db198e993aeb1c73c |access-date=14 August 2022 |website=Associated Press |language=en |archive-date=14 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814102006/https://apnews.com/article/weapons-programs-ap-top-news-north-korea-international-news-nuclear-weapons-8d5f00b17403495db198e993aeb1c73c |url-status=live }}</ref> At the G20 meeting in Japan, Xi called for a "timely easing" of sanctions imposed on North Korea.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lee |first=Jeong-ho |date=2 July 2019 |title=Xi calls for 'timely' easing of North Korea sanctions after Trump-Kim meeting |language=en |newspaper=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3016981/beijing-reaffirms-support-gradual-easing-north-korea-sanctions |url-status=live |access-date=5 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190823115523/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3016981/beijing-reaffirms-support-gradual-easing-north-korea-sanctions |archive-date=23 August 2019}}</ref> After the 20th CCP National Congress in 2022, ''Rodong Sinmun'', official newspaper of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, wrote a long editorial praising Xi, titling both Kim and Xi ''Suryong'' (수령), a title historically reserved for North Korea's founder [[Biography:Kim Il Sung|Kim Il Sung]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Isozaki |first=Atsuhito |date=23 December 2022 |title=China Relations Key to Situation in North Korea |work=The Diplomat |url=https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/china-relations-key-to-situation-in-north-korea/ |access-date=13 January 2023 |archive-date=13 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230113110128/https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/china-relations-key-to-situation-in-north-korea/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Russia====

[[File:Парад в честь 70-летия Великой Победы - 26.jpg|thumb|Xi with his wife Peng Liyuan during the Moscow Victory Day Parade on 9 May 2015]]

Xi has cultivated stronger relations with Russia, particularly in the wake of the Ukraine crisis of 2014. He seems to have developed a strong personal relationship with president Vladimir Putin. Both are viewed as strong leaders with a nationalist orientation who are not afraid to assert themselves against Western interests.<ref name="russia22">{{cite news |last1=Baker |first1=Peter |date=8 November 2014 |title=As Russia Draws Closer to China, U.S. Faces a New Challenge |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/world/vladimir-putin-xi-jinping-form-closer-ties.html |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828224309/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/world/vladimir-putin-xi-jinping-form-closer-ties.html |archive-date=28 August 2019}}</ref> Xi attended the opening ceremonies of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Under Xi, China signed a $400&nbsp;billion gas deal with Russia; China has also become Russia's largest trading partner.<ref name="russia22" />

Xi and Putin met on 4 February 2022 during the run up to the 2022 Beijing Olympics during the massive Russian build-up of force on the Ukrainian border, with the two expressing that the two countries are nearly united in their anti-US alignment and that both nations shared "no limits" to their commitments.<ref>{{Cite news |author1=Chao Deng |author2=Ann M. Simmons |author3=Evan Gershkovich |author4=William Mauldin |date=4 February 2022 |title=Putin, Xi Aim Russia-China Partnership Against U.S. |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-vladimir-putin-meets-with-chinese-leader-xi-jinping-in-beijing-11643966743 |issn=0099-9660 |access-date=5 April 2022 |archive-date=24 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220224213709/https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-vladimir-putin-meets-with-chinese-leader-xi-jinping-in-beijing-11643966743 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Xi-Putin">{{Cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |last2=Myers |first2=Steven Lee |date=7 March 2022 |title='No Wavering': After Turning to Putin, Xi Faces Hard Wartime Choices for China |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/world/asia/putin-ukraine-china-xi.html |issn=0362-4331 |access-date=5 April 2022 |archive-date=10 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220310022327/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/world/asia/putin-ukraine-china-xi.html |url-status=live }}</ref> U.S. officials said that China had asked Russia to wait for the invasion of Ukraine until after the Beijing Olympics ended on 20 February.<ref name="Xi-Putin" /> In April 2022, Xi Jinping expressed opposition to sanctions against Russia.<ref>{{cite news |last=Ng |first=Teddy |date=2 April 2022 |title=Chinese President Xi Jinping warns it could take decades to repair economic damage caused by Ukraine crisis |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3172860/chinese-president-xi-jinping-warns-it-could-take-decades |access-date=12 August 2022 |archive-date=15 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220515081918/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3172860/chinese-president-xi-jinping-warns-it-could-take-decades |url-status=live }}</ref> On 15 June 2022, Xi Jinping reasserted China's support for Russia on issues of sovereignty and security.<ref>{{cite news |last=Lau |first=Stuart |date=15 June 2022 |title=China's Xi gives most direct backing to Putin since invasion |work=Politico |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-give-most-direct-backing-putin-invasion-ukraine/ |access-date=12 August 2022 |archive-date=15 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220815183531/https://www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-give-most-direct-backing-putin-invasion-ukraine/ |url-status=live }}</ref> However, Xi also said China is committed to respecting "the territorial integrity of all countries",<ref>{{Cite web |title=China's Xi Says International Disputes Should be Resolved Via Dialogue, Not Sanctions |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-xi-says-international-disputes-should-be-resolved-via-dialogue-not-sanctions/6538799.html |access-date=12 August 2022 |website=Voice of America |date=21 April 2022 |language=en |archive-date=24 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220724021113/https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-xi-says-international-disputes-should-be-resolved-via-dialogue-not-sanctions/6538799.html |url-status=live }}</ref> and said China was "pained to see the flames of war reignited in Europe".<ref>{{Cite web |date=9 March 2022 |title=China's Xi: Beijing supports peace talks between Russia, Ukraine |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/9/chinas-xi-beijing-supports-peace-talks-between-russia-ukraine |access-date=12 August 2022 |website=[[Engineering:Al Jazeera English|Al Jazeera]] |language=en |archive-date=23 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220323082710/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/9/chinas-xi-beijing-supports-peace-talks-between-russia-ukraine |url-status=live }}</ref> China has additionally kept a distance from Russia's actions, instead putting itself as a neutral party.<ref name="Xi-Putin" /> In February 2023, China released a 12-point peace plan to "settle the acute crisis in Ukraine"; the plan was praised by Putin but criticized by the U.S. and European countries.<ref>{{Cite news |date=22 March 2023 |title=Putin to Xi: We will discuss your plan to end the war in Ukraine |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65018657 |access-date=24 March 2023 |archive-date=23 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230323215247/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65018657 |url-status=live }}</ref>

[[File:Putin-Xi press conference (2023).jpg|thumb|Vladimir Putin welcomes Xi in Moscow during Xi's visit to Russia in March 2023]]
During the war Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy has given a nuanced take to China,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Santora |first=Marc |date=2022-08-03 |title=On China, the normally forceful Zelensky offers a nuanced view. |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/03/world/europe/on-china-the-normally-forceful-zelensky-offers-a-nuanced-view.html |access-date=2022-10-26 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=18 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818142743/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/03/world/europe/on-china-the-normally-forceful-zelensky-offers-a-nuanced-view.html |url-status=live }}</ref> saying that the country has the economic leverage to pressure Putin to end the war, adding "I'm sure that without the Chinese market for the Russian Federation, Russia would be feeling complete economic isolation. That's something that China can do – to limit the trade [with Russia] until the war is over." In August 2022, Zelenskyy said that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Xi Jinping did not respond to his requests for direct talks with him.<ref>{{cite news |date=4 August 2022 |title=Zelenskyy urges China's Xi to help end Russia's war in Ukraine |work=[[Engineering:Al Jazeera English|Al Jazeera]] |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/zelenskyy-urges-chinas-xi-to-help-end-russias-war-in-ukraine |access-date=26 October 2022 |archive-date=22 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221022203811/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/zelenskyy-urges-chinas-xi-to-help-end-russias-war-in-ukraine |url-status=live }}</ref> He additionally said that while he would like China to take a different approach to the war in Ukraine, he also wanted the relationship to improve every year and said that China and Ukraine shared similar values.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Chew |first=Amy |date=2022-08-04 |title=Exclusive: Zelensky seeks talks with China's Xi to help end Russia's invasion of Ukraine |url=https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3187580/volodymyr-zelensky-seeking-direct-talks-chinas-xi-jinping-help |access-date=2022-10-26 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=26 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221026165146/https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3187580/volodymyr-zelensky-seeking-direct-talks-chinas-xi-jinping-help |url-status=live }}</ref> On 26 April 2023, Zelenskyy and Xi held their first phone call since the start of the war.<ref>{{Cite news |date=26 April 2023 |title=Xi Speaks With Zelenskiy for First Time Since Russia's War in Ukraine Began |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-26/xi-speaks-with-ukraine-leader-for-first-time-since-war-began-lgxlx13n?srnd=fixed-income&leadSource=uverify%20wall |access-date=26 April 2023 |archive-date=7 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231107173556/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-26/xi-speaks-with-ukraine-leader-for-first-time-since-war-began-lgxlx13n?srnd=fixed-income&leadSource=uverify%20wall |url-status=live }}</ref>

====South Korea====

Xi has initially improved relationships with South Korea,<ref name="chengli2" /> and the two countries signed a free-trade agreement in December 2015.<ref name=":2">{{Cite news |last=Kim |first=Bo-eun |date=26 July 2022 |title=China, South Korea renew service sector talks, opening up a 'win-win for both economies' |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3186792/china-south-korea-renew-service-sector-talks-opening-win-win |access-date=14 March 2023 |archive-date=14 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230314194644/https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3186792/china-south-korea-renew-service-sector-talks-opening-win-win |url-status=live }}</ref> Starting in 2017, China's relationship with South Korea soured over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), a missile defence system, purchase of the latter. which China sees as a threat but which South Korea says is a defence measure against North Korea.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Huang |first=Cary |date=2 April 2017 |title=Why China's economic jabs at South Korea are self-defeating |language=en |newspaper=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2083166/opinion-why-chinas-shadow-boycott-south-korea-self-defeating |url-status=live |access-date=29 July 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190729174351/https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2083166/opinion-why-chinas-shadow-boycott-south-korea-self-defeating |archive-date=29 July 2019}}</ref> Ultimately, South Korea halted the purchase of the THAAD after China imposed unofficial sanctions.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Kim |first1=Christine |last2=Blanchard |first2=Ben |date=31 October 2017 |title=China, South Korea agree to mend ties after THAAD standoff |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKBN1D003G |access-date=29 August 2022 |archive-date=29 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220829142007/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKBN1D003G |url-status=live }}</ref> China's relations with South Korea improved again under president Moon Jae-in.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Park |first=Chan-kyong |date=26 January 2021 |title=Xi charms Moon as China and US compete for an ally in South Korea |url=https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3119363/xi-charms-moon-china-and-us-compete-ally-south-korea |access-date=14 August 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=21 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210321171514/https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3119363/xi-charms-moon-china-and-us-compete-ally-south-korea |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Southeast Asia====
[[File:Bongbong Marcos and Xi Jinping.jpg|thumb|Xi Jinping with Philippine President Bongbong Marcos in Bangkok, November 2022]]
Since Xi came to power, China has been rapidly building and militarizing islands in the South China Sea, a decision ''Study Times'' of the Central Party School said was personally taken by Xi.<ref name="Liu-2009">{{cite web |date=May 2009 |title=Journal of Current Chinese Affairs |url=http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=%2Fcontent%2Fias%2Farchiv%2Fcds%2Fcds_0905.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120217211144/http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=%2Fcontent%2Fias%2Farchiv%2Fcds%2Fcds_0905.pdf |archive-date=17 February 2012 |access-date=20 October 2010 |website=giga-hamburg.de}}</ref> In April 2015, new satellite imagery revealed that China was rapidly constructing an airfield on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea.<ref>{{cite news |date=17 April 2015 |title=China building runway in disputed South China Sea island |publisher=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32331964 |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190909135656/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32331964 |archive-date=9 September 2019}}</ref> In November 2014, in a major policy address, Xi called for a decrease in the use of force, preferring dialogue and consultation to solve the current issues plaguing the relationship between China and its South East Asian neighbors.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Miller |first1=Matthew |date=7 September 2019 |title=China's Xi tones down foreign policy rhetoric |publisher={{wipe|CNBC}} |url=https://www.cnbc.com/id/102225589#. |url-status=live |access-date=30 November 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141206183128/http://www.cnbc.com/id/102225589#. |archive-date=6 December 2014}}</ref>

====Taiwan====
[[File:2015 Ma–Xi Meeting 08.jpg|thumb|Xi Jinping met with then-Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou in November 2015 in their capacity as the leader of mainland China and Taiwan respectively.]]

In 2015, Xi met with Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou, which marked the first time the political leaders of both sides of the Taiwan Strait have met since the end of the Chinese Civil War in Mainland China in 1950.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Perlez |first1=Jane |last2=Ramzy |first2=Austin |date=4 November 2015 |title=China, Taiwan and a Meeting After 66 Years |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/world/asia/leaders-of-china-and-taiwan-to-meet-for-first-time-since-1949.html |url-status=live |access-date=1 November 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170903072421/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/world/asia/leaders-of-china-and-taiwan-to-meet-for-first-time-since-1949.html |archive-date=3 September 2017}}</ref> Xi said that China and Taiwan are "one family" that cannot be pulled apart.<ref>{{Cite news |date=7 November 2015 |title=One-minute handshake marks historic meeting between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou |work=The Straits Times |url=https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/one-minute-handshake-marks-historic-meeting-between-xi-jinping-and-ma-ying-jeou |url-status=live |access-date=5 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190905182113/https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/one-minute-handshake-marks-historic-meeting-between-xi-jinping-and-ma-ying-jeou |archive-date=5 September 2019}}</ref> However, the relations started deteriorating after Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential elections in 2016.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Huang |first=Kristin |date=15 June 2021 |title=Timeline: Taiwan's relations with mainland China under Tsai Ing-wen |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3137231/timeline-cross-strait-relations-under-taiwans-president-tsai |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en}}</ref>

In the 19th Party Congress held in 2017, Xi reaffirmed six of the nine principles that had been affirmed continuously since the 16th Party Congress in 2002, with the notable exception of "Placing hopes on the Taiwan people as a force to help bring about unification".<ref name="Brookings R.C. Bush2">{{Cite news |last=Bush |first=Richard C. |date=19 October 2017 |title=What Xi Jinping said about Taiwan at the 19th Party Congress |publisher=Brookings Institution |url=https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/19/what-xi-jinping-said-about-taiwan-at-the-19th-party-congress/ |url-status=live |access-date=8 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180708013012/https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/19/what-xi-jinping-said-about-taiwan-at-the-19th-party-congress/ |archive-date=8 July 2018}}</ref> According to the Brookings Institution, Xi used stronger language on potential Taiwan independence than his predecessors towards previous DPP governments in Taiwan.<ref name="Brookings R.C. Bush2" /> He said that "we will never allow any person, any organisation, or any political party to split any part of the Chinese territory from China at any time at any form."<ref name="Brookings R.C. Bush2" /> In March 2018, Xi said that Taiwan would face the "punishment of history" for any attempts at separatism.<ref name="Wen-2018">{{Cite news |last1=Wen |first1=Philip |last2=Qiu |first2=Stella |date=20 March 2018 |title=Xi Jinping warns Taiwan it will face 'punishment of history' for separatism |work=The Australian Financial Review |url=https://www.afr.com/news/politics/world/xi-jinping-warns-taiwan-it-will-face-punishment-of-history-for-separatism-20180320-h0xpx4 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=8 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180708192153/https://www.afr.com/news/politics/world/xi-jinping-warns-taiwan-it-will-face-punishment-of-history-for-separatism-20180320-h0xpx4 |archive-date=8 July 2018}}</ref>

In January 2019, Xi Jinping called on Taiwan to reject its formal independence from China, saying: "We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means." Those options, he said, could be used against "external interference". Xi also said that they "are willing to create broad space for peaceful reunification, but will leave no room for any form of separatist activities."<ref>{{cite news |last=Kuo |first=Lily |date=2 January 2019 |title='All necessary means': Xi Jinping reserves right to use force against Taiwan |work={{wipe|The Guardian}} |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/02/all-necessary-means-xi-jinping-reserves-right-to-use-force-against-taiwan |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190822114526/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/02/all-necessary-means-xi-jinping-reserves-right-to-use-force-against-taiwan |archive-date=22 August 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Griffiths |first=James |date=2 January 2019 |title=Xi warns Taiwan independence is 'a dead end' |work=CNN |publisher= |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/02/asia/xi-jinping-taiwan-tsai-intl/ |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191003215248/https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/02/asia/xi-jinping-taiwan-tsai-intl/ |archive-date=3 October 2019}}</ref> President Tsai responded to the speech by saying Taiwan would not accept a one country, two systems arrangement with the mainland, while stressing the need for all cross-strait negotiations to be on a government-to-government basis.<ref>{{cite news |last=Lee |first=Yimou |date=2 January 2019 |title=Taiwan president defiant after China calls for reunification |publisher={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-president/taiwan-president-defiant-after-china-calls-for-reunification-idUSKCN1OW0FN |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190929044514/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-president/taiwan-president-defiant-after-china-calls-for-reunification-idUSKCN1OW0FN |archive-date=29 September 2019}}</ref>

In 2022, after the Chinese military exercises around Taiwan, the PRC published a white paper called "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era", which was the first white paper regards to Taiwan since 2000.<ref name="Millson-2022">{{Cite news |last=Millson |first=Alex |date=10 August 2022 |title=China's First White Paper on Taiwan Since Xi Came to Power — In Full |language=en |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-10/china-s-first-white-paper-on-taiwan-since-xi-came-to-power-in-full |access-date=12 August 2022}}</ref> The paper urged Taiwan to become a special administrative region of the PRC under the one country two systems formula,<ref name="Millson-2022" /> and said that "a small number of countries, the U.S. foremost amongst them" are "using Taiwan to contain China".<ref name="Falconer-2022">{{Cite news |last=Falconer |first=Rebecca |date=11 August 2022 |title=New Beijing policy removes pledge not to send troops to Taiwan if it takes control of island |language=en |website=Axios |url=https://www.axios.com/2022/08/11/beijing-taiwan-policy-update-troops-pledge |access-date=12 August 2022}}</ref> Notably, the new white paper excluded a part that previously said the PRC would not send troops or officials to Taiwan after unification.<ref name="Falconer-2022" />

====United States====
[[File:President Trump's Trip to Asia (37575409684).jpg|thumb|U.S. president Donald Trump arrives in China, 8 November 2017]]Xi has called China–United States relations in the contemporary world a "new type of great-power relations", a phrase the Obama administration had been reluctant to embrace.<ref name="nikkei2">{{cite news |last1=Hiroyuki |first1=Akita |date=22 July 2014 |title=A new kind of 'great power relationship'? No thanks, Obama subtly tells China |newspaper=Nikkei Asia |url=http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/A-new-kind-of-great-power-relationship-No-thanks-Obama-subtly-tells-China |access-date=11 November 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141111181321/http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/A-new-kind-of-great-power-relationship-No-thanks-Obama-subtly-tells-China |archive-date=11 November 2014}}</ref> Under his administration the U.S.–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue that began under Hu Jintao has continued, until it was suspended by the administration of Donald Trump.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Zhou |first=Cissy |date=19 July 2021 |title=US-China economic talks 'infinitely far away' with 'emphasis on competition over cooperation' |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3141700/us-china-economic-talks-infinitely-far-away-emphasis |access-date=19 May 2023}}</ref> On China–U.S. relations, Xi said, "If [China and the United States] are in confrontation, it would surely spell disaster for both countries".<ref name="scmp22">{{cite news|url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1550184/confrontation-us-would-be-disaster-says-president-xi-jinping?page=all|title=President Xi Jinping warns of disaster if Sino-US relations sour|last1=Ng|first1=Teddy|date=9 July 2014|work=South China Morning Post|access-date=7 September 2019|last2=Kwong|first2=Man-ki|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828224320/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1550184/confrontation-us-would-be-disaster-says-president-xi-jinping?page=all|archive-date=28 August 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>  The U.S. has been critical of Chinese actions in the South China Sea.<ref name="nikkei2" /> In 2014, Chinese hackers compromised the computer system of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management,<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Perez |first1=Evan |date=24 August 2017 |title=FBI arrests Chinese national connected to malware used in OPM data breach |work=CNN |publisher= |url=http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/24/politics/fbi-arrests-chinese-national-in-opm-data-breach/index.html |url-status=live |access-date=29 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181011015443/https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/24/politics/fbi-arrests-chinese-national-in-opm-data-breach/index.html |archive-date=11 October 2018}}</ref> resulting in the [[Office of Personnel Management data breach|theft]] of approximately 22 million personnel records handled by the office.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-system-affected-21-5-million-people-federal-authorities-say/|title=Hacks of OPM databases compromised 22.1 million people, federal authorities say|last=Nakashima|first=Ellen|date=9 July 2015|newspaper={{wipe|The Washington Post}}|access-date=29 October 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180726051157/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-system-affected-21-5-million-people-federal-authorities-say/|archive-date=26 July 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> Xi has also indirectly spoken out critically on the U.S. "strategic pivot" to Asia.<ref name="blan2">{{cite news |last=Blanchard |first=Ben |date=3 July 2014 |title=With one eye on Washington, China plots its own Asia 'pivot' |publisher={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-diplomacy-idUSKBN0F82GX20140703 |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151006010842/http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/03/us-china-diplomacy-idUSKBN0F82GX20140703 |archive-date=6 October 2015}}</ref>

Relations with the U.S. soured after Donald Trump became president in 2017.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Brown |first=Adrian |date=12 May 2019 |title=China-US trade war: Sino-American ties being torn down brick by brick |publisher=[[Engineering:Al Jazeera English|Al Jazeera]] |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/asia/2019/05/china-trade-war-sino-american-ties-torn-brick-brick-190512132227395.html |url-status=live |access-date=19 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190904140940/https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/asia/2019/05/china-trade-war-sino-american-ties-torn-brick-brick-190512132227395.html |archive-date=4 September 2019}}</ref> Since 2018, U.S. and China have been engaged in an escalating trade war.<ref>{{cite news |last=Swanson |first=Ana |date=5 July 2018 |title=Trump's Trade War With China Is Officially Underway |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html |url-status=live |access-date=26 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180712201844/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html |archive-date=12 July 2018}}</ref> In 2020, the relations further deteriorated due to the COVID-19 pandemic.<ref>{{Cite news |date=26 March 2020 |title=Relations between China and America are infected with coronavirus |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/03/26/relations-between-china-and-america-are-infected-with-coronavirus |access-date=14 August 2022 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> In 2021, Xi has called the U.S. the biggest threat to China's development, saying that "the biggest source of chaos in the present-day world is the United States".<ref name="Buckley-2021a" /> Xi has also scrapped a previous policy in which China did not challenge the U.S. in most instances, while Chinese officials said that they now see China as an "equal" to the U.S.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Wei |first1=Lingling |last2=Davis |first2=Bob |date=12 April 2021 |title=China's Message to America: We're an Equal Now |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-china-policy-biden-xi-11617896117 |access-date=14 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660}}</ref> On 6 March 2023, during a speech to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Xi said that "Western countries—led by the U.S.—have implemented all-round containment, encirclement and suppression" against China, which he said brought "unprecedentedly severe challenges to our country's development".<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Wong |first1=Chun Han |last2=Zhai |first2=Keith |last3=Areddy |first3=James T. |date=6 March 2023 |title=China's Xi Jinping Takes Rare Direct Aim at U.S. in Speech |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-jinping-takes-rare-direct-aim-at-u-s-in-speech-5d8fde1a?mod=article_inline |access-date=9 March 2023}}</ref>
{{Quote box
| quote = The foundation of China-U.S. relations lies among the people, the hope is in the people, the future lies in the youth, and the vitality lies in sub-national areas.
| source = — Xi Jinping told visiting California Governor Gavin Newsom in 2023<ref>{{cite web|url=https://english.news.cn/20231025/d523e508d6954d5da621d79651dae0a7/c.html|title=Xi meets U.S. California governor|work=Xinhuanet|date=2023-10-25}}</ref>
| align = right
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[[File:President Biden met with President Xi of the PRC before the 2022 G20 Bali Summit.jpg|thumb|Xi Jinping with U.S. President Joe Biden at the margins of the 2022 G20 Bali summit]]

====Economic relations====
{{see also|Belt and Road Initiative}}[[File:Belt and Road Initiative participant map.svg|thumb|300x300px|Countries that signed cooperation documents related to the Belt and Road Initiative]]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was unveiled by Xi in September and October 2013 during visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia,<ref>{{Cite news |date=6 September 2023 |title=The path ahead for China's Belt and Road Initiative |newspaper=The Economist |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2023/09/06/the-path-ahead-for-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative |access-date=2023-09-07 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> and was thereafter promoted by Premier Li Keqiang during state visits to Asia and Europe. Xi made the announcement for the initiative while in Astana, Kazakhstan, and called it a "golden opportunity".<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-09/08/content_16952304.htm|title=Xi proposes a 'new Silk Road' with Central Asia|last=Jiao|first=Wu|date=8 September 2013|work=China Daily|access-date=29 October 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181029232425/http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-09/08/content_16952304.htm|archive-date=29 October 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> BRI has been called Xi's "signature project", involving numerous infrastructure development and investment projects throughout Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://time.com/5578514/china-xi-jinping-belt-road-corruption-debt/|title=Xi Jinping Says China's Belt and Road Initiative Is Not Saddling Poor Countries With Debt|date=26 April 2019|magazine={{wipe|Time (magazine)}}|access-date=10 January 2020}}</ref> BRI was added to the CCP Constitution at the closing session of the 19th Party Congress on 24 October 2017,<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702025.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180127112204/http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702025.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=27 January 2018|title="Belt and Road" incorporated into CPC Constitution|date=24 October 2017|publisher=Xinhua News Agency|access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref> further elevating its importance.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tan |first=Huileng |date=31 October 2017 |title=China wrote Belt and Road Initiative into the party constitution. That makes it riskier than ever |work={{wipe|CNBC}} |publisher= |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/31/china-wrote-belt-and-road-initiative-into-the-party-constitution.html |access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref> Since the BRI was launched, China became the world's largest lender, lending about $1 trillion in a decade to almost 150 countries. However, by 2022, many BRI projects have stalled, and most of China's debt became held by countries in financial distress, leading the Chinese leaders to adopt a more conservative approach to BRI, dubbed as "Belt and Road Initiative 2.0".<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wei |first=Lingling |date=26 September 2022 |title=China Reins In Its Belt and Road Program, $1 Trillion Later |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-belt-road-debt-11663961638 |access-date=17 October 2022 |issn=0099-9660}}</ref>

Xi officially proposed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in October 2013 during a visit to Indonesia,<ref>{{Cite news |date=4 October 2013 |title=Only connect |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/analects/2013/10/04/only-connect |access-date=2023-01-04 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> which officially launched in January 2016.<ref name="Wong-2016">{{Cite news |last=Wong |first=Sue-Lin |date=2016-01-16 |title=China launches new AIIB development bank as power balance shifts |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-aiib-investment-idUSKCN0UU03Y |access-date=2023-01-04}}</ref> The membership of the AIIB has included numerous countries, including allies of the United States and Western countries, despite opposition from the US.<ref name="Wong-2016" /> Since its launch until 2022, AIIB has invested $36.43 billion to 190 projects.<ref>{{Cite news |date=10 October 2022 |title=To show that it can follow global rules, China built its own multilateral institution |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/special-report/2022/10/10/to-show-that-it-can-follow-global-rules-china-built-its-own-multilateral-institution |access-date=2023-01-04 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> Xi's tenure has seen a signing of several free-trade deals, including with Australia in 2014,<ref>{{Cite news |date=17 November 2014 |title=Australia and China seal major free trade deal |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-30076974 |access-date=14 March 2023}}</ref> South Korea in 2015,<ref name=":2" /> and the larger [[Finance:Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership|Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership]] (RCEP) in 2020.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Bradsher |first1=Keith |last2=Swanson |first2=Ana |date=2020-11-15 |title=China-Led Trade Pact Is Signed, in Challenge to U.S. |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/15/business/china-trade-rcep.html |access-date=2023-03-14 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Xi has also expressed his interest in China joining the [[Finance:Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership|Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership]] (CPTPP), with China formally applying to join in September 2021.<ref>{{Cite news |last=CK |first=Tan |date=5 November 2021 |title=Xi says open to discussion on state-owned companies in CPTPP talks |work=Nikkei Asia |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/Xi-says-open-to-discussion-on-state-owned-companies-in-CPTPP-talks |access-date=14 March 2023}}</ref>

===National security===
Xi has devoted a large amount of work towards national security, calling for a "holistic national security architecture" that encompasses "all aspects of the work of the party and the country".<ref>{{Cite news |date=30 December 2020 |title=Xi Sees Threats to China's Security Everywhere Heading Into 2021 |language=en |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-30/xi-sees-threats-to-china-s-security-everywhere-heading-into-2021 |access-date=21 August 2022}}</ref> During a private talk with U.S. president Obama and vice president Biden, he said that China had been a target of "colour revolutions", foreshadowing his focus on national security.<ref name="Buckley-2022">{{Cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |last2=Myers |first2=Steven Lee |date=6 August 2022 |title=In Turbulent Times, Xi Builds a Security Fortress for China, and Himself |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/06/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-security.html |access-date=21 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Since its creation by Xi, the National Security Commission has established local security committees, focusing on dissent.<ref name="Buckley-2022" /> In the name of national security, Xi's government has passed numerous laws including a counterespionage law in 2014,<ref>{{Cite news |date=1 November 2014 |title=China passes counter-espionage law |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-lawmaking-spy-idUSKBN0IL2N520141101 |access-date=21 August 2022}}</ref> national security<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wong |first=Chun Han |date=1 July 2015 |title=China Adopts Sweeping National-Security Law |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-adopts-sweeping-national-security-law-1435757589 |access-date=21 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660}}</ref> and a counterterrorism law in 2015,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Blanchard |first=Ben |date=28 December 2015 |title=China passes controversial counter-terrorism law |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-idUSKBN0UA07220151228 |access-date=21 August 2022}}</ref> a cybersecurity law<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wagner |first=Jack |date=1 June 2017 |title=China's Cybersecurity Law: What You Need to Know |work=The Diplomat |url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/chinas-cybersecurity-law-what-you-need-to-know/ |access-date=21 August 2022}}</ref> and a law restricting foreign [[Social:Non-governmental organization|NGOs]] in 2016,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wong |first=Edward |date=28 April 2015 |title=Clampdown in China Restricts 7,000 Foreign Organizations |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/world/asia/china-foreign-ngo-law.html |access-date=21 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> a national intelligence law in 2017,<ref>{{Cite news |date=27 June 2017 |title=China passes tough new intelligence law |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-lawmaking-idUSKBN19I1FW |access-date=21 August 2022}}</ref> and a data security law in 2021.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Haldane |first=Matt |date=1 September 2021 |title=What China's new data laws are and their impact on Big Tech |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3147040/what-chinas-new-data-laws-are-and-their-impact-big-tech |access-date=21 August 2022}}</ref> Under Xi, China's mass surveillance network has dramatically grown, with comprehensive profiles being built for each citizen.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Mozur |first1=Paul |last2=Xiao |first2=Muyi |last3=Liu |first3=John |date=26 June 2022 |title='An Invisible Cage': How China Is Policing the Future |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/25/technology/china-surveillance-police.html |access-date=21 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

===Hong Kong===
[[File:2019-10-01 Demonstration Hong Kong 11.jpg|thumb|Hong Kong protesters throw eggs at Xi Jinping's portrait on National Day]]During his leadership, Xi has supported and pursued a greater political and economic integration of Hong Kong to mainland China, including through projects such as the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge.<ref name="Bland-2018">{{Cite news |last=Bland |first=Ben |date=2 September 2018 |title=Greater Bay Area: Xi Jinping's other grand plan |work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/fe5976d8-ab81-11e8-94bd-cba20d67390c |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221214/https://www.ft.com/content/fe5976d8-ab81-11e8-94bd-cba20d67390c |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=11 January 2020 }}</ref> He has pushed for the Greater Bay Area project, which aims to integrate Hong Kong, Macau, and nine other cities in Guangdong.<ref name="Bland-2018" /> Xi's push for greater integration has created fears of decreasing freedoms in Hong Kong.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yu |first=Verna |date=5 November 2019 |title=China signals desire to bring Hong Kong under tighter control |work={{wipe|The Guardian}} |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/05/chinas-xi-jinping-expresses-high-degree-of-trust-in-hong-kongs-carrie-lam |access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref> Many of the views held by the central government and eventually implemented in Hong Kong were outlined in a white paper published by the State Council in 2014 named ''The Practice of the 'One Country, Two Systems' Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region'', which outlined that the China's central government has "comprehensive jurisdiction" over Hong Kong.<ref name="Buckley-2021b">{{Cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |last2=Wang |first2=Vivian |last3=Ramzy |first3=Austin |date=28 June 2021 |title=Crossing the Red Line: Behind China's Takeover of Hong Kong |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/china-hong-kong-security-law.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Under Xi, the Chinese government also declared the Sino-British Joint Declaration to be legally void.<ref name="Buckley-2021b" />

In August 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) made a decision allowing universal suffrage for the 2017 election of the chief executive of Hong Kong, but also requiring the candidates to "love the country, and love Hong Kong", as well as other measures that ensured the Chinese leadership would be the ultimate decision-maker on the selection, leading to protests,<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |last2=Forsythe |first2=Michael |date=2014-08-31 |title=China Restricts Voting Reforms for Hong Kong |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/world/asia/hong-kong-elections.html |access-date=2023-03-18 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> and the eventual rejection of the reform bill in the Legislative Council due to a walk-out by the pro-Beijing camp to delay to vote.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Chan |first=Wilfred |date=19 June 2015 |title=Hong Kong legislators reject China-backed reform bill |work=CNN |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/18/asia/hong-kong-reform-vote/index.html |access-date=19 March 2023}}</ref> In the 2017 chief executive election, Carrie Lam was victorious, reportedly with the endorsement of the CCP Politburo.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Cheng |first=Kris |date=7 February 2017 |title=Carrie Lam is the only leadership contender Beijing supports, state leader Zhang Dejiang reportedly says |work=Hong Kong Free Press |url=https://hongkongfp.com/2017/02/07/carrie-lam-is-the-only-leadership-contender-beijing-supports-state-leader-zhang-dejiang-reportedly-says/ |access-date=19 March 2023}}</ref>

Xi has supported the Hong Kong Government and Carrie Lam against the protesters in the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests, which broke out after a proposed bill that would allow extraditions to China.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Sin |first1=Noah |last2=Kwok |first2=Donny |date=16 December 2019 |title=China's Xi vows support for Hong Kong leader during 'most difficult' time |publisher={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests/chinas-xi-vows-support-for-hong-kong-leader-during-most-difficult-time-idUSKBN1YK025 |access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref> He has defended the Hong Kong police's use of force, saying that "We sternly support the Hong Kong police to take forceful actions in enforcing the law, and the Hong Kong judiciary to punish in accordance with the law those who have committed violent crimes."<ref>{{Cite news |last=Zhou |first=Laura |date=14 November 2019 |title=Xi Jinping again backs Hong Kong police use of force in stopping unrest |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3037811/xi-jinping-again-backs-hong-kong-police-use-force-stopping |access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref> While visiting [[Place:Macau|Macau]] on 20 December 2019 as part of the 20th anniversary of its return to China, Xi warned of foreign forces interfering in Hong Kong and Macau,<ref>{{Cite news |date=20 December 2019 |title=China's Xi warns of 'foreign forces' at Macao anniversary |publisher=Deutsche Welle |url=https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-xi-warns-of-foreign-forces-at-macao-anniversary/a-51747054 |access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref> while also hinting that Macau could be a model for Hong Kong to follow.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Siu |first1=Phila |last2=Cheung |first2=Gary |date=19 December 2019 |title=Xi Jinping seen as indirectly lecturing Hong Kong as he tells Macau residents to make 'positive voices' heard and resolve problems with rationality |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3042846/macau-handover-anniversary-xi-jinping-tells-residents-make |access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref>[[File:庆祝香港回归祖国25周年大会暨香港特别行政区第六届政府就职典礼 20220701-4.png|thumb|Xi swearing in John Lee as chief executive during the 25th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China]]

In 2020, the NPCSC passed a national security law in Hong Kong that dramatically expanded government clampdown over the opposition in the city; amongst the measures were the dramatic restriction on political opposition and the creation of a central government office outside Hong Kong jurisdiction to oversee the enforcement of the law.<ref name="Buckley-2021b" /> This was seem as the culmination of a long-term project under Xi to further closely integrate Hong Kong with the mainland.<ref name="Buckley-2021b" /> Xi visited Hong Kong as president in 2017 and 2022, in the 20th and 25th anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong respectively.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Yip |first1=Martin |last2=Fraser |first2=Simon |date=30 June 2022 |title=China's President Xi arrives in Hong Kong for handover anniversary |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-61991980 |access-date=13 August 2022}}</ref> In his 2022 visit, he swore in John Lee as chief executive, a former police officer that was backed by the Chinese government to expand control over the city.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ioanes |first=Ellen |date=2 July 2022 |title=Xi Jinping asserts his power on Hong Kong's handover anniversary |work=Vox |url=https://www.vox.com/2022/7/2/23192550/xi-hong-kong-john-lee-china |access-date=13 August 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Chan |first1=Ho-him |last2=Riordan |first2=Primrose |date=8 May 2022 |title=Beijing-backed hardliner John Lee chosen as Hong Kong's next leader |work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/a6466afa-0981-4a82-9787-8c630651d44f |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221231/https://www.ft.com/content/a6466afa-0981-4a82-9787-8c630651d44f |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=13 August 2022 }}</ref> While in the city, he said Hong Kong had moved from "chaos" to "stability".<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Chan |first1=Minnie |last2=Zheng |first2=William |date=1 July 2022 |title=Xi praises Hong Kong PLA garrison for city's transition from 'chaos' to 'stability' |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3183862/xi-praises-hong-kong-pla-garrison-citys-transition-chaos |access-date=13 August 2022}}</ref> Since John Lee became chief executive, Hong Kong government officials including Lee himself have shown public displays of loyalty towards Xi, similar to the mainland but previously unheard in the city.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Ramzy |first1=Austin |last2=May |first2=Tiffany |date=2022-07-27 |title=For Hong Kong's Beijing-Backed Officials, Xi's All That |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/27/world/asia/xi-jinping-hong-kong.html |access-date=2023-01-09 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

===Human rights===

According to the Human Rights Watch, Xi has "started a broad and sustained offensive on human rights" since he became leader in 2012.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/china-and-tibet|title=World Report 2018: Rights Trends in China|chapter=China: Events of 2017 |date=9 January 2018|publisher=Human Rights Watch|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828203028/https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/china-and-tibet|archive-date=28 August 2019|access-date=7 September 2019}}</ref> The HRW also said that repression in China is "at its worst level since the Tiananmen Square massacre."<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-repression-freedom-police-censorship-tiananmen-square-human-rights-watch-a8732501.html|title=Repression in China at worst level since Tiananmen Square, HRW warns|last=Withnall|first=Adam|date=17 January 2019|newspaper=The Independent|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190524133120/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-repression-freedom-police-censorship-tiananmen-square-human-rights-watch-a8732501.html|archive-date=24 May 2019|access-date=7 September 2019}}</ref> Since taking power, Xi has cracked down on grassroots activism, with hundreds being detained.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/b4de464a-7242-11e9-bf5c-6eeb837566c5|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221247/https://www.ft.com/content/b4de464a-7242-11e9-bf5c-6eeb837566c5|archive-date=11 December 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=China widens crackdown against grassroot activists|date=9 May 2019|work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]]|access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref> He presided over the 709 crackdown on 9 July 2015, which saw more than 200 lawyers, legal assistants and human rights activists being detained.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-39974953|title=Wang Quanzhang: The lawyer who simply vanished|last=Sudworth|first=John|date=22 May 2017|publisher=BBC News|access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref> His term has seen the arrest and imprisonment of activists such as Xu Zhiyong, as well as numerous others who identified with the New Citizens' Movement. Prominent legal activist Pu Zhiqiang of the [[Social:Weiquan movement|Weiquan movement]] was also arrested and detained.<ref name="afp2">{{cite news|url=https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/419842/chinese-dream-turns-sour-for-activists-under-xi-jinping|title=Chinese dream turns sour for activists under Xi Jinping|date=10 July 2014|newspaper=Bangkok Post|access-date=17 July 2014}}</ref>

In 2017, the local government of the Jiangxi province told Christians to replace their pictures of [[Biography:Jesus|Jesus]] with Xi Jinping as part of a general campaign on unofficial churches in the country.<ref name="scmpJesus">{{Cite news|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2119699/praise-xi-jinping-not-jesus-escape-poverty-christian|title=Replace pictures of Jesus with Xi to escape poverty, Chinese villagers urged|last=Gan|first=Nectar|date=14 November 2017|newspaper=South China Morning Post|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190717174448/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2119699/praise-xi-jinping-not-jesus-escape-poverty-christian|archive-date=17 July 2019|access-date=26 July 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/14/jesus-wont-save-you-president-xi-jinping-will-chinese-christians-told/|title=Jesus won't save you – President Xi Jinping will, Chinese Christians told|last=Denyer|first=Simon|date=14 November 2017|newspaper={{wipe|The Washington Post}}|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531100111/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/14/jesus-wont-save-you-president-xi-jinping-will-chinese-christians-told/|archive-date=31 May 2019|access-date=7 September 2019}}</ref><ref name="guardianJesus">{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/28/we-are-scared-but-we-have-jesus-china-and-its-war-on-christianity|title='We are scared, but we have Jesus': China and its war on Christianity|last=Haas|first=Benjamin|date=28 September 2018|work={{wipe|The Guardian}}|access-date=7 September 2019|language=en-GB|issn=0261-3077|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190823155226/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/28/we-are-scared-but-we-have-jesus-china-and-its-war-on-christianity|archive-date=23 August 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> According to local social media, officials "transformed them from believing in religion to believing in the party".<ref name="scmpJesus" /> According to activists, "Xi is waging the most severe systematic suppression of Christianity in the country since religious freedom was written into the Chinese constitution in 1982", and according to pastors and a group that monitors religion in China, has involved "destroying crosses, burning bibles, shutting churches and ordering followers to sign papers renouncing their faith".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.apnews.com/c09b2ee4b71540c8a7fd6178820c5970|title=Group: Officials destroying crosses, burning bibles in China|last=Bodeen|first=Christopher|date=10 September 2018|publisher=Associated Press|access-date=7 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191008144601/https://www.apnews.com/c09b2ee4b71540c8a7fd6178820c5970|archive-date=8 October 2019|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Under Xi, the CCP has embraced assimilationist policies towards ethnic minorities, scaling back affirmative action in the country by 2019,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lau |first=Mimi |date=5 December 2019 |title=From Xinjiang to Ningxia, China's ethnic groups face end to affirmative action in education, taxes, policing |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3040577/chinas-ethnic-groups-face-end-affirmative-action-education |access-date=14 March 2023}}</ref> and scrapping a wording in October 2021 that guaranteed the rights of minority children to be educated in their native language, replacing it with one that emphasized teaching the national language.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Zhai |first=Keith |date=8 October 2021 |title=China's Communist Party Formally Embraces Assimilationist Approach to Ethnic Minorities |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-communist-party-formally-embraces-assimilationist-approach-to-ethnic-minorities-11633702544 |access-date=14 March 2023}}</ref> In 2020, Chen Xiaojiang was appointed as head of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission, the first Han Chinese head of the body since 1954.<ref name="pear">{{cite news |author1=Linda, Lew |date=19 December 2020 |title=China puts Han official in charge of ethnic minority affairs as Beijing steps up push for integration |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3114638/china-puts-han-official-charge-ethnic-minority-affairs-beijing |access-date=9 October 2021}}</ref> On 24 June 2022, Pan Yue, another Han Chinese, became the head of the commission, with him reportedly holding assimilationist policies toward ethnic minorities.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Aaron |first=Glasserman |date=2 March 2023 |title=China's Head of Ethnic Affairs Is Keen to End Minority Culture |work=Foreign Policy |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/02/china-minorities-uyghur-racism/ |access-date=12 March 2023}}</ref> Xi outlined his official views relations between the majority Han Chinese and ethnic minorities by saying "[n]either Han chauvinism nor local ethnic chauvinism is conducive to the development of a community for the Chinese nation".<ref>{{Cite news |date=28 August 2021 |title=Xi Focus: Xi stresses high-quality development of Party's work on ethnic affairs |work=Xinhua News Agency |url=http://www.news.cn/english/2021-08/28/c_1310154568.htm |access-date=19 March 2023}}</ref>

==== Xinjiang ====
[[File:Xi Jinping Entrance Hall at the XUAR Museum.jpg|thumb|Xi Jinping's picture at the entrance hall of the Xinjiang Museum in Ürümqi, August 2018]]
Following several terrorist attacks in [[Place:Xinjiang|Xinjiang]] in 2013 and 2014, the CCP leaders held a secret meeting to find a solution to the attacks,<ref name=":5">{{Cite magazine |last=Khatchadourian |first=Raffi |date=5 April 2021 |title=Surviving the Crackdown in Xinjiang |magazine=The New Yorker |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang |access-date=19 March 2023}}</ref> leading to Xi to launch the [[Religion:Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism|Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism]] in 2014, which involved mass detention, and surveillance of ethnic Uyghurs there.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221202/https://www.ft.com/content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77|archive-date=11 December 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Fear and oppression in Xinjiang: China's war on Uighur culture|last=Shepherd|first=Christian|date=12 September 2019|work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]]|access-date=19 January 2020}}</ref><ref name="Ramzy-2019" /> Xi made an inspection tour in Xinjiang between 27 and 30 April in 2014.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://english.agri.gov.cn/news/dqnf/201405/t20140504_21806.htm|title=President Xi Jinping makes inspection tour in Xinjiang|date=4 May 2014|access-date=7 April 2020|publisher=Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China (from Xinhua News Agency)|quote=Xi made an inspection tour in Xinjiang from April 27 to 30.|archive-date=7 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200407004304/http://english.agri.gov.cn/news/dqnf/201405/t20140504_21806.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref> The program was massively expanded in 2016, after the appointment of [[Biography:Chen Quanguo|Chen Quanguo]] as the Xinjiang CCP secretary. The campaign included the detainment of 1.8 million people in [[Religion:Xinjiang internment camps|internment camps]], mostly Uyghurs but also including other ethnic and religious minorities, by 2020,<ref name=":5" /> and a birth suppression campaign that led to a large drop in the Uyghur birth rate by 2019.<ref name="apne_Chin">{{cite news |date=28 June 2020 |title=China cuts Uighur births with IUDs, abortion, sterilization |publisher=Associated Press |url=https://apnews.com/article/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c |url-status=live |access-date=18 December 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201216200613/https://apnews.com/article/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c |archive-date=16 December 2020}}</ref> Various human rights groups and former inmates have described the camps as "concentration camps", where Uyghurs and other minorities have been forcibly assimilated into China's majority ethnic Han society.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/11/more-than-20-ambassadors-condemn-chinas-treatment-of-uighurs-in-xinjiang|title=More than 20 ambassadors condemn China's treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang|date=11 July 2019|newspaper={{wipe|The Guardian}}|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190711031342/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/11/more-than-20-ambassadors-condemn-chinas-treatment-of-uighurs-in-xinjiang|archive-date=11 July 2019|access-date=11 July 2019}}</ref> This program has been called a [[Religion:Uyghur genocide|genocide]] by some observers, while a report by the UN Human Rights Office said they may amount to crimes against humanity.<ref>{{cite news |date=10 December 2021 |title=China's Xi responsible for Uyghur 'genocide', unofficial tribunal says |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-responsible-uyghur-genocide-unofficial-tribunal-says-2021-12-10/ |access-date=24 October 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |date=1 September 2022 |title=U.N. says China may have committed crimes against humanity in Xinjiang |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/outgoing-un-human-rights-chief-says-serious-human-rights-violations-committed-2022-08-31/ |access-date=24 October 2022}}</ref>

Internal Chinese government documents leaked to the press in November 2019 showed that Xi personally ordered a security crackdown in Xinjiang, saying that the party must show "absolutely no mercy" and that officials use all the "weapons of the [[Social:People's democratic dictatorship|people's democratic dictatorship]]" to suppress those "infected with the virus of extremism".<ref name="Ramzy-2019">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|title='Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims|last1=Ramzy|first1=Austin|last2=Buckley|first2=Chris|date=16 November 2019|newspaper={{wipe|The New York Times}}|access-date=6 December 2019}}</ref><ref name="hongkongFPHuawei">{{cite news|url=https://www.hongkongfp.com/2020/01/19/huaweis-human-rights-record-needs-scrutiny-britain-signs-5g-contracts/|title=Huawei's human rights record needs scrutiny before Britain signs 5G contracts|last=Tugendhat|first=Tom|date=19 January 2020|newspaper=Hong Kong Free Press|access-date=19 January 2020}}</ref> The papers also showed that Xi repeatedly discussed about [[Religion:Islamic extremism|Islamic extremism]] in his speeches, likening it to a "virus" or a "drug" that could be only addressed by "a period of painful, interventionary treatment."<ref name="Ramzy-2019" /> However, he also warned against the discrimination against Uyghurs and rejected proposals to eradicate Islam in China, calling that kind of viewpoint "biased, even wrong".<ref name="Ramzy-2019" /> Xi's exact role in the building of internment camps has not been publicly reported, though he's widely believed to be behind them and his words have been the source for major justifications in the crackdown in Xinjiang.<ref name="Economist-2022a" /><ref>{{Cite news |last=Chin |first=Josh |date=30 November 2021 |title=Leaked Documents Detail Xi Jinping's Extensive Role in Xinjiang Crackdown |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/leaked-documents-detail-xi-jinpings-extensive-role-in-xinjiang-crackdown-11638284709 |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660}}</ref> In the [[Xinjiang Police Files]] leaked in 2022, a document quoting Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi suggested that Xi had been aware of the internment camps.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Zenz |first=Adrian |date=24 May 2022 |title=Public Security Minister's Speech Describes Xi Jinping's Direction of Mass Detentions in Xinjiang |url=https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/public-security-ministers-speech-describes-xi-jinpings-direction-of-mass |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=ChinaFile |language=en}}</ref>

===COVID-19 pandemic===
{{See also|Chinese government response to COVID-19|COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China}}On 20 January 2020, Xi commented for the first time on the emerging COVID-19 pandemic in Wuhan, and ordered "efforts to curb the spread" of the virus.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Griffiths |first=James |date=17 February 2020 |title=Did Xi Jinping know about the coronavirus outbreak earlier than first suggested? |url=https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/17/asia/china-coronavirus-xi-jinping-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=CNN}}</ref> He gave premier Li Keqiang some responsibility over the COVID-19 response, in what has been suggested by ''The Wall Street Journal'' was an attempt to potentially insulate himself from criticism if the response failed.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Page |first=Jeremy |date=27 January 2020 |title=China's Xi Gives His No. 2 a Rare Chance to Shine in Coronavirus Fight, With Risks for Both |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-gives-his-no-2-a-rare-chance-to-shine-in-coronavirus-fight-with-risks-for-both-11580138767 |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660}}</ref> The government initially responded to the pandemic with a lockdown and censorship, with the initial response causing widespread backlash within China.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Griffiths |first=James |title=Wuhan is the latest crisis to face China's Xi, and it's exposing major flaws in his model of control |url=https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/23/asia/wuhan-china-coronavirus-sars-response-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=29 August 2022 |website=CNN|date=24 January 2020 }}</ref> He met with Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), on 28 January.<ref name="Steger-2020">{{Cite web |last=Steger |first=Isabella |date=10 February 2020 |title=Xi Jinping emerges to meet the people for the first time in China's coronavirus outbreak |url=https://qz.com/1799914/xi-jinping-appears-in-public-after-long-absence-during-coronavirus/ |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=Quartz |language=en}}</ref> ''Der Spiegel'' reported that in January 2020 Xi pressured Tedros Adhanom to hold off on issuing a [[Social:Public Health Emergency of International Concern|global warning]] about the outbreak of COVID-19 and hold back information on human-to-human transmission of the virus, allegations denied by the WHO.<ref>{{cite news |date=10 May 2020 |title=WHO dementiert Telefongespräch mit Chinas Präsident |language=de |website=Der Spiegel |url=https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/corona-ausbruch-who-dementiert-telefongespraech-mit-chinas-praesident-a-37678f1c-6960-453c-a317-8ef9feed8b7c}}</ref> On 5 February, Xi met with Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen in Beijing, the first foreign leader allowed into China since the outbreak.<ref name="Steger-2020" /> After the COVID-19 outbreak got under control in Wuhan, Xi visited the city on 10 March.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Yew |first1=Lun Tian |last2=Se |first2=Young Lee |date=10 March 2022 |title=Xi visits Wuhan, signaling tide turning in China's coronavirus battle |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-idUSKBN20X01F |access-date=13 August 2022}}</ref>

[[File:Sergio Mattarella and Xi Jinping 2019.jpg|left|thumb|225x225px|Italian president Sergio Mattarella with Xi in March 2019]]

After getting the outbreak in Wuhan under control, Xi has favoured what has officially been termed "dynamic zero-COVID policy"<ref>{{Cite web |last=Cao |first=Desheng |title=Xi: Dynamic zero-COVID policy works |url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202206/30/WS62bcd80ea310fd2b29e6962b.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=China Daily}}</ref> that aims to control and suppress the virus as much as possible within the country's borders. This has involved local lockdowns and mass-testing.<ref name="Wong-2022">{{Cite news |last=Wong |first=Chun Han |date=25 July 2022 |title=China's Zero-Covid Policy Drags on Vaccination Drive |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-zero-covid-policy-drags-on-vaccination-drive-11658745899 |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660}}</ref> While initially credited for China's suppression of the COVID-19 outbreak, the policy was later criticized by foreign and some domestic observers for being out of touch with the rest of the world and taking a heavy toll on the economy.<ref name="Wong-2022" /> This approach has especially come under criticism during a 2022 lockdown on Shanghai, which forced millions to their homes and damaged the city's economy,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Davidson |first=Helen |date=10 June 2022 |title=Xi Jinping says 'persistence is victory' as Covid restrictions return to Shanghai and Beijing |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/xi-jinping-says-persistence-is-victory-as-covid-restrictions-return-to-shanghai-and-beijing |access-date=29 August 2022 |website={{wipe|The Guardian}} |language=en}}</ref> denting the image of Li Qiang, close Xi ally and Party secretary of the city.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Hadano |first1=Tsukasa |last2=Doi |first2=Noriyuki |date=29 June 2022 |title=Xi ally Li Qiang keeps Shanghai party chief job, but star fades |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Xi-ally-Li-Qiang-keeps-Shanghai-party-chief-job-but-star-fades |access-date=29 August 2022 |work=Nikkei Asia |language=en-GB}}</ref> Conversely, Xi has said that the policy was designed to protect people's life safety.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Cai |first1=Jane |last2=Tang |first2=Frank |date=29 June 2022 |title=China to press on with 'zero Covid', despite economic risks: Xi |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3183550/china-press-zero-covid-despite-economic-risks-president-xi |access-date=13 August 2022 |work=South China Morning Post |language=en}}</ref> On 23 July 2022, the National Health Commission reported that Xi and other top leaders have taken the local COVID-19 vaccines.<ref>{{Cite news |date=23 July 2022 |title=Covid in China: Xi Jinping and other leaders given domestic vaccine |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-62279377 |access-date=13 August 2022}}</ref>

At the 20th CCP Congress, Xi confirmed the continuation of the zero-COVID policy,<ref>{{cite news |last=McDonell |first=Stephen |date=16 October 2022 |title=Xi Jinping speech: Zero-Covid and zero solutions |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-63274391 |access-date=11 November 2022}}</ref> stating he would "unswervingly" carry out "dynamic zero-COVID" and promising to "resolutely win the battle,"<ref>{{Cite news |date=17 December 2022 |title=Xi Jinping tied himself to zero-Covid. Now he keeps silent as it falls apart |work=CNN |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/16/china/china-zero-covid-uturn-xi-jinping-intl-hnk-mic/index.html |access-date=16 December 2022}}</ref> though China started a limited easing of the policies in the following weeks.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ramzy |first=Austin |date=11 November 2022 |title=China Eases Zero-Covid Rules as Economic Toll and Frustrations Mount |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-eases-some-covid-19-rules-even-as-cases-pass-10-000-11668150369 |access-date=11 November 2022}}</ref> In November 2022, protests broke out against China's COVID-19 policies, with a fire in a high-rise apartment building in Ürümqi being the trigger.<ref name="Che-2022">{{Cite news |last1=Che |first1=Chang |last2=Buckley |first2=Chris |last3=Chien |first3=Amy Chang |last4=Dong |first4=Joy |date=2022-12-05 |title=China Stems Wave of Protest, but Ripples of Resistance Remain |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/05/world/asia/china-covid-protests.html |access-date=2022-12-05 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> The protests were held in multiple major cities, with some of the protesters demanding the end of Xi's and the CCP's rule.<ref name="Che-2022" /> The protests were mostly suppressed by December,<ref name="Che-2022" /> though the government further eased COVID-19 restrictions in the time since.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Olcott |first1=Eleanor |last2=Mitchell |first2=Tom |date=4 December 2022 |title=Chinese cities ease Covid restrictions following nationwide protests |work=[[Social:Financial Times|Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/bfbc7afb-3994-4e4c-b649-ca791675b296 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221218/https://www.ft.com/content/bfbc7afb-3994-4e4c-b649-ca791675b296 |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=5 December 2022 }}</ref> On 7 December 2022, China announced large-scale changes to its COVID-19 policy, including allowing quarantine at home for mild infections, reducing of [[Biology:Polymerase chain reaction|PCR testing]], and decreasing the power of local officials to implement lockdowns.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Che |first1=Chang |last2=Chien |first2=Amy Chang |last3=Stevenson |first3=Alexandra |date=2022-12-07 |title=What Has Changed About China's 'Zero Covid' Policy |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/07/world/asia/china-zero-covid-changes.html |access-date=2022-12-08 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

===Environmental policy===

In September 2020, Xi announced that China will "strengthen its 2030 climate target (NDC), peak emissions before 2030 and aim to achieve [[Chemistry:Carbon neutrality|carbon neutrality]] before 2060".<ref name="CAT-2020" /> If accomplished, this would lower the expected rise in global temperature by 0.2–0.3&nbsp;°C – "the biggest single reduction ever estimated by the Climate Action Tracker".<ref name="CAT-2020">{{cite web |date=23 September 2020 |title=China going carbon neutral before 2060 would lower warming projections by around 0.2 to 0.3 degrees C |url=https://climateactiontracker.org/press/china-carbon-neutral-before-2060-would-lower-warming-projections-by-around-2-to-3-tenths-of-a-degree/ |access-date=27 September 2020 |website=Climate Action Tracker}}</ref> Xi mentioned the link between the COVID-19 pandemic and nature destruction as one of the reasons for the decision, saying that "Humankind can no longer afford to ignore the repeated warnings of nature."<ref>{{cite news |date=23 September 2020 |title=China, the world's top global emitter, aims to go carbon-neutral by 2060 |work=ABC News |publisher= |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-23/china-world-top-global-emitter-aims-carbon-neutral-by-2060/12691974 |access-date=29 September 2020}}</ref> On 27 September, Chinese scientists presented a detailed plan how to achieve the target.<ref>{{cite news |date=29 September 2020 |title=China's top climate scientists unveil road map to 2060 goal |newspaper=The Japan Times |agency={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/09/29/asia-pacific/science-health-asia-pacific/china-climate-change-road-map-2060/ |access-date=29 September 2020}}</ref> In September 2021, Xi announced that China will not build "coal-fired power projects abroad, which was said to be potentially "pivotal" in reducing emissions. The Belt and Road Initiative did not include financing such projects already in the first half of 2021.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Brant |first1=Robin |date=22 September 2021 |title=China pledges to stop building new coal energy plants abroad |work=BBC News |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58647481 |access-date=29 September 2021}}</ref>

Xi has popularized a metaphor of "two mountains" to emphasize the importance of environmental protection.<ref name=":03">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=David Daokui |title=China's World View: Demystifying China to Prevent Global Conflict |date=2024 |publisher=W. W. Norton & Company |isbn=978-0393292398 |location=New York, NY |author-link=David Daokui Li}}</ref>{{Rp|page=164}} The concept is that a mountain made of gold or silver is valuable, but green mountains with clear waters are more valuable.<ref name=":03" />{{Rp|page=164}} The slogan's meaning is that economic development priorities must also provide for economic protection.<ref name=":03" />{{Rp|page=164}}

Xi Jinping did not attend COP26 personally. However, a Chinese delegation led by climate change envoy Xie Zhenhua did attend.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Faulconbridge |first=Guy |date=15 October 2021 |title=China's Xi will not attend COP26 in person, UK PM Johnson told |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |publisher= |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/chinas-xi-snub-cop26-uk-pm-johnson-told-times-2021-10-15/ |access-date=20 August 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Harvey |first=Fiona |date=10 November 2021 |title=China's top Cop26 delegate says it is taking 'real action' on climate targets |work={{wipe|The Guardian}} |url=https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/nov/10/chinas-top-cop26-delegate-says-it-is-taking-real-action-on-climate-targets |access-date=11 November 2022}}</ref> During the conference, the United States and China agreed on a framework to reduce GHG emission by co-operating on different measures.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Volcovici |first1=Valeria |last2=James |first2=William |last3=Spring |first3=Jake |date=11 November 2021 |title=U.S. and China unveil deal to ramp up cooperation on climate change |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |publisher= |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/china-us-make-joint-statement-cop26-climate-summit-2021-11-10 |access-date=11 November 2021}}</ref>

===Governance style===
Known as a very secretive leader, little is known publicly about how Xi makes political decisions, or how he came to power.<ref name="Economist-2022b">{{Cite news |date=28 September 2022 |title=An investigation into what has shaped Xi Jinping's thinking |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/09/28/an-investigation-into-what-has-shaped-xi-jinpings-thinking |access-date=30 September 2022 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref><ref name="Myers-2018">{{Cite news |last=Myers |first=Steven Lee |date=5 March 2018 |title=Behind Public Persona, the Real Xi Jinping Is a Guarded Secret |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-leader.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Xi's speeches generally get released months or years after they are made.<ref name="Economist-2022b" /> Xi has also never given a press conference since becoming paramount leader, except in rare joint press conferences with foreign leaders.<ref name="Economist-2022b" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=McGregor |first=Richard |date=21 August 2022 |title=Xi Jinping's Radical Secrecy |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/08/china-xi-jinping-biography-opacity/671195/ |access-date=21 August 2022 |website=The Atlantic |language=en}}</ref> ''The Wall Street Journal'' reported that Xi prefers micromanaging in governance, in contrast to previous leaders such as Hu Jintao who left details of major policies to lower-ranking officials.<ref name="Chin-2021" /> Reportedly, ministerial officials try to get Xi's attention in various ways, with some creating slide shows and audio reports. ''The Wall Street Journal'' also reported that Xi created a performance-review system in 2018 to give evaluations on officials on various measures, including loyalty.<ref name="Chin-2021" /> According to ''The Economist'', Xi's orders have generally been vague, leaving lower level officials to interpret his words.<ref name="Economist-2022a">{{Cite news |title=Even in secret, China's leaders speak in code |newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2022/01/01/even-in-secret-chinas-leaders-speak-in-code |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> Chinese state media Xinhua News Agency said that Xi "personally reviews every draft of major policy documents" and "all reports submitted to him, no matter how late in the evening, were returned with instructions the following morning".<ref name="Blachard-2017">{{Cite news |last=Blachard |first=Ben |date=17 November 2017 |title=Glowing profile cracks door open on private life of China's Xi |language=en |publisher={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-xi-idUSKBN1DH0GA |access-date=9 December 2019}}</ref> With regard to behavior of Communist Party members, Xi emphasizes the "Two Musts" (members must not be arrogant or rash and must keep their hard-working spirit) and the "Six Nos" (members must say no to formalism, bureaucracy, gift-giving, luxurious birthday celebrations, hedonism, and extravagance).<ref name=":7" />{{Rp|page=52}} Xi called for officials to practice [[Social:Self-criticism (Marxism–Leninism)|self-criticism]] which, according to observers, is in order to appear less corrupt and more popular among the people.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Forde |first1=Brendan |date=9 September 2013 |title=China's 'Mass Line' Campaign |work=The Diplomat |url=https://thediplomat.com/2013/09/chinas-mass-line-campaign-2/ |url-status=live |access-date=23 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624035650/https://thediplomat.com/2013/09/chinas-mass-line-campaign-2/ |archive-date=24 June 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Levin |first1=Dan |date=20 December 2013 |title=China Revives Mao-Era Self-Criticism, but This Kind Bruises Few Egos |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/asia/china-revives-mao-era-self-criticism-but-this-kind-bruises-few-egos.html |url-status=live |access-date=23 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624010400/https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/asia/china-revives-mao-era-self-criticism-but-this-kind-bruises-few-egos.html |archive-date=24 June 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Tiezzi |first1=Shannon |date=27 December 2013 |title=The Mass Line Campaign in the 21st Century |work=The Diplomat |url=https://thediplomat.com/2013/12/the-mass-line-campaign-in-the-21st-century/ |url-status=live |access-date=23 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624010506/https://thediplomat.com/2013/12/the-mass-line-campaign-in-the-21st-century/ |archive-date=24 June 2018}}</ref>

==Political positions==

===Chinese Dream===
[[File:Lujiazui 2016.jpg|thumb|According to ''Qiushi'', the Chinese Dream is about Chinese prosperity, collective effort, socialism, and national glory.]]

Xi and CCP ideologues coined the phrase "Chinese Dream" to describe his overarching plans for China as its leader. Xi first used the phrase during a high-profile visit to the National Museum of China on 29 November 2012, where he and his Standing Committee colleagues were attending a "national revival" exhibition. Since then, the phrase has become the signature political slogan of the Xi era.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/leaders/2013/05/04/xi-jinping-and-the-chinese-dream|title=Xi Jinping and the Chinese dream|date=4 May 2013|newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]]|access-date=12 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160510092423/http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21577070-vision-chinas-new-president-should-serve-his-people-not-nationalist-state-xi-jinping|archive-date=10 May 2016|issn=0013-0613}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9935609/Xi-Jinping-calls-for-a-Chinese-Dream.html|title=Xi Jinping calls for a Chinese dream|last1=Moore|first1=Malcolm|date=17 March 2013|work=The Daily Telegraph|access-date=20 March 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130320072154/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9935609/Xi-Jinping-calls-for-a-Chinese-Dream.html|archive-date=20 March 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> The origin of the term "Chinese Dream" is unclear. While the phrase has been used before by journalists and scholars,<ref name="atlantic2">{{cite news|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/todays-china-notes-dreams-obstacles/275544/|title=Today's China Notes: Dreams, Obstacles|last=Fallows|first=James|date=3 May 2013|work=The Atlantic|access-date=7 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180712023142/https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/todays-china-notes-dreams-obstacles/275544/|archive-date=12 July 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> some publications have posited the term likely drew its inspiration from the concept of the [[Philosophy:American Dream|American Dream]].<ref name="economist22">{{cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/05/chinese-dream-0|title=The role of Thomas Friedman|last=M.|first=J.|date=6 May 2013|newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]]|access-date=12 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171028145059/https://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/05/chinese-dream-0|archive-date=28 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> ''The Economist'' noted the abstract and seemingly accessible nature of the concept with no specific overarching policy stipulations may be a deliberate departure from the jargon-heavy ideologies of his predecessors.<ref name="Economist-2013">{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21577063-chinas-new-leader-has-been-quick-consolidate-his-power-what-does-he-now-want-his|title=Chasing the Chinese dream |date=4 May 2013|newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]]|access-date=12 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161028080732/http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21577063-chinas-new-leader-has-been-quick-consolidate-his-power-what-does-he-now-want-his|archive-date=28 October 2016|issn=0013-0613}}</ref> Xi has linked the "Chinese Dream" with the phrase "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tao |first=Xie |date=14 March 2014 |title=Opinion: Is the Chinese dream fantasy or reality? |url=https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/14/world/asia/chinese-dream-anniversary-xi-jinping-president/index.html |access-date=14 August 2022 |website=CNN}}</ref>{{efn|{{zh|links=no|s=中华民族伟大复兴}}, which can also be translated as the "Great Renaissance of the Chinese nation" or the "Great revival of the Chinese people".}}

===Cultural revival===
In recent years, top political leaders of the CCP such as Xi have overseen the rehabilitation of ancient Chinese philosophical figures like [[Biography:Han Fei|Han Fei]] into the mainstream of Chinese thought alongside [[Philosophy:Confucianism|Confucianism]]. At a meeting with other officials in 2013, he quoted [[Biography:Confucius|Confucius]], saying "he who rules by virtue is like the Pole Star, it maintains its place, and the multitude of stars pay homage." While visiting Shandong, the birthplace of Confucius, in November, he told scholars that the Western world was "suffering a crisis of confidence" and that the CCP has been "the loyal inheritor and promoter of China's outstanding traditional culture."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/world/leader-taps-into-chinese-classics-in-seeking-to-cement-power.html|title=Leader Taps into Chinese Classics in Seeking to Cement Power|last=Buckley|first=Chris|date=12 October 2014|newspaper={{wipe|The New York Times}}|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190912091736/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/world/leader-taps-into-chinese-classics-in-seeking-to-cement-power.html|archive-date=12 September 2019|access-date=7 September 2019}}</ref>

According to several analysts, Xi's leadership has been characterised by a resurgence of the ancient political philosophy [[Philosophy:Legalism (Chinese philosophy)|Legalism]].<ref name=tni-cnl>{{cite journal |last1=Schneider |first1=David K. |title=China's New Legalism |journal=The National Interest |date=2016 |issue=143 |pages=19–25 |doi= |jstor=26557304 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Crane |first1=Sam |title=Why Xi Jinping's China is Legalist, Not Confucian |url=https://chinachannel.org/2018/06/29/legalism/ |website=China Channel |date=29 June 2018 |access-date=24 November 2020 |archive-date=7 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201107225951/https://chinachannel.org/2018/06/29/legalism/ |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name=tdma/> Han Fei gained new prominence with favourable citations; one sentence of Han Fei's that Xi quoted appeared thousands of times in official Chinese media at the local, provincial, and national levels.<ref name=tdma>{{cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/is-chinas-machiavelli-now-its-most-important-political-philosopher/|title=Is 'China's Machiavelli' Now Its Most Important Political Philosopher?|last=Mitchell|first=Ryan Mi|date=16 January 2015|newspaper=The Diplomat|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190912091739/https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/is-chinas-machiavelli-now-its-most-important-political-philosopher/|archive-date=12 September 2019|access-date=7 September 2019}}</ref> Xi has additionally supported the [[Philosophy:Neo-Confucianism|Neo-Confucian]] philosopher [[Biography:Wang Yangming|Wang Yangming]], telling local leaders to promote him.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Johnson |first=Ian |date=18 October 2017 |title=Forget Marx and Mao. Chinese City Honors Once-Banned Confucian. |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The New York Times}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/world/asia/china-guiyang-wang-yangming-confucian.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

Xi has also overseen a revival of traditional Chinese culture, breaking from the CCP's previous path, which had often attacked it.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/china/2017/08/17/the-communist-party-is-redefining-what-it-means-to-be-chinese|title=The Communist Party is redefining what it means to be Chinese|date=17 August 2017|newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]]|access-date=23 January 2020}}</ref> He has called traditional culture the "soul" of the nation and the "foundation" of the CCP's culture.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Zi |first=Yang |date=6 July 2016 |title=Xi Jinping and China's Traditionalist Restoration |work=The Jamestown Foundation |publisher= |url=https://jamestown.org/program/xi-jinping-chinas-traditionalist-restoration/ |access-date=23 January 2020}}</ref> Xi has also called for integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China's traditional culture.<ref name=":12" /> Hanfu, the traditional dress of Han Chinese, has seen a revival under him, associated with the revival of traditional culture.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.afr.com/life-and-luxury/fashion-and-style/why-its-hip-to-be-oldfashioned-in-china-20181129-h18hql|title=China's 'Hanfu' movement is making it hip to be old-fashioned. Here's why.|last=Buckley|first=Chris|date=30 November 2018|work=The Australian Financial Review|access-date=23 January 2020}}</ref> He has established the "four matters of confidence", which has later been added to the CCP constitution, calling for CCP members, government officials and the Chinese people to be "confident in our chosen path, confident in our guiding theories, confident in our political system, and confident in our culture". He has unveiled Global Civilisation initiative in 2023, calling for "respecting the diversity of civilisations, advocating the common values of humanity, valuing the inheritance and innovation of civilisations, and strengthening international people-to-people exchanges and cooperation"<ref name=":12" />

===Ideology===

Xi has said that "only socialism can save China".<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tian |first=Yew Lun |date=9 September 2021 |title=Analysis: Unleashing reforms, Xi returns to China's socialist roots |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/unleashing-reforms-xi-returns-chinas-socialist-roots-2021-09-09/ |access-date=17 September 2022}}</ref> Xi has also declared socialism with Chinese characteristics to be the "only correct path to realize national rejuvenation".<ref>{{Cite web |date=9 October 2021 |title=Socialism with Chinese characteristics only correct path toward national rejuvenation: Xi |url=http://ex.chinadaily.com.cn/exchange/partners/82/rss/channel/www/columns/np4922/stories/WS61610570a310cdd39bc6dcc1.html |access-date=17 September 2022 |website=China Daily}}</ref> According to BBC News, while the CCP was perceived to have abandoned its communist ideology since it initiated economic reforms in the 1970s, Xi is believed by some observers to be more believing in the "idea of a communist project",<ref>{{Cite news |last=McDonell |first=Stephen |date=22 September 2021 |title=Changing China: Xi Jinping's effort to return to socialism |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-58579831 |access-date=17 September 2022}}</ref> being described as a Marxist–Leninist by former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Rudd |first=Kevin |date=10 October 2022 |title=The World According to Xi Jinping |language=en-US |work=Foreign Affairs |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/world-according-xi-jinping-china-ideologue-kevin-rudd |access-date=12 October 2022}}</ref> Xi's emphasis on prioritizing ideology has included re-asserting the Party's goal of eventually realizing communism and reprimanding those who dismiss communism as impractical or irrelevant.{{sfn|Pieke|Hofman|2022|p=48}} Xi described the communist ideal as the "calcium" in a Party member's spine, without which the Party member would suffer the "osteoporosis" of political decay and be unable to stand upright.{{sfn|Pieke|Hofman|2022|p=48}}

Subscribing to the view that socialism will eventually triumph over capitalism, Xi has said "Marx and Engels's [[Philosophy:Dialectical materialism|analysis of the basic contradictions]] of [[Finance:Capitalist mode of production (Marxist theory)|capitalist society]] is not outdated, nor is the [[Philosophy:Historical materialism|historical materialist view]] that capitalism is bound to die out and socialism bound to win".<ref name="Hancock-2022">{{Cite web |last=Hancock |first=Tom |date=6 June 2022 |title=Marxism Makes a Comeback in China's Crackdown on 'Disorderly Capital' |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-06-06/marxism-makes-a-comeback-in-china-s-crackdown-on-disorderly-capital |access-date=17 September 2022 |website={{wipe|Bloomberg News}}}}</ref> Xi has overseen the increase of "Socialist Political Economy With Chinese Characteristics" as a major study topic for academics in China, aiming to decrease the influence of Western-influenced economics.<ref name="Hancock-2022" /> Though he has called a stop to what he considers to be "disorderly expansion of capital", he has also said that "it is necessary to stimulate the vitality of capital of all types, including nonpublic capital, and give full play to its positive role".<ref name="Hancock-2022" />

{{Quote box
| quote = China's success proves that socialism is not dead. It is thriving. Just imagine this: had socialism failed in China, had our communist party collapsed like the party in the Soviet Union, then global socialism would lapse into a long dark age. And communism, like Karl Marx once said, would be a haunting spectre lingering in limbo.
| source = — Xi Jinping during a speech in 2018<ref name=":12bb" />
| align = right
| width = 25em
}}

Xi has supported greater CCP control over the PRC, saying "government, the military, society and schools, north, south, east and west – the party leads them all".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gan |first=Nectar |date=25 October 2017 |title=The Communist Party's tighter grip on China in 16 characters |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2116836/xi-jinping-thought-communist-partys-tighter-grip-china |access-date=14 August 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en}}</ref> During the 100th anniversary of the CCP in 2021, he said that "without the Communist Party of China, there would be no new China and no national rejuvenation", and that "the leadership of the Party is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics and constitutes the greatest strength of this system".<ref name="Nikkei Asia-2021">{{Cite web |date=1 July 2021 |title=Full text of Xi Jinping's speech on the CCP's 100th anniversary |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Full-text-of-Xi-Jinping-s-speech-on-the-CCP-s-100th-anniversary |access-date=14 August 2022 |website=Nikkei Asia |language=en-GB}}</ref> He has said that China, despite many setbacks, has achieved great progress under the CCP, saying that "socialism with Chinese characteristics has become the standard-bearer of 21st-century socialist development".<ref name=":12bb">{{Cite web |last=Zheng |first=William |date=16 September 2022 |title=Xi article gives insight into China's direction ahead of party congress |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3192677/xi-article-gives-insight-chinas-direction-ahead-party-congress |access-date=17 September 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en}}</ref> However, he has also warned that it will take a long time for China under the CCP to complete its rejuvenation, and during this timeframe, party members must be vigilant to not let CCP rule collapse.<ref name=":12bb" />

Xi has ruled out a [[Social:Multi-party system|multi-party system]] for China, saying that "constitutional monarchy, imperial restoration, parliamentarism, a multi-party system and a presidential system, we considered them, tried them, but none worked".<ref>{{Cite news |date=2 April 2014 |title=Xi says multi-party system didn't work for China |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-xi-idUSBREA3107S20140402 |access-date=13 August 2022}}</ref> However, Xi considers China to be a democracy, saying that "China's [[Social:Socialist democracy|socialist democracy]] is the most comprehensive, genuine and effective democracy".<ref name="Drinhausen-2009">{{Cite web |title=Democracy |url=https://decodingchina.eu/democracy/ |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=Decoding China |date=4 February 2021 |language=en-US}}</ref> China's definition of democracy is different from liberal democracies and is rooted in Marxism–Leninism, and is based on the phrases "[[Social:People's democratic dictatorship|people's democratic dictatorship]]" and "[[Social:Democratic centralism|democratic centralism]]".<ref name="Drinhausen-2009" /> Xi has additionally coined the term "whole-process people's democracy" which he said was about having "the people as masters".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Chen |first=Stella |date=23 November 2021 |title=Whole-Process Democracy |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/whole-process-democracy/ |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US}}</ref> Foreign analysts and observers have widely disputed that China is a democracy, saying that it is a one-party authoritarian state and Xi an authoritarian leader.{{refn|name=dictatorandauthoritarian|<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Brady|first=Anne-Marie|date=2015|title=China's Foreign Propaganda Machine|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/content/crossref/journals/journal_of_democracy/v026/26.4.brady.html|journal=Journal of Democracy|language=en|volume=26|issue=4|pages=51–59|doi=10.1353/jod.2015.0056|s2cid=146531927|issn=1086-3214}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Amako|first=Satoshi|date=2 January 2018|title=China's authoritarian path to development: is democratization possible?, by Liang Tang, Abingdon, Routledge, 2017, 263pp., {{text|ISBN}}: 978-1-138-01647-7|journal=Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies|volume=7|issue=1|pages=81–83|doi=10.1080/24761028.2018.1483700|issn=2476-1028|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Tung|first=Hans H.|title=Economic Growth and Endogenous Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Reform China|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2019|isbn=978-3-030-04828-0|location=|pages=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Howell|first1=Jude|last2=Pringle|first2=Tim|date=2019|title=Shades of Authoritarianism and State–Labour Relations in China|journal=British Journal of Industrial Relations|language=en|volume=57|issue=2|pages=223–246|doi=10.1111/bjir.12436|s2cid=158485609|issn=1467-8543|url=https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/29847/1/Howell%20and%20Pringle_Shades%20of%20Authoritarianism_British_Journal_of_Industrial_Relations.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Düben|first=Björn Alexander|date=3 March 2020|title=Xi Jinping and the End of Chinese Exceptionalism|journal=Problems of Post-Communism|volume=67|issue=2|pages=111–128|doi=10.1080/10758216.2018.1535274|s2cid=158657283|issn=1075-8216}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Tung|first=Hans H.|title=Economic Growth and Endogenous Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Reform China|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2019|isbn=978-3-030-04828-0}}</ref>}} Some observers, including German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock,<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-09-16 |title=Germany's Baerbock calls China's Xi Jinping a dictator |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-foreign-minister-annalena-baerbock-calls-chinas-xi-jinping-a-dictator/ |access-date=2023-09-18 |website=POLITICO |language=en}}</ref> have called Xi a dictator, citing the large centralisation of power around him unseen compared to his predecessors.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Phillips |first=Tom |date=26 February 2018 |title='Dictator for life': Xi Jinping's power grab condemned as step towards tyranny |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Guardian}} |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/26/xi-jinping-china-presidential-limit-scrap-dictator-for-life |access-date=12 August 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Gueorguiev |first=Dimitar |date=4 December 2019 |title=Is China a dictatorship? |language=en-US |newspaper={{wipe|The Washington Post}} |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/04/michael-bloomberg-said-china-isnt-dictatorship-is-he-right/ |access-date=14 July 2021 |quote=Yes, Xi Jinping is a dictator.}}</ref> Xi has additionally rejected [[Social:Westernization|Westernisation]] as the only way to modernize, instead promoting what he says is "Chinese-style modernisation".<ref>{{Cite news |date=8 February 2023 |title=Xi Rejects Westernization in Show of Faith in Self Reliance |work={{wipe|Bloomberg News}} |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-08/xi-calls-for-china-s-modernization-path-to-surpass-capitalism |access-date=10 February 2023}}</ref> He has identified five concepts as part of Chinese-style modernisation, including modernisation of a huge population, common prosperity, material and cultural-ethical advancement, harmony between humanity and nature, and peaceful development.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Xi |first=Jinping |date=16 October 2022 |title=Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects |work=Qiushi |url=http://en.qstheory.cn/2023-01/06/c_845251.htm |access-date=10 February 2023}}</ref>

====Xi Jinping Thought====
{{main|Social:Xi Jinping Thought}}
[[File:A political slogan on the wall in Longhua District, Shenzhen, Guangdong, China, picture1.jpg|thumb|A billboard promoting Xi Jinping Thought in Shenzhen]]

In September 2017, the CCP Central Committee decided that Xi's political philosophies, generally referred to as "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era", would become part of the Party Constitution.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-09/18/c_1121683516.htm|script-title=zh:中共中央政治局召开会议 研究拟提请党的十八届七中全会讨论的文件-新华网|last1=Liu|first1=Xiaodong|last2=Chen|first2=Yu|date=18 September 2017|publisher=Xinhua News Agency|language=zh-hans|trans-title=The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Convened to Study the Documents to be Submitted to the Seventh Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011094706/http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-09/18/c_1121683516.htm|archive-date=11 October 2017|access-date=4 October 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2017/09/party-constitution-amendment-signal-xis-power/|title=CCP Constitution Amendment May Signal Xi's Power – China Digital Times (CDT)|last=Rudolph|first=Josh|date=19 September 2017|work=China Digital Times (CDT)|access-date=4 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171003234252/http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2017/09/party-constitution-amendment-signal-xis-power/|archive-date=3 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> Xi first made mention of the "Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" in his opening day speech delivered to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017. His Politburo Standing Committee colleagues, in their own reviews of Xi's keynote address at the Congress, prepended the name "Xi Jinping" in front of "Thought".<ref name="xithought2">{{cite news|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/19/c_136689808.htm|title=CPC creates Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era|last1=Zhang|first1=Ling|date=18 October 2017|work=Xinhua News Agency|access-date=19 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171018195301/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/19/c_136689808.htm|archive-date=18 October 2017|url-status=dead}}</ref> On 24 October 2017, at its closing session, the 19th Party Congress approved the incorporation of Xi Jinping Thought into the Constitution of the CCP,<ref name="PhillipsGuardian2" /> while in March 2018, the National People's Congress changed the state constitution to include Xi Jinping Thought.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ken |first=Suzuki |date=27 November 2018 |title=China's New "Xi Jinping Constitution": The Road to Totalitarianism |url=https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a05803/ |access-date=11 August 2022 |website=nippon.com |language=en}}</ref>

[[File:201901 Xi Jinping's books at Shanghai Library.jpg|left|thumb|''The Governance of China'' in different languages presented at Shanghai Library]]

Xi himself has described the Thought as part of the broad framework created around socialism with Chinese characteristics, a term coined by Deng Xiaoping that places China in the primary stage of socialism. In official party documentation and pronouncements by Xi's colleagues, the Thought is said to be a continuation of [[Social:Marxism–Leninism|Marxism–Leninism]], Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development, as part of a series of guiding ideologies that embody "Marxism adopted to Chinese conditions" and contemporary considerations.<ref name="xithought2" /> It has additionally been described as the "21st century Marxism" by two professors in the Central Party School of the CCP.<ref name="Page-2020" /> Wang Huning, a top political adviser and a close ally of Xi, has been described as pivotal to developing Xi Jinping Thought.<ref name="Page-2020" /> The concepts and context behind Xi Jinping Thought are elaborated in Xi's ''The Governance of China'' book series, published by the Foreign Languages Press for an international audience. Volume one was published in September 2014, followed by volume two in November 2017.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/07/c_136733705.htm|title=Second volume of Xi's book on governance published|last=Yang|first=Yi|date=7 November 2017|publisher=Xinhua News Agency|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171206143920/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/07/c_136733705.htm|archive-date=6 December 2017|access-date=6 December 2017}}</ref>

An app for teaching Xi Jinping Thought had become the most popular smartphone app in China in 2019, as the country's ruling CCP launched a new campaign that calls on its cadres to immerse themselves in the political doctrine every day. ''[[Software:Xuexi Qiangguo|Xuexi Qiangguo]]'' is now the most downloaded item on Apple's domestic App Store, surpassing in demand social media apps such as WeChat and TikTok.<ref name=scmp20100214>{{Cite news|url=https://www.scmp.com/tech/apps-social/article/2186037/chinas-most-popular-app-propaganda-tool-teaching-xi-jinping-thought|title=China's most popular app is a propaganda tool teaching Xi Jinping Thought|last=Huang|first=Zheping|date=14 February 2019|work=South China Morning Post|access-date=7 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190920105809/https://www.scmp.com/tech/apps-social/article/2186037/chinas-most-popular-app-propaganda-tool-teaching-xi-jinping-thought|archive-date=20 September 2019}}</ref> In 2021, the government included Xi Jinping Thought in the curriculum including to students from primary schools to university, which created pushback from parents. For much of the preceding 30 years, political ideology and communist doctrine were not a standard taught in Chinese schools until middle school, and textbooks featured a wider set of Chinese leaders with less emphasis on a single leader like Xi.<ref name="irishtimes202108292">{{cite news |last=Sun |first=Yu |date=29 August 2021 |title=Lessons on Xi Jinping's political philosophy alarm Chinese parents |work=Irish Times |url=https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/lessons-on-xi-jinping-s-political-philosophy-alarm-chinese-parents-1.4659194 |access-date=7 September 2021 |quote=A campaign to make Chinese children as young as 10 study President Xi Jinping's political philosophy has been labelled by some parents as 'disgusting', and evoked memories of Mao Zedong's personality cult.}}</ref>

==Personal life==
===Family===
[[File:Peng Liyuan, Xi Jinping and Barack Obama in the Lincoln Bedroom.jpg|thumb|Xi Jinping, Peng Liyuan and U.S. president Barack Obama in the Lincoln Bedroom]]
Xi's first marriage was to Ke Lingling, the daughter of Ke Hua, China's ambassador to the United Kingdom in the early 1980s. They divorced within a few years.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/07/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-profile/index.html|title=Xi Jinping: From 'sent-down youth' to China's top|last=Yuan|first=Elizabeth|date=8 November 2012|publisher=CNN|access-date=8 November 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121108195546/http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/07/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-profile/index.html|archive-date=8 November 2012}}</ref> The two were said to fight "almost every day", and after the divorce Ke moved to England.<ref name="newyorker2" /> In 1987, Xi married the prominent Chinese folk singer Peng Liyuan.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/23/world/fg-chileaders23|title=China's 'fifth generation' of leaders reflects nation's shifts|last=Magnier|first=Mark|date=23 October 2007|work={{wipe|Los Angeles Times}}|access-date=21 December 2009|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110823133224/http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/23/world/fg-chileaders23|archive-date=23 August 2011}}</ref> Xi and Peng were introduced by friends as many Chinese couples were in the 1980s. Xi was reputedly academic during their courtship, inquiring about singing techniques.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/02/13/peng-liyuan-meet-chinas-folk-song-singing-first-lady-in-waiting/|title=Meet China's Folk Star First Lady-in-Waiting|last=Page|first=Jeremy|date=12 February 2012|work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}}|access-date=7 November 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120511045002/http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/02/13/peng-liyuan-meet-chinas-folk-song-singing-first-lady-in-waiting/|archive-date=11 May 2012}}</ref> Peng Liyuan, a household name in China, was better known to the public than Xi until his political elevation. The couple frequently lived apart due largely to their separate professional lives. Peng has played a much more visible role as China's "first lady" compared to her predecessors; for example, Peng hosted U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama on her high-profile visit to China in March 2014.<ref name="beech2">{{cite news|url=http://time.com/33164/michelle-obama-china-beijing-peng-liyuan/|title=Michelle Obama Tours Beijing With China's First Lady|last1=Beech|first1=Hannah|date=21 March 2014|newspaper={{wipe|Time (magazine)}}|access-date=17 July 2014|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140626122108/http://time.com/33164/michelle-obama-china-beijing-peng-liyuan/|archive-date=26 June 2014}}</ref>

Xi and Peng have a daughter named Xi Mingze, who graduated from [[Organization:Harvard University|Harvard University]] in the spring of 2015. While at Harvard, she used a pseudonym and studied Psychology and English.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-did-chinas-first-daughter-find-in-america|title=What Did China's First Daughter Find in America?|last=Osnos|first=Evan|date=6 April 2015|magazine=The New Yorker|access-date=29 October 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181030035420/https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-did-chinas-first-daughter-find-in-america|archive-date=30 October 2018}}</ref> Xi's family has a home in Jade Spring Hill, a garden and residential area in north-western Beijing run by the CMC.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/hundreds-02202015111702.html|title=Beijing Police Detain Hundreds For Trying to Visit Chinese Leaders Over New Year|last=Qiao|first=Long|date=20 February 2015|publisher=Radio Free Asia|access-date=1 March 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180301164338/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/hundreds-02202015111702.html|archive-date=1 March 2018}}</ref>

In June 2012, ''{{wipe|Bloomberg News}}'' reported that members of Xi's extended family have substantial business interests, although there was no evidence he had intervened to assist them.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-29/xi-jinping-millionaire-relations-reveal-fortunes-of-elite.html|title=Xi Jinping Millionaire Relations Reveal Fortunes of Elite|last1=Bennett|first1=Amanda|date=29 June 2012|publisher={{wipe|Bloomberg News}}|access-date=11 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120704222305/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-29/xi-jinping-millionaire-relations-reveal-fortunes-of-elite.html|archive-date=4 July 2012|last2=Hirschberg|first2=Peter}}</ref> The ''Bloomberg'' website was blocked in mainland China in response to the article.<ref name="guardian296122">{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/29/china-bloomberg-xi-jinping|title=China blocks Bloomberg for exposing financial affairs of Xi Jinping's family|last=Branigan|first=Tania|date=29 June 2012|newspaper={{wipe|The Guardian}}|access-date=11 September 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131120041457/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/29/china-bloomberg-xi-jinping|archive-date=20 November 2013}}</ref> Since Xi embarked on an anti-corruption campaign, ''The New York Times'' reported members of his family were selling their corporate and real estate investments beginning in 2012.<ref name="nytimes3">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/world/asia/chinas-president-xi-jinping-investments.html|title=As China's Leader Fights Graft, His Relatives Shed Assets|last1=Forsythe|first1=Michael|date=17 June 2012|work={{wipe|The New York Times}}|access-date=16 July 2014|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140716105611/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/world/asia/chinas-president-xi-jinping-investments.html|archive-date=16 July 2014|url-access=registration}}</ref> Relatives of highly placed Chinese officials, including seven current and former senior leaders of the Politburo of the CCP, have been named in the [[Panama Papers]], including Deng Jiagui,<ref>
{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/04/the-panama-papers-are-super-awkward-for-beijing/|title=The Panama Papers are super awkward for Beijing|last1=Rauhala|first1=Emily|date=4 April 2016|newspaper={{wipe|The Washington Post}}|access-date=7 September 2019|url-status=live|url-access=limited|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160421044242/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/04/the-panama-papers-are-super-awkward-for-beijing/|archive-date=21 April 2016}}</ref> Xi's brother-in-law. Deng had two [[Finance:Shell corporation|shell companies]] in the British Virgin Islands while Xi was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, but they were dormant by the time Xi became general secretary of the CCP in November 2012.<ref name="MP2">{{cite news|url=http://www.marketplace.org/2016/04/04/world/xi-jinpings-family-linked-panama-papers|title=Xi Jinping's family linked to Panama Papers|last=Schmitz|first=Rob|date=4 April 2016|newspaper=Marketplace|access-date=6 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160407224017/http://www.marketplace.org/2016/04/04/world/xi-jinpings-family-linked-panama-papers|archive-date=7 April 2016}}</ref>

===Personality===
Peng described Xi as hardworking and down-to-earth: "When he comes home, I've never felt as if there's some leader in the house. In my eyes, he's just my husband."<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/leadership/html/6.stm|title=China's Leaders|publisher=BBC News|access-date=26 August 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130808233513/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/leadership/html/6.stm|archive-date=8 August 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1992, ''{{wipe|The Washington Post}}'' journalist Lena H. Sun had an interview with Xi, then CCP secretary of Fuzhou; Sun described Xi as considerably more at ease and confident than many officials his age, and said that he talked without consulting notes.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Sun |first=Lena H. |date=8 June 1992 |title=Post for a 'princeling' |newspaper={{wipe|The Washington Post}} |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/06/08/post-for-a-princeling/3acd443c-37e3-45ff-9103-3a9f8b0a64ea/ |access-date=12 June 2023}}</ref> He was described in a 2011 ''The Washington Post'' article by those who know him as "pragmatic, serious, cautious, hard-working, down to earth and low-key". He was described as a good hand at problem solving and "seemingly uninterested in the trappings of high office".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/xi-jinping-likely-chinas-next-leader-called-pragmatic-low-key/2011/08/15/gIQA5W83GJ_story.html|title=Xi Jinping, likely China's next leader, called pragmatic, low-key|last=Richburg|first=Keith B.|date=15 August 2011|newspaper={{wipe|The Washington Post}}|access-date=7 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191029173940/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/xi-jinping-likely-chinas-next-leader-called-pragmatic-low-key/2011/08/15/gIQA5W83GJ_story.html|archive-date=29 October 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Soccer===
Xi is an avid soccer fan.<ref name="soccer">{{cite web|url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202310/10/WS65250929a31090682a5e7bf1.html|title=Xi shows off his football skill|work=China Daily|date=2023-10-10}}</ref> According to reports, when working in Hebei, Xi often asked his friend Nie Weiping, a professional [[Software:Go (game)|Go]] player, for soccer tickets.  The two walked out of a match between Chinese national team and a team from UK because they disappointed at the performance of the Chinese team.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-10/11/content_18723212_6.htm|title=What saddens President Xi Jinping?|work=China Daily|date=2014-10-11}}</ref> During a visit to Ireland in 2012 as China's vice-president, Xi showcased his soccer technique at Croke Park.<ref name="soccer" /> In 2011, Xi outlined a vision to turn China from a footballing minnow to a soccer superpower. He outlined a three stage plan for the national team: to qualify for another World Cup, to host a World Cup and to win a World Cup.<ref name="foot">{{cite web|author1=Andrew McNicol|author2=Andrew Raine|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/07/china/xi-jinping-china-football-dream-fail-intl-hnk-dst/index.html|title=Xi Jinping wanted China to be a global soccer power. What went wrong?|work=CNN|date=2023-04-07}}</ref> In 2015, Xi approved China’s 50-point plan for the sport, which included including soccer in the national school curriculum and setting up 50,000 soccer schools in the country by 2025.<ref>{{cite web|author=Tariq Panja|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/29/sports/soccer/china-soccer.html|title=China's Soccer Experiment Was a Flop. Now It May Be Over.|work={{wipe|The New York Times}}|date=2023-03-29}}</ref> However, according to CNN, poor financial decisions and alleged high-level corruption coupled with a three-year pandemic have left the sport in tatters.<ref name="foot" /> In 2023, Xi said he is "not so sure" of the abilities of the national team.<ref>{{cite web|date=2023-11-19|work=Channel NewsAsia|url=https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/china-xi-not-so-sure-football-team-abilities-world-cup-3931906|title=Xi says 'not so sure' of Chinese football team's abilities}}</ref>

==Public life==
It is hard to gauge the opinion of the Chinese public on Xi, as no independent surveys exist in China and social media is heavily censored.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lin |first=Liza |date=13 October 2022 |title=Do Chinese People Like Xi Jinping? You Won't Find an Easy Answer Online |language=en-US |work={{wipe|The Wall Street Journal}} |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-do-chinese-people-think-of-xi-jinping-its-very-hard-to-tell-11665664627 |access-date=17 October 2022 |issn=0099-9660}}</ref> However, he is believed to be widely popular in the country.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Phillips |first=Tom |date=14 October 2017 |title=Chairman Xi crushes dissent but poor believe he's making China great |language=en-GB |work={{wipe|The Guardian}} |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/14/xi-jinping-crushes-dissent-but-making-china-great-again |url-status=live |access-date=26 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190826122356/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/14/xi-jinping-crushes-dissent-but-making-china-great-again |archive-date=26 August 2019 |issn=0029-7712}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Zhou |first1=Christina |last2=Mantesso |first2=Sean |date=6 March 2019 |title='No room for mercy in this system': Xi Jinping's rise from cave dweller to post-modern chairman |language=en-AU |work=ABC News (Australia) |publisher= |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-06/the-astonishing-rise-of-chinese-president-xi-jinping/10794486 |url-status=live |access-date=26 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190826051002/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-06/the-astonishing-rise-of-chinese-president-xi-jinping/10794486 |archive-date=26 August 2019}}</ref> According to a 2014 poll co-sponsored by the Harvard Kennedy School's Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Xi ranked 9 out of 10 in domestic approval ratings.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-worlds-most-popular-leader-chinas-president-xi/|title=The World's Most Popular Leader: China's President Xi|last=Tiezzi|first=Shannon|date=20 December 2014|newspaper=The Diplomat|language=en-US|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191027062238/https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-worlds-most-popular-leader-chinas-president-xi/|archive-date=27 October 2019|access-date=27 October 2019}}</ref> A YouGov poll released in July 2019 found that about 22% of people in mainland China list Xi as the person they admire the most, a plurality, although this figure was less than 5% for residents of [[Place:Hong Kong|Hong Kong]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://today.yougov.com/topics/international/articles-reports/2019/07/18/2019-worlds-most-admired|title=Michelle Obama is the world's most admired woman|last=Smith|first=Matthew|date=18 July 2019|website=YouGov|language=en-us|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190729151150/https://today.yougov.com/topics/international/articles-reports/2019/07/18/2019-worlds-most-admired|archive-date=29 July 2019|access-date=17 August 2019}}</ref> In the spring of 2019, the Pew Research Center made a survey on confidence on Xi Jinping among six-country medians based on Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines and South Korea, which indicated that a median 29% have confidence in Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs, meanwhile a median of 45% have no confidence; these numbers are slightly higher than those of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (23% confidence, 53% no confidence).<ref>{{cite news |last1=Silver |first1=Laura |last2=Devlin |first2=Kat |last3=Huang |first3=Christine |date=5 December 2019 |title=China's Economic Growth Mostly Welcomed in Emerging Markets, but Neighbors Wary of Its Influence |publisher=Pew Research Center |url=https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/12/05/chinas-economic-growth-mostly-welcomed-in-emerging-markets-but-neighbors-wary-of-its-influence/ |access-date=4 August 2020}}</ref> A poll by Politico and Morning Consult in 2021 found that 5% of Americans have a favorable opinion of Xi, 38% unfavorable, 17% no opinion and 40%, a plurality, never hearing of him.<ref>{{Cite web |date=19–22 March 2021 |title=National Tracking Poll #2103129 |url=https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000178-6298-d5c9-ab7c-e79a8aa50000 |access-date=29 August 2022 |website=Morning Consult and Politico}}</ref>

In 2017, ''The Economist'' named him the most powerful person in the world.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/10/14/xi-jinping-has-more-clout-than-donald-trump-the-world-should-be-wary|title=Xi Jinping has more clout than Donald Trump. The world should be wary|date=14 October 2017|newspaper=[[Finance:The Economist|The Economist]]|access-date=11 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190918133802/https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/10/14/xi-jinping-has-more-clout-than-donald-trump-the-world-should-be-wary|archive-date=18 September 2019|issn=0013-0613|url-access=subscription}}</ref> In 2018, ''{{wipe|Forbes}}'' ranked him as the most powerful and influential person in the world, replacing Russian President Vladimir Putin, who had been ranked so for five consecutive years.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidewalt/2018/05/08/the-worlds-most-powerful-people-2018/#7e7884216c47|title=The World's Most Powerful People 2018|last1=Ewalt|first1=David M.|date=31 May 2018|work={{wipe|Forbes}}|access-date=7 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180509222602/https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidewalt/2018/05/08/the-worlds-most-powerful-people-2018/#7e7884216c47|archive-date=9 May 2018|author-link=David McWalter}}</ref> Since 2013, Reporters Without Borders, an international non-profit and non-governmental organization with the stated aim of safeguarding the right to freedom of information, included Xi among the list of press freedom predators.<ref>{{cite web |author= |date=17 November 2016 |title=Xi Jinping |url=https://rsf.org/en/predator/xi-jinping |access-date=1 November 2021 |website=Reporters Without Borders |publisher=}}</ref>

Unlike previous Chinese leaders, Chinese state media has given a more encompassing view of Xi's private life, although still strictly controlled. According to Xinhua News Agency, Xi would swim one kilometer and walk every day as long as there was time, and is interested in foreign writers, especially Russian.<ref name="Blachard-2017" /> He is known to love films and TV shows such as ''Saving Private Ryan'', ''The Departed,'' ''The Godfather'' and ''Game of Thrones,''<ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=8 February 2012 |title=China leader-in-waiting carries heavy political baggage to U.S. |language=en |work={{wipe|Reuters}} |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-xi-idUSTRE8170FZ20120208 |access-date=29 August 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=15 November 2013 |title=Xi, in 'Godfather' Mold, Looks Assertive and Even Imperial |url=https://archive.nytimes.com/sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/xi-in-godfather-mold-looks-assertive-and-even-imperial/ |access-date=29 August 2022 |website={{wipe|The New York Times}} |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |date=28 April 2019 |title=Xi Jinping shows his love of Game of Thrones but warns reality must not mirror fantasy |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3007991/xi-jinping-shows-his-love-game-thrones-warns-reality-must-not |url-status=live |access-date=5 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190505041030/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3007991/xi-jinping-shows-his-love-game-thrones-warns-reality-must-not |archive-date=5 May 2019}}</ref> also praising the independent film-maker Jia Zhangke.<ref>{{cite news |last=Branigan |first=Tania |date=13 February 2012 |title=The Guardian profile: Xi Jinping |newspaper={{wipe|The Guardian}} |location=UK |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/13/xi-jinping-profile-china |url-status=live |access-date=14 February 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131106055944/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/13/xi-jinping-profile-china |archive-date=6 November 2013}}</ref> The Chinese state media has also cast him as a fatherly figure and a man of the people, determined to stand up for Chinese interests.<ref name="Myers-2018" />

==Honors==
{| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align:center;"
! colspan="2" width="350px" |Decoration
! width="100px" |Country/Organisation
! width="100px" |Date
! width="300px" |Note
! class="unsortable" |{{Tooltip|Ref.|Reference(s)}}
|-
|[[File:Gold.Olimpicorder1.png|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|The Golden Olympic Order
|{{Flag|International Olympic Committee}}
|19 November 2013
|The highest award of the Olympic movement
|<ref name="China-Consulate-SF-2013">{{cite web |date=23 November 2013 |title=Xi Jinping Meets with International Olympic Committee President Thomas Bach and Receives the Olympic Order in Gold |url=http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/zgxw/t1101193.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304091315/http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/zgxw/t1101193.htm |archive-date=4 March 2016 |access-date=7 September 2019 |publisher=Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in San Francisco}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:BEL - Order of Leopold - Grand Cordon bar.svg|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Grand Cordon of the Order of Leopold
|{{Flag|Belgium}}
|30 March 2014
|The highest order of Belgium
|<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/china-belgium.uml/|title=China's Xi receives royal welcome in Belgium before EU talks|website=EUbusiness}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:VEN Order of the Liberator - Grand Cordon BAR.png|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Grand Cordon of the Order of the Liberator
|{{Flag|Venezuela}}
|20 July 2014
|The highest order of Venezuela
|<ref>{{cite web |title=Xi Jinping Receives the Order of the Liberator from Venezuela |url=https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpzxcxjzgjldrdlchwdbxagtwnrlgbjxgsfwbcxzlldrhw/t1177105.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200727231159/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpzxcxjzgjldrdlchwdbxagtwnrlgbjxgsfwbcxzlldrhw/t1177105.shtml |archive-date=27 July 2020 |access-date=25 June 2020 |website=fmprc.gov.cn}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:Ribbon jose marti.png|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Order of José Martí
|{{Flag|Cuba}}
|22 July 2014
|Order of Cuba
|<ref>{{cite web |title=Xi Jinping Receives Order of José Marti of Cuba |url=https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpzxcxjzgjldrdlchwdbxagtwnrlgbjxgsfwbcxzlldrhw/t1177769.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200728011327/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpzxcxjzgjldrdlchwdbxagtwnrlgbjxgsfwbcxzlldrhw/t1177769.shtml |archive-date=28 July 2020 |access-date=25 June 2020 |website=fmprc.gov.cn}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:Order of Pakistan.png|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Nishan-e-Pakistan
|{{flag|Pakistan}}
|21 April 2015
|The highest civilian award of Pakistan
|<ref>{{cite web |date=21 April 2015 |title=Pakistan confers Nishan-e-Pakistan on Chinese president Xi Jinping |url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/pakistan-confers-nishan-e-pakistan-on-chinese-president-xi-jinping/story-sxPOPMRJNTQCNu3hIYX8nK.html |access-date=25 June 2020 |website=Hindustan Times |language=en}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:Order of King Abdulaziz, 1st Class (Saudi Arabia).png|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Order of Abdulaziz al Saud
|{{flag|Saudi Arabia}}
|19 January 2016
|Saudi Arabian order of merit
|<ref>{{cite web |title=Xi Jinping Holds Talks with King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia Two Heads of State Jointly Announce Establishment of China-Saudi Arabia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership |url=https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdstajyljxgsfw/t1333527.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190616192336/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdstajyljxgsfw/t1333527.shtml |archive-date=16 June 2019 |access-date=25 June 2020 |website=fmprc.gov.cn}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:Orden Republike Srbije.gif|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Collar of the Order of the Republic of Serbia
|{{flag|Serbia}}
|18 June 2016
|The highest state order of Serbia
|<ref>{{cite news |date=18 June 2016 |title=Chinese president receives Order of Republic of Serbia |newspaper=B92 |url=http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2016&mm=06&dd=18&nav_id=98363 |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190616192355/https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2016&mm=06&dd=18&nav_id=98363 |archive-date=16 June 2019}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:Noribbon.svg|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Order for Promotion of Peace and Friendship
|{{flag|Belarus}}
|29 September 2016
|Order of Belarus
|<ref>{{cite news |date=9 September 2016 |title=Lukashenko awards Order for Strengthening Peace and Friendship to Xi Jinping |publisher=Belarusian Telegraph Agency |url=http://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-awards-order-for-strengthening-peace-and-friendship-to-xi-jinping-94925-2016/ |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612193511/http://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-awards-order-for-strengthening-peace-and-friendship-to-xi-jinping-94925-2016/ |archive-date=12 June 2018}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:Medalla de Honor del Congreso (Peru) - ribbon bar.png|frameless|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Grand Cross Medal of Honor
|{{flag|Peru}}
|21 November 2016
|Medal of Peru
|<ref>{{Cite web |date=22 November 2016 |title=Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech at Peruvian Congress |url=https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/XJPDEGDEBLZLJXGSFWBCXZBLLMJXDYTJHZZDESSCLDRFZSHY/t1418209.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211123204621/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/XJPDEGDEBLZLJXGSFWBCXZBLLMJXDYTJHZZDESSCLDRFZSHY/t1418209.shtml |archive-date=23 November 2021 |access-date= |publisher=Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China |quote=Luz Salgado welcomed Xi Jinping's visit to the Congress and conferred Xi Jinping the Grand-Cross Medal of Honor, the highest level of honor of the Peruvian Congress.}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:OOSA.jpg|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Order of Saint Andrew
|{{Flag|Russia}}
|3 July 2017
|The highest order of Russia
|<ref>{{cite web |date=4 July 2017 |title=Presenting the Order of St Andrew the Apostle to President of China Xi Jinping |url=http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54973 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190811022033/http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54973 |archive-date=11 August 2019 |access-date=7 September 2019 |publisher=The Kremlin}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:Grand Collar of the Order of the State of Palestine ribbon.svg|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Grand Collar of the State of Palestine
|{{flag|Palestine}}
|18 July 2017
|The highest civilian order of Palestine
|<ref>{{Cite news |date=10 February 2018 |title=PM Modi conferred 'Grand Collar of the State of Palestine |language=en |newspaper=The Times of India |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pm-modi-conferred-grand-collar-of-the-state-of-palestine/articleshow/62862222.cms |url-status=live |access-date=18 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180614192605/https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pm-modi-conferred-grand-collar-of-the-state-of-palestine/articleshow/62862222.cms |archive-date=14 June 2018}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:Ribbon bar of the Order of Zayed.svg|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Order of Zayed
|{{Flag|United Arab Emirates}}
|20 July 2018
|The highest civilian decoration of the United Arab Emirates
|<ref name="UAE Order of Zayed2">{{cite news |last1=Dennehy |first1=John |date=20 July 2018 |title=China visit: UAE leadership strikes strategic deals with Xi Jinping |work=The National |url=https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/china-visit-uae-leadership-strikes-strategic-deals-with-xi-jinping-1.752319 |url-status=live |access-date=22 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180722070115/https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/china-visit-uae-leadership-strikes-strategic-deals-with-xi-jinping-1.752319 |archive-date=22 July 2018}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:SEN_Order_of_the_Lion_-_Grand_Cross_BAR.svg|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Grand Cross of the Order of the Lion
|{{Flag|Senegal}}
|29 July 2018
|Order of Senegal
|<ref>{{cite news |title=Wang Yi Talks About President Xi Jinping's Asian and African Visits: Good Friends Feel Close to Each Other Even When They are Thousands of Miles Away |work=mfa.gov.cn |url=https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cgmb/eng/zgyw/t1581639.htm |access-date=1 June 2022}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:ARG Order of the Liberator San Martin - Grand Cross BAR.svg|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Collar of the Order of the Liberator General San Martin
|{{Flag|Argentina}}
|2 December 2018
|Order of Argentina
|<ref>{{cite news |title=El Gobierno condecoró a Xi Jinping con la Orden del Libertador San Martín |work=infobae |url=https://www.infobae.com/politica/2019/05/02/el-gobierno-condecoro-a-xi-jinping-con-la-orden-del-libertador-san-martin/ |access-date=25 May 2021}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:KRG Order Manas.png|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Order of Manas
|{{Flag|Kyrgyzstan}}
|13 June 2019
|The highest order of Kyrgyzstan
|<ref>{{Cite web |date=13 June 2019 |title=Xi Jinping Attends a Ceremony and Receives the Manas Order of the First Degree Awarded by President Sooronbay Jeenbekov of Kyrgyzstan |url=https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1672738.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211123205630/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1672738.shtml |archive-date=23 November 2021 |access-date= |publisher=Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China |quote=Sooronbay Jeenbekov awarded Xi Jinping the Manas Order of the First Degree. The Manas Order is the highest national prize of Kyrgyzstan awarded by Kyrgyz President and has three degrees, of which the first degree is the highest one.}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:TJ Zarrintoch rib.png|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Order of the Crown
|{{Flag|Tajikistan}}
|15 June 2019
|Order of Tajikistan
|<ref>{{Cite news |date=15 June 2019 |script-title=ru:Си Цзиньпин награждён высшим орденом Таджикистана |language=ru |trans-title=Xi Jinping awarded the highest order of Tajikistan |newspaper=NEWSru |url=https://news.ru/world/si-czinpin-nagrazhdyon-vysshim-ordenom-tadzhikistana/ |url-status=live |access-date=5 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190905163817/https://news.ru/world/si-czinpin-nagrazhdyon-vysshim-ordenom-tadzhikistana/ |archive-date=5 September 2019}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:AltynKiran_1.png|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Order of the Golden Eagle
|{{Flag|Kazakhstan}}
|14 September 2022
|The highest order of Kazakhstan
|<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202209/t20220915_10766193.html|title=President Xi Jinping receives Order of the Golden Eagle Awarded by President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev|newspaper=Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China|date=15 September 2022|access-date=15 September 2022}}</ref>
|-
|[[File:Dustlik_rib.png|85x85px|class=noviewer]]
|Order of Friendship
|{{Flag|Uzbekistan}}
|15 September 2022
|State award of Uzbekistan
|<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202209/t20220915_10766660.html|title=President Xi Jinping Accepts the Order of Friendship Conferred by Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev|newspaper=Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China|date=15 September 2022|access-date=16 September 2022}}</ref>

|-
|
|Order of South Africa
|{{Flag|South Africa}}
|22 August 2023
|State award of South Africa
|<ref>{{Cite news |last=Khoza |first=Amanda |date=22 August 2023 |title=Ramaphosa honours Chinese President Xi Jinping with Order of SA for his 'principled commitment' |work=TimesLIVE |url=https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2023-08-22-ramaphosa-honours-chinese-president-xi-jinping-with-order-of-sa-for-his-principled-commitment/ |access-date=22 August 2023}}</ref>
|}

=== Key to the City ===
Xi holds a "key to the city", an honor granted to attending guests to symbolize their significance, in:

* {{flagdeco|US}}{{flagicon|Iowa}} Muscatine, Iowa, United States (26 April 1985)<ref name="National Public Radio2">{{cite news|url=https://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/146888717/iowa-a-top-destination-for-chinas-vice-president/|title=A Familiar Face Back in Iowa: China's Vice President|date=14 February 2012|publisher=NPR|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190714065854/https://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/146888717/iowa-a-top-destination-for-chinas-vice-president|archive-date=14 July 2019|access-date=7 September 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17022158|title=The early adventures of Xi Jinping|last=Dailey|first=Kate|date=15 February 2012|publisher=BBC News|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190331084433/https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17022158|archive-date=31 March 2019|access-date=7 September 2019}}</ref>
* {{flagdeco|JAM}} Montego Bay, Jamaica (13 February 2009)<ref name="JIS-2009" />
* {{flagdeco|US}}{{flagdeco|Iowa}} Muscatine, Iowa, United States (14 February 2012)<ref name="National Public Radio2" />
* {{flagdeco|CRI}}{{flagu|San José, Costa Rica}} (3 June 2013)<ref>{{cite web |title=Xi Jinping recibe las llaves de la ciudad de San José – Vídeo Dailymotion|url=https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2gvr3u|access-date=4 May 2021|website=Dailymotion|date=10 February 2015|language=es-ES}}</ref>
* {{flagdeco|MEX}}{{flagu|Mexico City}}, Mexico (5 June 2013)<ref>{{cite news |title=Mancera entrega llaves de la ciudad a Xi Jinping|url=https://www.informador.mx/Mexico/Mancera-entrega-llaves-de-la-ciudad-a-Xi-Jinping-20130605-0053.html|access-date=4 May 2021|website=El Informador |language=es-ES}}</ref>
* {{flagdeco|ARG}}{{flagu|Buenos Aires}}, Argentina (19 July 2014)<ref>{{cite web|title=Xi Jinping Recibió Llaves de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires|url=http://co.china-embassy.org/esp/xwrd/t1176588.htm|access-date=4 May 2021|website=co.china-embassy.org}}</ref>
*{{flagdeco|CZE}}{{flagu|Prague}}, Czech Republic (29 March 2016)<ref>{{cite news |title=President Xi Jinping presented with 'key to Prague,' continuing the 'freedom of the city' tradition|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/china-watch/politics/12208417/Xi-Jinping-key-to-prague.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/china-watch/politics/12208417/Xi-Jinping-key-to-prague.html |archive-date=10 January 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|access-date=8 May 2021|website=The Daily Telegraph}} </ref>
* {{flagdeco|ESP}}{{flagicon|City of Madrid}} [[Place:Madrid|Madrid]], Spain (28 November 2018)<ref>{{cite web|title=Xi Jinping recibe la llave de Madrid, ciudad que considera "inolvidable"|url=https://www.efe.com/efe/espana/gente/xi-jinping-recibe-la-llave-de-madrid-ciudad-que-considera-inolvidable/10007-3826710|access-date=4 May 2021|website=efe.com|language=es}}</ref>

===Honorary doctorates===
* {{flagdeco|Kazakhstan}} [[Organization:Nazarbayev University|Nazarbayev University]] (7 September 2013)<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisitcenterasia/2013-09/08/content_16952228_2.htm|title=Xi proposes a 'new Silk Road' with Central Asia|first1=Jiao|last1=Wu|first2=Zhang|last2=Yunbi|date=2013-09-08|newspaper=China Daily|access-date=2022-12-09}}</ref>
* {{flagdeco|South Africa}} University of Johannesburg (11 April 2019)<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.uj.ac.za/news/uj-acknowledges-chinese-president-xi-jinpings-role-in-advancing-the-fourth-industrial-revolution-with-honorary-doctoral-degree/|title=UJ acknowledges Chinese President Xi Jinping's role in advancing the Fourth Industrial Revolution with honorary doctoral degree|newspaper=University of Johannesburg|date=2019-04-11|access-date=2022-12-09}}</ref>
* {{flagdeco|Russia}} Saint Petersburg State University (6 June 2019)<ref>{{cite web|url=https://tass.com/society/1062416|title=China's Xi awarded Dr. h.c. degree of St. Petersburg State University|date=2019-06-07|newspaper=TASS|access-date=2022-12-09}}</ref>
* {{flagdeco|Saudi Arabia}} King Saud University (8 December 2022)<ref>{{Cite news |date=9 December 2022 |title=Xi receives honorary doctorate from King Saud University |work=China Daily |url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202212/09/WS63926cdca31057c47eba379c.html |access-date=9 December 2022}}</ref>

==Works==
* {{cite book |last=Xi |first=Jinping |author-mask= |title=Theory and Practice on Modern Agriculture |volume= |year=1999 |publisher=Fujian Education Press |location=Fuzhou |isbn=}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=A Tentative Study on China's Rural Marketization|volume=|year=2001|publisher=Tsinghua University (Doctoral Dissertation)|location=Beijing|isbn= |url=https://qiwen.lu/uploads/xilunwen.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130117082909/https://qiwen.lu/uploads/xilunwen.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=17 January 2013}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=Zhijiang Xinyu|volume=|year=2007|publisher=Zhengjiang People's Publishing House|location=Hangzhou|isbn=9787213035081}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=The Governance of China|volume=I|year=2014|publisher=Foreign Languages Press|location=Beijing|isbn=9787119090573}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=General Secretary Xi Jinping important speech series|volume=I|year=2014|publisher=People's Publishing House & Study Publishing House|location=Beijing|isbn=9787119090573}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=General Secretary Xi Jinping important speech series|volume=II|year=2016|publisher=People's Publishing House & Study Publishing House|location=Beijing|isbn=9787514706284}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=The Governance of China|volume=II|year=2017|publisher=Foreign Languages Press|location=Beijing|isbn=9787119111643 }}
* {{cite book |last=Xi |first=Jinping |author-mask= |title=Quotations from Chairman Xi Jinping |volume= |year=2018 |publisher=Some units of the PLA |location= |isbn=}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=The Belt And Road Initiative|volume=|year=2019|publisher=Foreign Languages Press|location=Beijing|isbn=978-7119119960 }}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=The Governance of China|volume=III|year=2020|publisher=Foreign Languages Press|location=Beijing|isbn=9787119124117 }}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=On Propaganda and Ideological Work of Communist Party|volume=|year=2020|publisher=Central Party Literature Press|location=Beijing|isbn=9787507347791}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=On History of the Communist Party of China|volume=|year=2021|publisher=Central Party Literature Press|location=Beijing|isbn=9787507348033}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=The Governance of China|volume=IV|year=2022|publisher=Foreign Languages Press|location=Beijing|isbn=9787119130941 }}

==Notes==
{{notelist}}

==References==
===Citations===
{{Reflist}}

===Works cited===
{{refbegin|40em}}
* {{Cite book|title=China's Management Revolution: Spirit, Land, Energy|last=Bouée|first=Charles-Edouard|publisher=[[Company:Palgrave Macmillan|Palgrave Macmillan]]|year=2010|isbn=978-0-230-28545-3|}}
* {{cite book|title=China's Emerging Technological Edge: Assessing the Role of High-End Talent|last1=Simon|first1=Denis Fred|last2=Cong|first2=Cao|year=2009|publisher={{wipe|Cambridge University Press}}|isbn=978-0-521-88513-3}}
* {{cite book|title=Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression?|last=Lam|first=Willy|year=2015|publisher=[[Company:Routledge|Routledge]]|isbn=978-0765642097|}}
* {{Cite book|title=China's Political System|last=Heilmann|first=Sebastian|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|year=2017|isbn=978-1442277342|}}
* {{Cite book|title=Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping|last=Bougon|first=François|year=2018|publisher=C. Hurst & Co.|isbn=9781849049849}}
* {{cite book|title=Handbook of the Politics of China|last=Goodman|first=David S. G.|year=2015|publisher=Edward Elga|isbn=9781782544371|}}
* {{cite book|title=The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State|last=Economy|first=Elizabeth C.|year=2018|publisher=[[Organization:Oxford University Press|Oxford University Press]]|isbn=9780190866075|}}
* {{cite book |title=CPC Futures: The New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics |date=2022 |publisher=National University of Singapore Press |isbn=9789811852060 |location=Singapore |doi=10.56159/eai.52060 |oclc=1354535847 |doi-access=free|editor-last1=Pieke |editor-last2=Hofman |editor-first1=Frank N. |editor-first2=Bert |editor1-link=Frank N. Pieke}}
* {{cite book |title=Party of One: The Rise of Xi Jinping and China's Superpower Future |date=2023 |publisher=Simon & Schuster |isbn=9781982185732 |pages=48 |last=Wong|first=Chun Han}}

{{refend}}

==Further reading==
{{refbegin|30em}}
* {{cite journal|last1=Bulman|first1=David J.|last2=A. Jaros|first2=Kyle|title=Localism in retreat? Central-provincial relations in the Xi Jinping era|journal=Journal of Contemporary China|date=2021|volume=30|issue=131|pages=697–716|doi=10.1080/10670564.2021.1889228|s2cid=233928573|ref=none}}
* {{cite journal|last=Denton|first=Kirk|title=China Dreams and the 'Road to Revival|journal=Current Events in Historical Perspective|url=http://origins.osu.edu/article/china-dreams-and-road-revival|volume=8|date=2014|issue=3|pages=–1–12|ref=none}} 
* {{cite journal|last=Economy|first=Elizabeth C.|title=China's New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping|url=http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/2018_MayJune_ForeignAffairs_ChinasNewRevolution.pdf|journal=Foreign Affairs|volume=97|date=2018|pages=60|ref=none}}
* {{cite journal|last1=Foot|first1=Rosemary|first2=Amy|last2=King|title=Assessing the deterioration in China–US relations: US governmental perspectives on the economic-security nexus|journal=China International Strategy Review|year=2019|volume=1|pages=1–12 |doi=10.1007/s42533-019-00005-y|s2cid=195241090|ref=none |doi-access=free}}
* {{cite journal |last=Cabestan |first=Jean-Pierre |title=China's foreign and security policy institutions and decision-making under Xi Jinping |journal=British Journal of Politics and International Relations |year=2020 |page=1369148120974881|ref=none}}
* {{cite journal|last1=Dhar |first1=Bablu Kumar |last2=Mahazan |first2=Mutalib |title=Leadership of Xi Jinping behind Unstoppable Sustainable Economic Growth of China |journal=International Journal of Organizational Leadership |volume=9 |year=2020 |pages=39–47 |url=https://ijol.cikd.ca/article_60489_172f6b43f678a11b44043906eaafc1bc.pdf |ref=none}} 
* {{cite journal|last=Goldstein |first=Avery |title=China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance |journal=International Security |volume=45 |issue=1  |year=2020 |pages=164–201 |doi=10.1162/isec_a_00383 |s2cid=220633947 |url=https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/45/1/164/1860463/isec_a_00383.pdf|ref=none}}
* {{cite news |last=Johnson |first=Ian |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/world/asia/aiming-for-top-xi-jinping-forged-ties-early-in-china.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120930091232/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/world/asia/aiming-for-top-xi-jinping-forged-ties-early-in-china.html |archive-date=30 September 2012 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |title=Changing of the Guard: Elite and Deft, Xi Aimed High Early in China |date=29 September 2012 |work=The New York Times|ref=none}}
* {{cite book |last=McGregor |first=Richard |title=Xi Jinping: The Backlash |publisher=Penguin Books Australia |year=2019 |isbn=978-1760893040 |ref=none}}
** includes McGregor, Richard. "Xi Jinping's Quest to Dominate China." ''Foreign Affairs'' 98 (Sept 2019): 18+.
* Magnus, George. ''Red Flags: Why Xi's China is in Danger'' (Yale UP, 2018). 
* {{Cite book|last=Li|first=Cheng|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3NKACwAAQBAJ|title=Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership|date=2016|publisher=Brookings Institution Press|isbn=978-0-8157-2694-4|language=en}}
* {{cite journal |last=Mulvad |first=Andreas Møller |title=Xiism as a hegemonic project in the making: Sino-communist ideology and the political economy of China's rise |journal=Review of International Studies |volume=45 |issue=3 |year=2019 |pages=449–470|doi=10.1017/S0260210518000530 |s2cid=150473371 |ref=none}}
* {{cite news |last=Osnos |first=Evan |url=http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2012/02/chinas-valentines-day-in-washington.html |title=China's Valentine's Day in Washington |magazine=The New Yorker |date=14 February 2012|ref=none}} Review of comment accompanying Xi's visit.
* {{cite news|last=Osnos |first=Evan |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red |title=Born Red: How Xi Jinping, an unremarkable provincial administrator, became China's most authoritarian leader since Mao |magazine=The New Yorker |date=30 March 2015|ref=none}} Describes Xi Jinping's life.
* Osnos, Evan, "China's Age of Malaise: Facing a grim economy, disillusioned youth, and fleeing entrepreneurs, Xi Jinping turns to the past," ''The New Yorker'', 30 October 2023, pp. 34–45. "Xi [...] has abandoned Deng [Xiaoping]'s 'courageous experiments' and ushered [China] into a straitened new age." (p. 34.) "Year by year, Xi appears more at home in the world of the man he calls his 'best and closest friend,' Vladimir Putin." (p. 36.) "Can Xi's China still manage the pairing of [[Social:Autocracy|autocracy]] and [[Philosophy:Capitalism|capitalism]]?" (p. 37.) "At his core, a longtime observer told me, Xi is 'Mao with money.'" (p. 38.) "Xi [has] got[ten] rid of anyone with power, [an] entrepreneur said: 'If you have influence, you have power. If you have capital, you have power.'" (p. 40.) 
* {{cite journal|last=Smith|first=Stephen N.|title=Harmonizing the periphery: China's neighborhood strategy under Xi Jinping|journal=Pacific Review|volume=34|date=2021|issue=1|pages=56–84|doi=10.1080/09512748.2019.1651383|s2cid=202329851|ref=none}}
* {{cite journal |last=Vogel |first=Ezra |title=The Leadership of Xi Jinping: A Dengist Perspective |journal=Journal of Contemporary China |year=2021 |volume=30 |issue=131 |pages=693–696|doi=10.1080/10670564.2021.1884955 |ref=none|doi-access=free }}
* {{cite journal |last=Zhang |first=Feng |title=The Xi Jinping Doctrine of China's International Relations |journal=Asia Policy |volume=14 |issue=3 |year=2019 |url=https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P4-2275866529/the-xi-jinping-doctrine-of-china-s-international-relations |ref=none}}
{{refend}}

==External links==

{{Library resources box}}
* [http://www.chinavitae.com/biography_display.php?id=303 Biography] at Chinavitae.com
* {{C-SPAN|1028978}}
* [http://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/xi-jinping/ Xi Jinping] collected news and commentary at the China Digital Times
* {{Guardian topic}}
* {{NYTtopic|people/x/xi_jinping}}
* [https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01nnw8l Xi Jinping 2012 profile] on BBC Radio Four

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{{s-ttl|title=CCP Committee Secretary of [[Place:Shanghai|Shanghai]]|years=2007}}
{{s-aft|after=Yu Zhengsheng}}
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{{s-ttl|title=First Secretary of the CCP Secretariat|years=2007–2012}}
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{{s-ttl|title=Director of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission|years=2013–present}}
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{{s-ttl|title=Director of the Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission|years=2013–present}}
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{{s-ttl|title=Chairman of the Central National Security Commission|years=2014–present}}
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{{s-ttl|title=Chairperson of APEC|years=2014}}
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{{s-ttl|title=Chairperson of the [[Organization:G20|Group of 20]]|years=2016}}
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{{s-ttl|title=Supreme Commander of the People's Liberation Army|years=2016–present}}
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[[Category:Critics of religions]]

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